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 I 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains two lines of research.  The first applies the strategic decision-making 
theory of the firm to the issue of corporate governance.  We find that preferences vary over 
strategy but not all interests are currently being represented, resulting in a failure to govern in 
the public interest.  As solutions, we consider membership of the company and also more 
immediate ways forward, focusing on regulation and democratically controlled public 
agencies, but stressing the fundamental significance of active, effective citizens.   Throughout, 
our arguments are illustrated using utility companies as our primary examples.  It includes 
discussion of electricity privatisation in Mexico and, to demonstrate that the theory is widely 
applicable, we also consider governance of corporate universities.  The second line of 
research builds upon earlier analysis by considering aspects of British electricity privatisation.  
We consider the role of independent power producers, finding that they have not significantly 
increased competition as intended but have adversely affected the future viability of the 
system.  The affect of privatisation on electricity prices is also considered via the use of a 
counterfactual model for continued state ownership.  Observed prices are found to have been 
significantly higher than those that would have been charged had the industry remained in the 
public sector. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
I. CONTEXT, MOTIVATION AND FOCUS 
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) first introduced the possibility of US corporations being 
controlled by their management, there has been much attention focussed on how 
corporations are governed, and by whom.   This debate has recently been given fresh 
impetus by the collapse of the giant US based transnational energy corporation, Enron, amid 
a web of accounting irregularities, fraud and dubious business practices on a massive scale.
1
  
These events prompted serious questions as to how shareholders had been blind toward, and 
powerless to prevent, the managers of their corporation from pursuing such questionable and 
illegal policies that had such disastrous effects.  Moreover, such interest in governance was 
further fuelled by subsequent revelations of more cases of fraud and/or accounting 
irregularities within the US corporate sector, as companies such as Worldcom,
2
 Qwest,
3
 
Tyco
4
 and Xerox
5
 also admitted to wrong doing.   The issue of corporate control has 
therefore been brought back onto the main agenda, both in the USA and elsewhere. 
 
The US and UK response to these corporate scandals seems to have focussed on 
shareholders being wronged by the criminal or otherwise dubious activities of the 
managers/directors of the various companies, and thus what might be done to prevent such 
actions in the future.   Such a shareholder focus implicitly suggests that governance of 
corporations is only (or at least mainly) about the relationship between shareholders and 
managers.  However, we would take issue with this, as we would suggest (and will later 
argue) that governance should not be limited to the relationship between these two groups, 
                                                 
1
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2517389.stm (accessed on 3
rd
 December 2002). 
2
 See  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2407991.stm  (accessed on 3
rd
 December 2002). 
3
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2275318.stm (accessed on 3
rd
 December 2002). 
4
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2254125.stm (accessed on 3
rd
 December 2002). 
 3 
but should instead be concerned about all of those groups who have an interest in the 
activities of a particular corporation.   Only when all groups have the ability to assert 
influence on governance, can outcomes be framed as truly representing the ‘public interest’, 
which we would argue must be the goal of any democratic society. 
 
It is therefore our intention to conceptually, theoretically and empirically re-visit the issue of 
governance, examining not only the debate as to who actually controls the modern 
corporation, but also the possible implications of this control configuration and therefore the 
potential policy responses required if the public interest is to be achieved.    
 
A second, but related, line of research has also been pursued: that on privatisation  Whilst 
there is some tension between these two avenues, privatisation is fundamentally about 
governance since it is the transfer of activities from the public sector into the private sector, 
and therefore from public to private control.  Moreover, privatisation is a process during 
which many changes often occur, and therefore it presents a natural opportunity in which to 
make the fundamental governance changes that our work on the public interest suggests may 
be required. 
 
It is often argued that the change in governance inherent to privatisation is needed in order to 
gain greater economic efficiency (because of the higher emphasis usually placed on profits 
by the private sector). However, our initial focus on governance of the modern corporation 
and the public interest considers a broader notion of efficiency, and therefore points to the 
possibility of ‘strategic failure’ within the governance of the modern corporation.  We would 
                                                                                                                                                       
5
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2277753.stm (accessed on 3
rd
  December 2002).   
 4 
therefore suggest that, privatisation via the simple transfer of assets into the private sector 
does nothing to address such concerns. Conversely, we submit that this need not be the case 
by presenting a practical illustration to demonstrate that privatisation, if implemented 
appropriately, does have the possibility to address both economic efficiency and broader 
concerns.  In doing so, lessons from existing privatisations (both on economic efficiency and 
on other aspects) need to be learned, and it is this that is the focus of the later analysis in the 
thesis. 
 
Our concern with governance of the modern corporation draws heavily upon the case of 
utility companies (especially electricity companies) in order to illustrate the ideas and 
concepts that we investigate.  Our discussions of some lessons to be learned from existing 
privatisation are therefore similarly based around the electricity industry, specifically the 
privatisation of the sector in Britain. 
  
II. ORGANISATION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
In order to pursue these arguments this thesis is split into two parts, each of which focuses on 
the different lines of research as mentioned above.  Part One, entitled ‘Public Interest 
Decision-Making’, uses the strategic decision-making perspective of the firm to focus 
attention on the governance of the modern corporation, within which our specific concern is 
the attainment of the ‘public interest’. 
 
Chapter One starts by introducing the notion of strategic decisions, and suggests that because 
these decisions determine a corporation’s broad direction, to control them is in essence to 
control the firm.  In light of this, control of the strategic decision-making process is then 
 5 
examined in a review of corporate governance, in order to explore how control of the 
modern corporation is currently conceptualised in the world’s major economies.  We find 
that although there are significant differences within the corporate governance systems 
observed, the core result is the same; shareholder power rests with a relatively small group of 
shareholders.  Together with higher management and the board of directors, we suggest that 
they form an elite, a select few, who control the strategic decision-making process and 
therefore exercise control of the corporation. 
 
The significance of elite control is explored in Chapter Two, which uses the example of 
utility companies to illustrate this in a practical context.  We propose that preferences over 
potential strategic decisions vary between those who have an interest in the activities of a 
particular corporation.  This variation is then used to suggest that having control of the 
modern corporation in the hands of a subset of those who have an interest in its activities 
leads to decisions being taken in the interest of that elite, and thus perhaps not in the interests 
of the wider public; that decision-making is not taken in the public interest.  In light of this, 
we examine what measures might be taken in order to ensure that utility companies, and thus 
companies more generally, are controlled so as to serve the wider public interest.  We 
advocate that companies be controlled by their members, where members consist of all of 
those different groups who have a specific interest in the activities of a particular company.  
Practical and immediate ways forward are also addressed. 
 
To give an illustration of how such ideas of economic democracy might be implemented in 
practice, Chapter Three examines the topical case of electricity reform in Mexico.  After 
discussing why privatisation is a particularly attractive and likely option for a publicly 
 6 
owned electricity system in a ‘less-developed country’ such as Mexico, the chapter presents 
one possible avenue for privatisation which seeks to incorporate the aim of economic 
efficiency together with principles of democratic decision-making.   We suggest that 
Mexican pension funds have the potential to play a key role in such a process, although 
direct input from ordinary Mexican citizens via a variety of mechanisms and channels, is 
also required. 
 
Given the focus on utility companies in the preceding chapters, Chapter Four purposely 
digresses from this sector by considering corporate universities.  This is done in order to 
provide a significantly different illustration of the broadly applicable nature of our previous 
conclusions on governance and the public interest.  After initially discussing the issue of 
what constitutes a corporate university, we establish the possibility of elite control of such 
organisations and thus the affects this may have.  Drawing upon original telephone 
interviews, we conduct an investigation of the corporate universities of the FTSE 100 
companies in order to investigate how this theoretical possibility relates to reality.  Our 
findings suggest that British corporate universities are controlled by a subset of those with an 
interest in their activities and therefore that policies are needed to address this issue.  
 
Part Two of the thesis, entitled ‘British Electricity Privatisation’, concentrates on the 
reorganisation, privatisation and subsequent development of the British electricity sector.  In 
doing so, it aims to add to the debate on the success or failure of this particular privatisation 
process, firstly by considering the structure adopted and some of the subsequent changes this 
induced, and secondly by considering the issue of electricity prices.   
 
 7 
To this end, Chapter Five introduces the 1990 restructuring and privatisation of the 
electricity sector in Great Britain before considering the specific issue of the emergence of 
the so called  ‘independent power producers’ in the market of England and Wales.  The 
reason behind their emergence and the nature of these companies is addressed, as is their 
effect on the market for electricity. Original telephone interviews with those involved with 
the independent power producers are heavily utilised in order to provide fresh (and often 
unexpected) insight into these issues.  The evidence collected suggests that the independents 
have not done the job they were originally intended for, and that they have had a number of 
unforeseen consequences. 
 
Chapter Six considers the issue of electricity prices, suggesting that privatisation should not 
be regarded as a success simply because electricity prices have fallen in real terms, since 
other industry structures might have resulted in more significant price cuts.  The Chapter 
therefore develops a counterfactual scenario for the likely decision of a publicly owned 
industry in order to assess whether privatisation resulted in these price cuts or if they would 
have happened anyway.  This counterfactual is developed around the context of an identity 
that splits the price of electricity into three elements, and draws upon the previous work of 
Yarrow (1992), and Newbery and Pollitt (1997).   The conclusion is that observed electricity 
prices are significantly higher than would have been charged had the industry remained in 
public ownership.   Moreover, we find that domestic consumers are particularly 
disadvantaged when compared with industrial users, suggesting that it is domestic consumers 
who bear the biggest burden of privatisation. 
 
 8 
Finally, our concluding comments are then presented in the last Chapter.  A brief summary 
of the thesis is presented, where the key findings are highlighted and distilled in order to 
reach some conclusions on our central theme of governance.  The implications of the work 
contained herein are then discussed, together with suggestions for possible extensions or 
future research to be conducted. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
III.i Overview 
As Hussey and Hussey (1997, p.54) outline, “methodology refers to the overall approach to 
the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of 
data.” Furthermore, as Silverman (1993, p.2) suggests,  “like theories, methodology cannot 
be true or false, only more or less useful.”  The methodology utilised herein has therefore 
been chosen to closely reflect and facilitate the themes, aims, scope and motivations inherent 
to this thesis.  
 
To that end, the chosen methodology employed during the researching and writing of this 
thesis utilised most of the research techniques commonly used in the social sciences when 
conducting such research.  Specifically, we have used: literature searches (both academic 
and non-academic sources); telephone based interviews; data analysis; surveys of, and 
correspondence with, those involved in sectors of interest; and communication/dialogue with 
those with expertise in related fields.  Each of these techniques was chosen after careful 
thought and consideration in order to be the most appropriate for the issues in question.  In 
the majority (if not all) of cases, several methods were utilised during the investigation of 
particular issues in order to verify, support and give rise to robust findings. 
 9 
 
Throughout, the thesis utilises many actual company examples to illustrate the theory or idea 
being explained.  Some of these examples are relatively short in nature whilst others are 
addressed in much more detail, acting as recurring themes throughout the thesis and/or as in-
depth case studies.   Whilst in one sense the choice of the specific examples is somewhat 
arbitrary, generally reflecting our own research interests, they have also been chosen for 
their topicality, their scope to raise a variety of relevant issues, their relevance to a re-
occurring (utilities) theme, and their complementarity (due to either similarities or 
differences). 
 
III.ii Telephonic Interviews 
Chapters Four, Five and Six all make use of original telephone interviews conducted 
specially for this thesis.  These interviews were all of the ‘semi-structured’ type in which the 
interviewer (J. Robert Branston in all cases) had a list of themes and questions to be 
addressed that formed a general but flexible guide (Saunders et al., 2000).
6
    Each interview 
was therefore free to develop its own character in that the interviewer could respond to the 
specific conditions encountered by, for example, varying the order that the questions were 
given in, occasionally omitting specific questions where appropriate, or supplementing the 
pre-determined questions with additional queries (Saunders et al., 2000; Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). 
 
                                                 
6
 This ‘semi-structure’ type of interview can be compared with the other two types as discussed in the 
literature: ‘structured’ and ‘unstructured’.  A structured interview consists of a rigid set of questions that are 
read out, with responses generally being recorded using pre-coded answers.  Unstructured interviews have no 
predetermined questions to work through although clear ideas as to the aspects to be explored are required - see 
Saunders et al. (2000) for further details.   
 10 
This method of interviewing was chosen because it was identified as the most appropriate for 
the research issues to be addressed. As Saunders et al. (2000, p.245) put it, “semi-structured 
… interviews are used in qualitative research in order to conduct exploratory discussions not 
only to reveal and understand the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ but also to place more emphasis on 
exploring the ‘why’”.  These are the exact issues that are explored within Chapters Four, 
Five and Six.  Moreover, semi-structured interviews allow “the opportunity to ‘probe’ 
answers” and thereby to get “the interviewees to explain, or build on, their responses … 
add[ing] significance and depth to the data obtained”  (Saunders et al., 2000, p.247).  Indeed, 
such probing often led the discussion into areas that were not previously considered but 
which proved to be of significant benefit to our understanding of the issues. 
 
Other research methods, such as questionnaires or face-to-face interviews, were actively 
considered but, given the issues to be investigated and experiences reported in the research 
literature, it was felt that telephone interviews would be superior on a number of grounds.  
For example, interviews  (as against questionnaires) are said to “undoubtedly be the most 
advantageous approach…where the questions are either complex or open-ended  [or] where 
the order and logic of questioning may need to be varied” (Saunders et al., 2000, p.248 
building upon the work of Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Healey, 1991 and Jankowicz, 1995).  
Furthermore, it was felt that given the busy nature of the relatively high-ranking individuals 
to be interviewed, the more flexible approach offered by a telephone interview (as opposed 
to the planning required for a face-to-face interview) was more likely to engender 
participation.
7
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Saunders et al. (2000), Hussey and Hussey (1997), or Jankowicz (1995) for further details on the 
advantages/disadvantages of interviews of the type utilised herein. 
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III.iii The Risk of Bias and Other Potential Deficiencies 
Inherent in any methodological approach is the potential for bias, and/or other forms of 
deficiency.   The most obvious areas where accusations of weaknesses in the methodology 
adopted herein might be placed, are the telephonic interviews and the incorporation of 
significant examples during Part One of the thesis. 
 
The potential for bias and other weaknesses relating to interviewing originate for several 
factors.  For example, bias could occur because of the actions of the interviewer, such as the 
way in which the questions were asked or the tone in which they were delivered.  There 
would also be a danger of interviewee bias, which may occur because of the nature of the 
individuals who agreed to be interviewed, or due to the interviewee not wishing to reveal all 
aspects of the chosen topic.  Indeed, where permission was granted, the telephone interviews 
were also tape-recorded which may have increased the possibility of the interviewees giving 
inhibited responses (Saunders et al., 2000; Hussey and Hussey, 1997).   
 
However, following the findings of the literature, great care was taken in the preparation and 
conducting of the interviews in order to minimise the impact of such potential problems.  To 
this end, the interviews were generally arranged in advance rather than done on a ‘cold-call’ 
basis, and prior to the interviews, the following steps were taken:  background information 
on the company in question was researched; interviewees were provided with appropriate 
information (both background to the research and the broad content of the interview); careful 
thought and consideration was given to the opening of the interview and the wording of the 
questions; permission was obtained for the recording of the interviews once the strict 
confidentiality and the purpose of this was carefully explained.  In addition to these steps, 
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summaries of the interviewees’ responses were utilised to check that a full an unbiased 
understanding was reached (Saunders et al., 2000; Hussey and Hussey, 1997, Jankowicz, 
1995).  Given these measure, we are therefore reasonably confident that the possibility for 
bias in or a lack of validity from, the interviews has been minimised. 
 
 
The second main area where criticism of our methodology might be directed is our use of 
extended discussions on the examples of utility (especially electricity) companies and 
corporate universities. Yin (1994, p.13) defines “a case study as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context”, and as such, it is clear 
that at least some of our discussions on the aforementioned topics do conform to this 
definition, and might therefore be called case studies.   
 
 
One of the major concerns surrounding the use of case studies is the problem of generalising 
from a single or small number of detailed cases, towards broader theory.  However, this 
criticism is explicitly addressed and questioned by Yin (1994, p.10), who suggests that “case 
studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions”.  The cases utilised 
herein have been incorporated in order to enrich and illustrate developments in governance 
theory, and thereby give a practical demonstration of how the policies we advocate as being 
required, might be implemented in practice.  This type of use is in keeping with the 
suggestion by Yin (1994, p.1) that “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed … and when the focus in on … some real-life context”.   
 13 
We therefore believe that the use of such illustrative examples should not be seen as a 
methodological weakness, but rather as a particular strength.
8
 
                                                 
8
 Yin (1994) also suggests that there are often two other common concerns regarding the use of case studies as 
a means of academic inquiry, although neither of these is a particularly appropriate criticism of the case studies 
used within the context of this thesis.  The first is that there is a perception that case studies are a less desirable 
approach than other alternatives (such as experiments or surveys), which Yin believes may in part be due to 
many previous case study enquiries lacking rigor, incorporating biased information or being the result of sloppy 
investigation.  However, such potential problems are in no way limited to the case study approach to research. 
Furthermore there is no reason to suppose that the adoption of such methodology herein would mean this thesis 
suffers from such problems.  The second potential problem Yin (p.10) identified is that case studies “take too 
long, and they result in massive, unreadable documents”.  Given the nature of a PhD thesis, the potential length 
and depth of a case study is not a significant issue, especially given the way that case studies have only been 
used as an illustration of the underlying governance theory, rather than as the defining rigorous case study used 
to generalise a new theory.  
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of corporate control is once again a topical issue, with interest having been 
reinvigorated following recent scandals in corporate America. Our particular interest in the 
control of corporations is to incorporate recent developments in understanding the theory of 
the firm, and it is our contention that such an approach provides fresh insight into the 
implications of the modern corporation.  Specifically we will focus on the strategic decision-
making approach to the theory of the firm and the implications that this has for corporate 
governance. 
  
In order to pursue these ideas, Section II introduces the notion of strategic decisions, tracing 
the development of the strategic decision-making literature from its origins, and establishes 
why this is of relevance to corporate governance.   Section III moves the discussion forward 
by centring attention on corporate governance, examining who controls the modern 
corporation and the mechanisms utilised to exert control.  The arguments are made by 
particular reference to the corporate governance systems of Japan and the continental 
European and Anglo-US economies.  The Chapter finds that although these systems are 
different in many respects, the adoption of the strategic decision-making approach leads to a 
common conclusion on corporate governance.  The implications of this approach are then 
addressed in Section IV. Finally our concluding comments are presented in Section V.    
Throughout, the Chapter draws upon the evidence of a number of different topical examples 
in order to practically illustrate several points of theory.  The choice of the examples chosen 
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are somewhat arbitrary and necessarily reasonably brief but nevertheless give practical insight 
into the theory. 
 
II. STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
Within the economics literature, there have been many contributions to the debate on the 
theory of the firm.  One of the more recent theories to emerge as to the nature of the modern 
(transnational) corporation is the strategic decision-making approach, which is particularly 
(but not exclusively) associated with the work of Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden.   Cowling 
and Sugden (1998, p.61) take the view that a corporation is “a nexus of strategic decision-
making” and so they define “a modern, large corporation [as] the means of co-ordinating 
production from one centre of strategic decision-making” (Cowling and Sugden, 1998, p.67).  
The significance of this approach to the nature of a corporation becomes apparent when one 
considers the nature of strategic decisions and the analysis of the impact of a corporation that 
this approach leads to.  Associated with this view of the impact of a corporation will (amongst 
other things) be an alternative analysis of appropriate public policy.  Whilst these issues are 
covered later in this Chapter, or in subsequent Chapters of this thesis, it is first necessary to 
consider the origins of the strategic decision-making approach if its implications are to be 
fully explored and understood. 
 
II.i Origins in The Literature
1 
The strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm, as advanced by Cowling 
and Sugden (1987a, 1994, 1998), has two principal foundations:  firstly, the seminal work by 
                                                 
1 For a more in-depth analysis of the origins of strategic decision-making, the essence of the modern corporation 
and other literature contributions on the theory of the firm, see Cowling and Sugden (1998). 
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Coase (1937) as to the nature of the firm; and secondly, the literature on corporate 
governance, in particular the contribution by Zeitlin (1974). 
 
The basis for the majority, if not all, economic analysis on the theory of the firm, is the 
seminal work by Coase (1937), which is typically seen as being a pillar supporting a market-
centred approach.  Coase (1937, p.388) suggested that ‘firms’ and ‘markets’ represent 
alternative means of co-ordinating production.  To this end, Coase saw a firm as a unit where 
“market transactions are eliminated” in its’ internal operation, in favour of an “entrepreneur-
co-ordinator who directs production” (p.388).  Coase (1937, p.387) illustrated this through an 
example, suggesting that when a workman is redeployed from one department to another 
within a firm, it is not because the market has caused price differentials in the rewards of 
factors of production, but because he is ordered to do so by those with positions of authority 
within the company.2  Coase therefore founded his analysis on planning, although as Cowling 
and Sugden point out, this is not something that is widely recognised.  This is not planning in 
the sense of the former centrally planned economies, which might be termed macroeconomic 
planning, but rather planning on a microeconomic scale. 
 
Coase (1937, p.387) argued that under the market system there is “planning by individuals” 
who “exercise foresight and choose between alternatives” based around the co-ordination 
provided by the price mechanism.    However, he suggested there to be another type of 
“planning within our economic system which is quite different from … individual planning … 
and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning”   (Coase, 1937, pp.387-388).  
                                                 
2 Those in authority taking the decision to redeploy the workman may themselves be responding to market 
signals, but the crucial point is that the market is not operating within the firm. 
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It is this type of planning that he argued occurs within firms, and which thus allows them to 
form an alternative to the co-ordination provided by the market mechanism.    
 
This idea of firms as units of planning leads to the more recent notion of strategy.  If firms are 
units of planning, then they must include long-term broad plans aimed at ensuring a 
successful future for the firm.  Such long-term plans are otherwise known as strategies, and 
the choice over which strategy to adopt has been termed strategic decision-making.   In the 
context of the modern corporation, strategic decisions can be thought of as those decisions 
that give rise to the broad corporate plans that are the crucial determinants of the activities 
with which the corporation is associated.  The essence of a strategic decision is to plan the 
general route that the firm takes with regard to the activities with which it is associated.   
 
The importance of strategy was crucially raised by Zeitlin (1974), which brings the concept 
into the wider debate on corporate governance.  Zeitlin saw the ability to control a corporation 
as actually being the capacity to determine “the broad policies guiding a corporation and not 
… the actual influence on the day to day affairs of an enterprise” (Goldsmith and Parmelee, 
1940, quoted in Zeitlin, 1974, pp.1089-1090).  Such broad policies can thus be thought of as 
being the strategic decisions already defined above.   Therefore, following Zeitlin and Coase, 
it can be said that to control the strategic decision-making process is, in essence, to control a 
corporation.  Building upon Zietlin (1974, pp.1091-1092), examples of strategic decisions 
might be the power to decide where a corporation locates its facilities, the relationships it 
develops with workers and Governments in such locations, how it interacts with rival 
corporations, or how it sources any required raw materials.  (Examples of real world strategic 
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decisions are given in the later Chapters of this thesis that examine a number of specific 
industry cases). 
 
II.ii Implication of Strategic Decisions 
The focus on strategy points to the modern corporation being viewed as a centre of strategic 
decision-making, and although it is not suggested that whatever is done in a corporation is 
determined solely by strategic decisions, it is suggested that these decisions are especially 
important because, by definition, they determine a corporation’s broad direction.3   
 
The importance of this strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm is that 
different approaches are associated with different analyses of the impact of corporations and 
thus with different analyses of public policy, including policy towards corporate governance.  
A market-centred approach to the theory of the firm is a foundation for a market-centred 
analysis of impact and policy but, in contrast, a strategy-centred approach leads to an 
understanding of impact and policy based on strategic decision-making.  For the latter, the 
impact of corporations depends crucially on who governs and on what basis they make their 
decisions.  
 
Different strategic decisions for a corporation will be associated with differing impacts of that 
corporation upon society.  The choice of where to locate a new production facility, for 
example, could have a dramatic effect on the various different locations under consideration.  
Thus to choose a corporation’s strategy, is to choose the impact of that corporation upon 
                                                 
3 In line with this Pitelis and Sugden (1986) outline two further layers of decision-making within the firm: 
operational decisions and working decisions.  They argue that all three types of decision shape what actually 
occurs within a corporation but strategic decisions are the crucial ones since they determine the scope available 
when making operational and working decisions. 
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society.  A widely used assumption in economics is that decisions are made to be in the 
interests of those who make the decisions.  Accepting this assumption, we expect a 
corporation’s strategy to be designed and implemented in the interests of those making its 
strategic decisions.  It therefore follows that the affects of a corporation are determined by 
which group has the ability to take such decisions.  Consequently, it is important to know 
who, or which group of individuals, control the strategic decision-making process so that the 
impact of the modern corporation can be more fully understood. It is to this that we now turn 
to in the next Section of this Chapter, where corporate governance of the modern corporation 
is analysed.4   
 
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The notion of corporate governance has been defined in numerous ways by different 
commentators, and has therefore come to mean many things to many people.  Nevertheless, 
one thing that unites most definitions of corporate governance is the concept of control over a 
corporation, and the overwhelming focus placed upon the relationship between shareholders 
and management.  Implicit within all of this debate is the notion that it is shareholders who 
are the owners of a corporation in the eyes of the law, and the majority of existing 
contributions take this to imply that shareholders should ultimately determine how a 
                                                 
4 Cowling and Sugden (1987a, 1994, 1998) suggest that a corporation should be thought of as more that just a 
legal entity. They argue a corporation to an economist should be a wider concept in order to incorporate the 
nature, scope and influence of strategic decisions beyond the strictly legal boundaries of the conventionally 
defined corporation.  In other words to view a corporation as a centre of strategic decision-making, and thus 
include those activities which are influenced, but not necessarily owned, by the legal body making the strategic 
decisions.  That is to say, to include, for example, the activities of sub-contractors where their operations are 
controlled by the strategic decisions of the ‘parent firm’.  This thesis is not focused on the definition of the 
modern corporation but rather focuses on the strategic decision-making that occurs in such institutions.  As such 
it does not matter if one chooses to define a corporation as something akin to the narrower legal definition, or the 
broader definition as suggested by Cowling and Sugden.  
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corporation is run.5  Corporate governance has therefore come to represent the concept of how 
shareholders exert their influence in order to be sure that it is their (and not the mangers’) 
agenda that their company follows in situations where the ownership and management of a 
corporation are in separate hands.  In short, how shareholders, rather than managers, exercise 
control over a corporation.    
 
Many authors (for example: Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992; Franks and Mayer, 1995; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Becht and Röell, 1998; Scott, 1999; Yafeh, 2000) highlight the differences 
that exist between the types of corporate governance that is observed across the major 
economic systems of the world.  These differences have the potential to lead to different 
conclusions regarding who controls a corporation and as such may have profound 
implications for the affects of that corporation on the societies in which it operates.   To this 
end we present a description and analysis of the different ownership systems that can be 
observed across different economies and the implications these differences have for corporate 
governance.  In doing so we follow the established convention and make the distinction 
between three types of governance systems: Anglo-US, Japanese and continental European.  
These three have been chosen since they represent the largest amount of previous research 
contributions, perhaps because they represent some of the worlds major economies, although 
this is not to deny that other distinctions could have been made.  However, as this Section will 
later suggest, although these corporate governance structures differ in many regards they 
ultimately give rise to the same broad conclusions; de facto control of the modern corporation 
                                                 
5 That is not to deny the acceptance that there will be legal (and other) restrictions on the ability of shareholders 
to determine the way in which ‘their’ corporation is run. 
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rests with a subset of those who have an interest in its activities.6  In this respect the choice of 
the three ‘different’ systems under consideration is somewhat arbitrary. 
 
III.i Ownership Concentration 
Concentration of share ownership is said to be one of the key factors in corporate governance 
because it usually leads to the concentration of shareholder power in the hands of a relatively 
small number of agents.  This gives each of those agents significant influence over 
management, often by virtue of the fact that these large shareholders are also members of the 
board of directors.   It also gives rise to strong incentives for those agents to be proactively 
involved with management in order to ensure that it is their agenda (and not the managers’) 
that is followed by the corporation, due to the significant financial interest they have in the 
operations of that particular corporation.  Therefore, although the cost of monitoring and 
proactively engaging with management may be high, the rewards the agent will get from such 
action are more likely to be significant due to their large financial stake in the enterprise.   
 
Conversely, where ownership concentration is low, each shareholder has little power since 
they control only a small amount of the enterprise, and the incentive to be actively involved is 
therefore low because the costs of such action are high relative to the potential rewards.  This 
leads to the problem of  ‘free-riding’.  If any one individual or institution expends resources in 
an effort to monitor and/or control the management of a specific corporation in which they are 
shareholders, the benefits do not accrue solely to them.  All investors will benefit, even those 
who have contributed nothing to the costs of such action.  There is therefore a great incentive 
                                                 
6 Cowling and Tomlinson (2000, 2002) present a related argument in that they attribute the present weakness in 
the Japanese economy to the concentration of strategic decision-making within the keiretsu  networks of firms.  
They go on to say that, in this respect, the Japanese economy shares a fundamental symmetry with recent crises 
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to free-ride on the efforts of other investors, by doing nothing/less oneself, relying instead on 
the efforts of the active participant(s) to reduce the risk of management failure.  However, 
because such incentives apply to all shareholders, there is a significant danger that all 
investors will wait for someone else to do the job due to the high costs involved relative to the 
expected benefits, and thus that nothing gets done, resulting in managers gaining a high 
degree of autonomy  (Blair, 1995; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). 
 
The problem of free-riding leading to shareholders suffering from little or no influence over 
managers is therefore easier to solve when the number of parties is smaller, and/or where 
ownership is more concentrated.  In this case the benefits accruing to one shareholder who 
acts are so much greater, it is worth their expending significant resources on monitoring/ 
controlling the management of a specific company irrespective of the actions of the other 
shareholders. By the very nature of the concentrated ownership, more of the benefits from 
such action will accrue to the party responsible and thus the expected payoff from such action 
is greater (Blair, 1995; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992).7  It would therefore seem that ownership 
concentration has the potential to have a significant influence on corporate governance and it 
is therefore appropriate to consider the ownership concentration in the different governance 
systems. 
 
In Japan and many continental European countries, corporate ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a relatively small number of other firms, banks, families or individuals.  In contrast, 
ownership in the Anglo-US economies is perceived as being far more diverse.  Franks and 
                                                                                                                                                        
in other forms of industrial organisation, such as the Anglo-US type of corporation.  They do not however, given 
an in-depth investigation of the exact nature or mechanisms behind this concentration of decision-making. 
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Mayer (1995, pp.174-176), for example, report that of the approximately 170 largest quoted 
companies, the proportion in which there was at least one shareholder who owned more than 
25% of the equity of the firm, was 85% for Germany and 79% for France.  This situation can 
be compared with that in the UK, where just 16% of the top 170 quoted companies had at 
least one shareholder who owned more than 25% of the equity of the firm.  Furthermore, 
Prowse (1990, p.45) reports that commercial banks hold over 20% of all outstanding 
corporate equity in Japan, compared with 0% in the USA.8  The differing levels of 
concentration are again illustrated by Prowse (1994), who highlights the differences in the 
average percentage of outstanding shares in large non-financial corporations that are owned 
by the largest five shareholders.  He reports (p.35) that in Germany, the top five shareholders 
on average account for 41.5% of the outstanding shares, indicating concentrated corporate 
ownership.  A similar, but less extreme picture can be observed in Japan, where the figure is 
33.1%.  These statistics can be compared with the more diversely owned US and UK 
economies, where the figures are just 25.4% and 20.9% respectively.  
 
Becht and Röell (1998, p.1049) show empirically that ownership concentration in continental 
Europe is reflected in voting power; they highlight the “extraordinarily high degree of 
concentration of shareholder voting power in continental Europe relative to the USA and the 
UK” as their most salient finding.  It would seem that the concentrated ownership (and hence 
voting rights) in the continental European system has been a significant factor resulting in 
shareholders being more directly involved in the management of these corporations than in 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Even where ownership concentration is high there may well be free-riding because small shareholders will still 
have an incentive to let the larger shareholders get involved and thus bear the cost.  The difference is that this is 
less likely to lead to a situation where nothing gets done and thus managers are very autonomous.  
8 See also the report in Yafeh (2000). 
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the Anglo-US system. Shareholders are therefore able to exert a greater degree of direct 
control.9 
 
The Japanese system might be seen as having a similar result to that of the continental 
European system, since they are both characterised by high ownership concentration levels.  
However, the Japanese system also has a number of individual features which differentiate it 
and which may therefore lead to a distinctive and unique outcome.  Japanese corporations 
typically operate within networks – the so called keiretsu - which contain many other firms 
who are inter-related transaction partners, and who have long-term, established relationships 
with each other.10   Sheard (1994, p.310) notes that the “prevalence of interlocking 
shareholdings is one of the most striking features of the large Japanese firm.  A typical listed 
firm has … extensive interlocking shareholdings with transaction partners (banks, insurance 
companies, suppliers, customers, trading companies)”.  Whilst each of these shareholdings is 
likely to be individually small, collective ownership within the network constitutes a majority 
holding.  Sheard (1994, p.313) goes on to say that the interlocking nature of share ownership 
within such networks of firms results in  “a relatively small number of shareholders being in a 
position to exercise joint control over any given company. Ownership is both dispersed and 
concentrated: a listed firm has on average 12,910 shareholders, but between ten and twenty of 
these could exercise joint control”.  
 
 
                                                 
9 That is not to suggest that factors other than concentrated share ownership have not contributed to the process 
of how shareholders are directly involved in the management of a corporation.  An example of another factor 
that might have contributed to this process would be the German two-tier board system in which shareholder 
nominees play a significant part of the Aufsichsrat - the supervisory board (Davies, 1999, pp.51-53). 
10 See Cowling and Tomlinson (2000, 2002) for more detail on the nature of the Japanese firm and the Keiretsu 
networks. 
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Cowling and Tomlinson (2002), drawing upon Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995), indicate that 
this process of the concentration of shareholder power inside the Japanese corporate grouping, 
is re-enforced by the habit of leading firms within the networks appointing former executives 
to key positions in lower ranked firms within the same group.  This facilitates the 
dissemination of corporate strategy, giving the leading firms (who are often shareholders) 
greater influence and thus power.  A similar situation is also reported by Kester (1992), who 
sees the habit of temporarily seconding managers to other group companies within the 
keiretsu as having a similar affect. 
 
It would therefore seem that although significant differences exist, the Japanese and 
continental European models yield similar results in terms of who has the power to control a 
corporation; shareholder power is concentrated in the hands of a small group, which therefore 
have a significant degree of control over, and are actively involved with, management.  
Unlike the continental European or Japanese systems discussed above, the Anglo-US 
economies are characterised by relatively low ownership concentration rates.  This not only 
gives shareholders less individual power, reflecting their smaller ownership stake, but also 
reduces the incentive for shareholders to be actively involved in the (monitoring of) 
management of their corporations. The costs of engaging in such action will be relatively high 
compared with the potential benefits of doing so, due to the small financial stake in question, 
and thus other corporate governance mechanisms are said to have been adopted in order to 
help over-come the risk of managerial failure. 
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III.ii Alternative Anglo-US Mechanisms 
In 1997, 75% of the British stock market was owned by institutions (MacLean, 1999), and 
such institutional investors are said to rely on take-over to reduce management failure and 
diverse portfolio holdings to spread the risk of management failure in any one corporation 
(Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992).  Investors manage portfolios that contain a large number of 
investments in many different corporations.  Each stake is relatively small in terms of the 
percentage of equity owned, even though collectively the funds can be very large, reflecting 
their majority ownership of the stock market.   The risk of managerial failure in any one 
corporation is therefore small to such investors since they have spread their risk via their 
diverse investment portfolio, and so any financial costs incurred due to managerial failure in 
one corporation is going to be relatively insignificant next to their total investments. 
 
Take-over is without doubt a very significant aspect of economic activity, and is very much 
integral to corporate governance since the process of buying or merging a corporation impacts 
upon who controls, or can control, that corporation. In the year 2000, the value of worldwide 
mergers and acquisitions was US$3.5 trillion, up from US$3.3 trillion in 1999 (Economist, 
2001, p.83).  One of the most highlighted and commented upon differences observed in the 
world’s various economic systems, is the extremely strong prevalence of take-over activity 
that exists in the Anglo-US economies.  This is in stark contrast to what is observed in other 
economies, where take-over is much less common, and hence plays a far smaller role in the 
economic system.  Franks and Mayer (1990), for example, document that in the UK there are 
approximately double the number of take-overs as there are in France or Germany.  
Comparable financial data on this area is hard to establish, but Prowse (1994, p.47) reports 
that over the period 1985-1989, the average value of completed domestic mergers and 
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corporate transactions with disclosed value was far higher in the Anglo-US economies than in 
either Japan or Germany.  Normalising the data as a percentage of total market capitalisation, 
Prowse indicates that the average annual value of such activity as being 41.1% and 18.7% of 
the value of the US and UK stock markets respectively, compared with just 3.1% and 2.3% 
for Japan and Germany.11  Even allowing for the inherent dangers when examining cross-
country data of this type, the size of the difference in these figures clearly indicates that take-
over activity is of a completely different magnitude in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
Another noticeable difference of the Anglo-US economies is the way that this take-over 
activity takes place.  Hostile bids are commonplace in the USA and UK, but are far more   
uncommon in the Japanese or continental European economies.12  Franks and Mayer (1998), 
for example, report that there have only been three hostile take-overs in Germany in the post 
war period.  Furthermore, Prowse (1994, p.49) reports that of all attempted transactions in the 
period 1985-1989, 37.1% of these were hostile take-overs in the UK, compared with just 
9.6% for the rest of Europe.13   It is therefore evident that there are more take-overs in the 
Anglo-US economies, and more of these bids are hostile, than is the case in the Japanese or 
continental European economies  
 
                                                 
11 The data was normalised as a percentage of stock market capitalisation to reflect the larger number of 
companies listed on the stock markets in the US and UK. For example, Franks and Mayer (1995, p.175) indicate 
there were 2,006,000 domestic listed companies on the stock market in the UK, compared with 649,000 in 
Germany or just 443,000 in France.   This difference in the number of firms on the respective stock markets is 
also a significant since it further illustrates the different approach to corporate ownership adopted in these 
different economies. 
12 It was said by some that Vodafone’s take-over of Mannesmann in 2000, the first successful hostile bid for a 
Germany firm by a foreign predator, was the start of a new era.  However, it would seem that so far, the 
prediction of such profound changes has not been observed, and thus that the status quo has not been 
significantly altered – see The Economist (2001, p.84). 
13 One might also include leveraged buyouts as being ‘hostile’.  Taking this wider definition of what constitutes 
hostile, the adjusted figures would be 43% for the UK, and just 12.3% for Germany. 
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It has been argued by many authors (for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; MacLean, 1999; 
Davies 1999; Franks and Mayer 1995; Prowse, 1994) that this high level of take-over activity 
is an important and integral aspect of the Anglo-US system of corporate governance. It is 
suggested that the threat of take-over will provide management with a large incentive to 
adhere to shareholders wishes and where mis-management does occur, take-over will 
facilitate change.   
 
The threat of take-over action will have the effect of disciplining management and 
encouraging them to focus on ‘shareholder value’, rather than pursing their own interests.  If 
shareholders are not happy with the efforts of management, they can engage in the so called 
‘Wall Street walk’ and simply sell their shares (Brancato, 1997, p.xi/23). When many 
shareholders sell their shares, the value will fall, making the company a more attractive take-
over target. The management of a company must therefore make it attractive for shareholders 
to maintain their holdings.  This would, at least in part, involve the managers creating 
shareholder value, and following the course of action that the shareholders would choose.  In 
other words, the share price is acting as a signal to management (Blair, 1995, p.68).  
 
Take-overs are also important because where managerial failure actually occurs, take-overs 
are said to facilitate the replacement of poor management. A corporation that is perceived as 
being mis-managed would be the target of a bid, because a corporation or individual making a 
bid must believe that they could change the firms operations and make (greater) profits.  The 
replacement of poor management and the alteration of corporate strategy would be believed to 
facilitate the return of the firm to the ‘right track’ of increased profitability (Roe, 1993, 
p.322).  Franks and Mayer (1992), cited in Jenkinson and Mayer (1992, p.3), report that in the 
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two years following a hostile take-over in the UK, nearly 90% of directors (both executive 
and non-executive) will have been replaced.14   
 
 
The disparity of take-over activity might therefore initially suggest that there is greater 
pressure on management in the Anglo-US economies to follow the agenda of the 
shareholders.  However, various authors (see for example, Kester, 1992; or Schneider-Lenné, 
1992) suggest that the take-over market is not so vigorous outside the Anglo-US economies 
because it is not needed. By their direct and official involvement, large shareholders in 
Japanese and continental European firms have sufficient control over their corporation.  In 
contrast, it is often argued that in Anglo-US corporations, the real threat of take-over is 
needed to ensure that the management is effective.  
 
These differences in corporate governances systems have lead to many commentators (for 
example, Franks and Mayer, 1995 or Blair, 1995) labelling the corporate governance systems 
of Japan and continental Europe, as ‘insider’ systems, and that of the Anglo-US economies as 
‘outsider’ systems.  Insider systems are said to be characterised by more concentrated share 
ownership, where shareholders are often key ‘stakeholders’ such as banks, supplier or 
customer firms, which enables the relatively close observation of the working of the 
corporation.  These stakeholders are also likely to be on the board of directors, enabling them 
to exercise control from inside the corporation via their direct involvement.15  Conversely, 
outsider systems are characterised by diverse share ownership and a board of directors 
                                                 
14 The ability for the new owners to change the way the corporation is run and hence make (higher) profits, 
presumably explains, at least in part, why the bidding party is willing to pay a bid premium over the traded value 
of the shares.  They see the potential of the corporation and its future value, not simply what it is worth today. 
Jenson (1988, p.22) indicates that premiums in hostile bids have historically average approximately 30% 
although have been known to average as high as 50% at times. 
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dominated by outsiders who have little or no personal stake in the performance of the 
corporation.  In these systems, control of the corporation is said to be determined outside the 
corporation through the methods discussed in the Section above (Blair, 1995, p.283-284).  
However, the use of the terms insider and outsider might be taken to imply that shareowners 
in the Anglo-US economies solely utilise the outsider methods of corporate governance.  
Whilst these instruments are clearly important, there are also other aspects to Anglo-US 
corporate governance. 
 
III.iii Anglo-US Direct Contact and Influence 
Diverse ownership portfolios and the adoption of take-over as methods of corporate 
governance do not, however, mean that the larger shareholders in the Anglo-US system have 
no means of direct influence over the corporations in which they invest. Whilst discussing the 
British system, Holland (1995, p.28) highlights the fact that “institutional influence and 
intervention is normally conducted through co-operative relationships with investee 
companies.  Much of this process of influence and intervention … [is] conducted away from 
the public gaze”.  As Pitelis and Sugden (1986, p.75) put it, “the well-timed business lunch 
should not be underestimated”.  These inter-organisational contacts, which also take place in 
the US, are often termed ‘relationship investing’; the building of long-term co-operative 
communications based associations between an organisation’s owners and management 
(Rubach, 1999; Blair, 1995).16  When taken together with more traditional mechanisms of 
shareholder influence like filing shareholder proposals, and voting at the AGM, this forms the 
notion of  ‘institutional shareholder activism’, i.e. institutional shareholders having an active 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Not only are (some of these) stakeholders likely to own significant shareholding in corporations and thus have 
influence via this, but they are often also involved through other channels such as the German two-tier board 
system which gives groups such as employees significant influence.   
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interest in their holdings (Rubach, 1999, pp.1-5).  These concepts have spawned a growing 
literature looking at how widespread these are, and how effective they are in practice (see for 
example: Rubach, 1999; Brancato, 1997; Holland, 1995).  Rubach (1999, p.34) reports a 
survey of equity fund managers and institutional owners in the US by Russell Reynolds 
Associates.  It found the practice of relationship investing to be widespread; nearly half of the 
surveyed  “managers conveyed their organisation's point of view to a board of directors, either 
verbally or in written form”.17  Indeed, Rubach (1999, p.101) observes that “institutional 
owners have a major ownership presence in United States corporate governance”.  It therefore 
seems that, although less obvious, the Anglo-US system functions along similar lines to the 
Japanese and continental European models, albeit at a lower level of intensity. Large 
shareholders can and do have contact with, and influence over, the boards of modern 
corporations.   
 
The influence of large shareholders over Anglo-US corporations is often explicitly recognised 
in the companies’ annual reports. To pick one of countless examples, Severn Trent Plc (one of 
the privatised British water companies) report that “the company attaches considerable 
importance to the effectiveness of its communications with shareholders … Regular 
communication is maintained with institutional shareholders and fund managers through 
meetings and presentations” (Severn Trent, 2001, p.22).  Indeed, some corporations take these 
contacts even further, introducing measures such as those observed at The Coca-Cola 
Company, which has a special telephone inquiry line for institutional investors (Coca-Cola 
Company, 2001, p.72). 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 Rubach (1999, p.5)  reports that this process is also sometimes known as ‘relational investing’ but there tends 
to be some confusion as to what this actually encompasses. 
17 See also Rubach (1999), chapter 4, which contains a good summary of the major literature on institutional 
activism. 
 33 
 
These institutional links with the management of a corporation are given increased weight and 
importance as a consequence of the way that the process of such contacts interacts with the 
aforementioned take-over threat mechanism.  Although the largest shareholders are smaller 
and therefore less powerful than in the Japanese or continental European systems, they can 
off-set this (at least in part) by utilising the possible vulnerability of the corporation to take-
over.  Large shareholders can threaten to sell their holdings, thereby making the corporation a 
potential target if managers do not pay real attention to their wishes as communicated via 
these direct contacts.  In other words, to use the interaction of the various methods of 
corporate governance to their advantage. (This interaction between different types of 
corporate governance mechanism is discussed in more detail in Section III.v of this Chapter). 
 
III.iv Other Facets of The Concentration of Power  
As the above Sections have illustrated, concentrated share ownership, direct contact between 
management and the larger share owners and active take-over markets tend to concentrate 
shareholder power in the hands of the largest shareholders.  This concentration of shareholder 
power within the modern corporation is further increased by the preference in many 
continental European countries for dual-class shares, where the different classes carry 
different voting rights.  In Denmark, for example, class ‘B’ shares cannot have less than one-
tenth of the voting rights of class ‘A’ shares whilst in Italy, France and Germany only 50% of 
equity need have any voting rights (Rydqvist, 1992, p.47). In many countries this habit has 
become the norm; approximately 75% of quoted firms in Denmark and Sweden have dual-
class shares, with Switzerland being only slightly lower at 68% (Rydqvist, 1992, p.48). Where 
dual-class shares exist, a subset of shareholders will control a disproportionately high 
 34 
percentage of the company voting rights, giving these shareholders a correspondingly high 
degree of control.   Indeed, this predilection for dual-class shares is most likely one of the 
factors behind the concentration of shareholder voting power in continental Europe, as 
reported by Becht and Röell (1999) in Section III.i of this Chapter.18  
 
In other countries, such as the UK, Japan or the USA, the one-share/one-vote system is 
favoured.  Rydqvist (1992, p.48), for example, reports that only approximately 1% of 
companies in the UK or Japan have dual-class shares, whilst it is only slightly more common 
in the USA, with 4% of companies having dual-class shares.  Equal voting rights per share, 
however, is still not enough to ensure that influence over the strategic decisions of a 
corporation is widely spread amongst shareholders.  Tricker (1997, p.49) argues that 
“information has always been central to the exercise of power, and so it is with governance 
power”, yet Russell Reynolds Associates (1998, p.67) reports that “investors say they do not 
have enough information”. Without the general availability of genuine and appropriate 
information, the majority of shareholders cannot effectively monitor management, giving 
them little or no corporate control. 
 
As Jenkinson and Mayer (1992, p.7) report, this problem is compounded by widely dispersed 
shareholding because “there is little incentive for a shareholder to devote much attention to 
the monitoring and control of a company if only a minute fraction of the total shareholdings in 
a firm is held”.   Given a relatively small shareholding, the cost of such action could be 
expected to be high, relative to the benefits that might accrue from such actions.   Indeed, as 
                                                 
18 It might be argued that the existence of dual-class shares with different voting rights doesn’t matter so long as 
it is clear as to exactly what is being bought when each class of share is purchased.  Whilst this may be true for 
some matters of share ownership, to argue this in regard to corporate control would be incongruous in that it 
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the start of the Section outlined, this also gives rise to the problem of free-riding amongst the 
smaller shareholders, since they have a significant incentive to rely upon the efforts of the 
larger shareholders to prevent managerial failure, which further distances the smaller 
shareholder from positions of influence.   Only larger shareholders have a financial interest of 
a size that delivers sufficient returns to justify the costs of taking the time, effort and resources 
of monitoring and actively engaging in measures to control a corporation. 
 
The combination of these features therefore means that the large shareowners that regularly 
meet management are typically the only groups with the incentive and opportunity to access 
the information needed to effectively monitor management. Consequently the annual general 
meeting, where all shareholders are in theory supposed to be able to exert some influence over 
corporate control, fails to provide an appropriate forum for achieving, as Tricker (1997, p.50) 
puts it, “real democratic shareholder control”.  
 
Tricker (1997, p.49) indicates that there is “a widespread and growing demand for disclosure, 
transparency, and access to corporate information”.  In Britain, the 1992 Cadbury Committee 
Report touched upon this broad issue, when it addressed the issue of non-executive directors. 
Its findings, together with other more recent events, have resulted in an increased role for, as 
O’Sullivan and Wong (1998, p.92) put it, “non-executive directors who are expected to 
critically evaluate the policies and strategies of their executive colleagues”. Davies (1999) 
cites a 1997 MORI poll that showed that only five companies out of 305 respondents had no 
non-executive directors, with there being an average of four such directors for all companies.  
The 2003 Higgs report again addressed the issue of non-executive directors in light of events 
                                                                                                                                                        
misses the point made herein that by issuing shares with different voting rights, shareholder power is further 
concentrated. 
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surrounding Enron and proposed a number of measures to refine their role in governing the 
corporation.   Amongst other things, it proposed that independent non-executive directors 
should be encouraged to work closely with major shareholders (Higgs, 2003).19    
 
In one sense, non-executive directors might be seen to reduce the requirement for 
shareholders to have access to information, since these directors are (at least in theory) acting 
to ensure that management/the board are acting in the best interests of the shareholders.  
However, despite this, there is still the problem of delegation; it is not the shareholders 
themselves being able to exert influence and monitor management. In short, there does not 
appear to have been (or will be in the near future) any significant changes to the information 
being provided to the general shareholder and so the status quo has yet to be fundamentally 
altered; shareholder power rests with a subset, a privileged few.    
 
III.v  Exit and Voice 
As Rubach (1999, p.45) and Blair (1995, p.68) allude, the essence of corporate governance, 
and thus the differences in the various systems observed, might be seen as revolving around 
the choice of Hirschman’s (1970) seminal notion of exit and voice.  Hirschman focused on the 
behaviour of consumers in relation to the firms from which they purchase goods or services, 
but he pointed out that such theories are applicable to other situations.  Moreover, his ideas 
are readily applicable to corporate governance and indeed, he does, if very briefly, touch upon 
aspects of this.    
 
                                                 
19 See also summary at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2674007.stm (accessed on 14th February 2003). 
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To Hirschman (p.74), weak management has two ways of finding out about its failure:  
customers can stop buying the firm’s product, revenues drop and so the management is 
compelled to search for ways to correct the faults that have lead to this exit; or customers can 
express their dissatisfaction directly to management, that is exercise voice, highlighting to  
management the causes and cures for such dissatisfaction.  As Hirschman himself put it, voice 
might therefore be defined “as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p.30). It is interest articulation. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, exit and voice might be see as describing the options open 
to shareholders who are not satisfied with their corporation’s managers. Shareholders can 
either exit when they are dissatisfied with the operation of the corporation by selling their 
shares, or they can exert their influence over management (and perhaps other shareholders) by 
choosing voice and making their views known on the future direction of the corporation; they 
“can  ‘kick up a fuss’ and thereby force improve[ment] … upon delinquent management” 
(Hirschman, 1970, p.30).   
 
Hirschman’s contribution on exit and voice also allows a better understanding of the way the 
exit option works in corporate governance. According to Hirschman (p.24), if in general exit 
is to be successful, it is best to have a mixture of alert and inert customers in order to give 
management time to correct its failures.  In a corporate governance context, alert shareholders 
who are not satisfied with management and sell their shares provide a feedback mechanism 
(i.e. the drop in share price) which alerts management to their failing from a shareholder’s 
point of view.  The inert shareholders, by retaining their shares, help to provide stability 
thereby allowing management time to identify and make the necessary adjustments required 
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by shareholders.  The exit option, therefore, need not to be taken to the extreme of making the 
firm vulnerable to take-over in order to work, but can serve as both a signal to existing 
management, and as a last resort, to replace failing management via take-over.20 
 
However, corporate governance cannot be viewed as being such a simple ‘either/or’ type of 
choice, since exit and voice will interact with each other.  In other words, corporate 
governance might be more accurately viewed as a balance between the two mechanisms.  As 
the previous Sections of this Chapter have illustrated, both exit (take-over) and voice (direct 
contact with management) are used in the corporate governance systems of the Anglo-US 
economies, and in the continental European and Japanese systems.  Indeed, Hirschman 
recognised that exit and voice could be part of a balance when he said that they “come into 
play alongside, or in lieu of” each other (p.30).  Shareholders may not be able to successfully 
use voice if they have no threat of exit to add weight to their voice, whilst the choice of exit 
may involve costs  (e.g. selling (potentially) valuable shares) and so some attempts may first 
be made to use voice in order to avoid these costs.  In the extreme, the costs of exit might be 
such that it is no longer a viable alternative and thus voice is the only sensible option available 
to the shareholder.21 Such examples are in keeping with the views of Hirschman (p.83), who 
noted that “the effectiveness of the voice mechanism is strengthened by the possibility of exit.  
The willingness to develop and use the voice mechanism is reduced by exit but the ability to 
use [voice] with effect is increased by [exit]”.  Earlier in his work, Hirschman (p.34) 
                                                 
20 As Hirschman (p.26) points out the use of exit to alert management to cases of failure may break-down in 
situations where many firms are suffering from the same problem and thus the exit by existing customers is 
offset by the acquision of new customers.  In a corporate governance context this would be those selling shares 
to illustrate dissatisfaction would be replaced by new shareholders without the loss in value of the shares 
required to send the appropriate signal to management. The new shareholders might be equally unhappy with 
management but cannot find a better investment opportunity that does not suffer from the same problems. 
21 Example of such an extreme cost precluding exit might be a massive loss on the value of the shares held, 
should they be sold at the currently available low price, or their sale would adversely affect the image, reputation 
or standing of the share owner. 
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commented that “the role of voice would increase as the opportunities for exit decline, up to 
the point where, with exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire burden of alerting 
management to its failings.”  
 
Whilst corporate governance might be seen to consist of a balance between exit and voice, the 
balance would seem to be different in the distinct governance systems that have been 
examined in this thesis. Hirschman (p.74) himself noted that “different organisations are 
differentially sensitive to voice and exit and that the optimal mix of voice and exit will 
therefore differ from one type of organisation to another.”   This not only suggests that 
differences will exist across countries, but that differences could also exist in the balance 
between exit and voice within countries. 
 
 In the Anglo-US model, exit seems to be a powerful facet of corporate governance due to the 
prominence of take-over in those economies.  That does mean to say that voice is not utilised, 
but rather that the widely dispersed share ownership that characterises this system results in it 
being used in a less intense or formal manner.  However, the strong take-over markets and 
corresponding threat of exit results in voice, albeit limited in scope relative to the ‘insider’ 
systems, being taken seriously because of the real threat behind it.  Conversely, continental 
European or Japanese shareowners are generally far more able to utilise voice without having 
to resort to the threat of exit due to the more concentrated share ownership in these 
economies. That does not mean to say that exit is never used in these economies but rather 
that it is not as common as in the Anglo-US.22    
 
                                                 
22 Hirschman’s concept of exit and voice in relation to consumer and other groups who have an interest in the 
activities of a corporation is further illustrated in chapter three of this thesis.  
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Implicit within this discussion of exit and voice, and thus the balance between their use in the 
various systems of corporate governance, is the conjecture that it is only large (or relatively 
large) shareholders who are in a position to exert real control over a corporation.  A small 
shareholder opting to use exit is likely to have little or no effect on the corporation as a whole 
and, likewise, a similarly small shareholder opting to use voice is unlikely to be able to ‘kick 
up much of a fuss’ on its own.  Generally, only larger shareholders are successfully able to 
use exit and/or voice because only they have a noticeable effect by utilising such mechanisms. 
  
III.vi Concentrated Shareholder Power  
The governance systems that have been characterised as Anglo-US, continental European and 
Japanese differ in many respects, but in terms of shareholder power they seem to yield the 
same end result.  Although most clearly and extensively observable in the continental 
European and Japanese cases, it is only the larger shareholders that have direct access to, and 
thus influence over, a corporation’s management.  The smaller shareholders are often 
excluded from these links, which serve to concentrate shareholder power in the hands of the 
privileged few.  Indeed, this is implicitly recognised in parts of the existing corporate 
governance literature.  La Porta et al. (2000, p.15) summarise the arguments of Shleifer and 
Vishy (1997), when they frame the agency problem of corporate governance in terms of the 
relationship between  “controlling shareholders and outside investors”, instead of the more 
conventional Berle and Means (1932) conflict involving “outside investors and managers” (La 
Porta et al., 2000, p.15).   
 
The reasons for this concentration of shareholder power vary from country to country, 
reflecting their respective corporate governance systems, but the end result is the same.  
 41 
Concentrated share ownership, restricted voting practices, restricted corporate information 
and active take-over markets all contribute to the concentration of power with a relatively 
small group of shareholders.   
 
III.vii Control of The Modern Corporation 
As the whole debate on corporate governance illustrates, managers are (in theory) delegated 
agents, acting on behalf of, and for, shareholders who are the legal owners of the modern 
corporation.  However, as Tirole (2001, p.17) puts it “the allocation of formal control … 
cannot be the full story.”   We have already seen that shareholder power is concentrated in the 
hands of the larger owners.   Furthermore, the modern corporation is an immensely 
complicated, not to mention large, entity that requires that many strategic decisions are taken.   
It is unrealistic to expect that all of these decisions are, or could possibly be, made with the 
understanding of the controlling shareholders.   This would seem to indicate that, as Tirole 
(2001, p.17) again puts it, “players without formal control rights actually enjoy substantial 
control over their organisation”.  In other words, it appears that (large) shareholders are only 
involved (both directly and indirectly) with what they regard as the most important strategic 
decisions.  This leaves senior management with a high degree of autonomy and thus a high 
degree of de facto control over the corporation.  Only when management deviates 
significantly from the controlling shareholders’ wishes, will they be pulled back into line as 
the shareholders exercise their formal control powers.  It would therefore seem likely that de 
facto control of strategic decision-making process, and thus control of the modern 
corporation, rests somewhere between a subset of (large) shareholders and the company’s 
senior management.   
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE 
Whilst there are various answers and much debate within the corporate governance literature 
as to the exact balance of power between these two constituents, there is also consensus; 
control is clearly perceived as resting with a subset of those having an interest in a 
corporation’s activities.  A group of (relatively) large shareholders and the company’s senior 
management are seen as being the only groups able to influence the strategic decision-making 
process.  Other groups with an interest in the activities of a corporation, such as employees or 
customers, are excluded from this process.   Strategic decision-making might therefore be 
characterised as being the preserve of a select few of those with an interest in the activities of 
a particular corporation, or as Cowling and Sugden (1994, p.42), and Zeitlin (1974, p.1075) 
label it, an “elite”. 
  
The identification of the existence of this controlling elite should be seen as the important 
contribution made by the corporate governance literature.  This is far more profound than 
working out the exact nature of the relationship between shareholder and manager, or such 
things as the effects this has on company financial performance.  These are mere details and 
minutiae when compared to the existence of this controlling elite, which, as will be explained 
in Chapter Two, is of fundamental importance to the way that corporations operate.23  
 
 
The exact make-up of this controlling elite is almost certain to differ from country to country, 
and from company to company within a given locality; it is likely that no two controlling 
elites will be exactly the same.  Each country or particular corporation is likely going to have 
                                                 
23 That is not to deny that the controlling elites are going to have limitations on their knowledge, and that this 
may impinge upon their ability to take all strategic decisions.  In such cases they may need to seek outside 
council or employ advisors in order to gain specific knowledge or insight into particular issues – ultimately the 
decision will still rest with the elite, even if their decision is based on the advice of an expert. 
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a number of particular features that give rise to a unique balance between the relative strength 
of the larger shareholders and the top management.  The fundamental issue is that some form 
of controlling elite exists, and as introduced above, that they consist of subset of those who 
have an interest in the actions of a particular corporation. 
   
It is important, however, to note that just because controlling elites exist across companies 
and countries, it does not mean that they will all necessarily act in exactly the same way, even 
when presented with exactly the same situation.  There is no given blueprint as to the exact 
composition of the controlling elite in any given situation, or how this elite should react when 
faced with a certain opportunity or problem.  The balance between shareholders and managers 
within the group will differ, for example, yielding different outcomes in terms of the goals of 
elite as a whole.  Moreover, large shareholders or managers are not homogenous groups who 
have exactly the same aims, goals and desires; each manager or shareholder is potentially 
different, having their own opinions on the future.   Sometimes these opinions will coincide 
and so commonalities will exist between the members of the elite, on other occasions there 
will be differences.  It is the co-existence of these commonalities and differences that allows 
many different elites to be in control of the worlds many different corporations, without all 
acting in exactly the same manner.  
 
Take, for example, the British banking industry.  HSBC and Lloyds TSB (two of the largest 
British banking corporations) although similar in many regards, have in some circumstances 
acted in different ways and adopted different policies, indicating that those in charge of the 
two companies have made different strategic decisions. For instance, in the late 1980s HSBC 
made the decision to create its branchless First Direct subsidiary, which is designed to be 
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innovative and technologically driven, making use such things as telephone and internet 
banking.24  By contrast Lloyds TSB did not create, and does not own such a specialist 
subsidiary.25   Such differing decisions reflect the different preferences, and the different 
balance of interests, that exist within the elite groups controlling these particular corporations.  
 
As well as differing in their composition and aims, elites controlling corporations will also 
differ in the constraints they face.  The policy space available to an elite, for example, is likely 
to differ depending on the company or locality involved, and by the nature of the decision to 
be made.  These constraints upon decision-making might be legally binding and enforceable 
laws, such as the German two-board system, but they could also be wider, less tangible 
considerations, such as the public perception of the company or mass community action.   
 
Witness the differing reactions across countries to the news in March 2001 that British retailer 
Marks and Spencer was closing its continental European operations by the end of the year.26  
In France, where the company’s entire portfolio of 18 stores was due to be closed with the 
loss of 1,650 jobs, the decision created, as The Times newspaper puts it, “a bitter 
confrontation with unions and politicians”.27  As early as April 2001, more than 1,000 people 
took to the street in Paris as a protest against this action28 and a legal challenge resulted in the 
suspension of the closures to enable a “full consultation and information process” with its 
workers.29  Indeed, in July 2001, Marks and Spencer was forced into announcing that it was 
suspending these mandatory consultations whilst it attempted to sell the business as a going 
                                                 
24 See www.firstdirect.com  and www.hsbc.com  (accessed on 21st January 2003). 
25 See www.lloydstsb.com (accessed on 21st January 2003). 
26 “Strike Threatens M&S Closure”, The Times, Saturday June 23rd 2001. 
27 “M&S Try To Sell 18 French Stores”, The Times, Wednesday July 25th 2001. 
28 “M&S Protests To Come To London”, The Times, Saturday May 5th 2001. 
29 “EU Will Back France Against Brutal M&S”, The Times, Tuesday April 24th 2001. 
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concern.  Compare this reaction where workers, politicians and the general public were united 
against the closure plans, to that in Belgium, where the closure of the country’s four stores 
was already agreed by the time of the attempt to find a buyer for the French stores.30    This 
example clearly illustrates how the elite controlling Marks and Spencer faced far more 
constraints on their decision-making ability in France than they did in Belgium, where the 
closure of stores was more easily arranged. 
 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This Chapter sought to investigate how corporations are controlled, and which groups are able 
to use these mechanisms to exert control.  In order to do this, the Chapter rooted its arguments 
in the economic literature on strategic decision-making. Strategic decisions were defined as 
those important decisions that give rise to corporate strategies, the broad plans that are the 
crucial determinants of the activities with which corporations are associated.  It was therefore 
argued that to control the decision-making process was, in essence, the ability to control a 
corporation.  Consequently the Chapter then turned its attention towards investigating those 
who are in a position to influence strategic decision-making, by examining the existing 
corporate governance literature. 
 
Corporate governance, however, is not a uniquely acknowledged concept but is a more vague 
idea representing the notion of control over a corporation.  Given this rather blurred 
definition, there is considerable debate around what is, or what should be, included in the 
topic of corporate governance, and indeed the conclusions that are reached as to the nature of 
control within the modern corporation.  Many focus on the relationship between shareholders 
                                                 
30 “M&S Try To Sell 18 French Stores”, The Times, Wednesday July 25th 2001. 
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and managers, often examining developments as to which of these has the power to control 
the direction of the corporation, and/or examining the effects of control on corporate financial 
performance.  
 
Furthermore, many commentators make much of the differences in the systems of corporate 
governance that are found in Japan, continental European countries and the Anglo-US 
economies.  Such differences are the source of great debate within the literature, but as this 
Chapter has argued, these differences are in a sense superficial.  Differences only exist in so 
far as contributions generally concentrate on the notion of shareholders competing against 
management for control of a corporation.  It is to the extent that one or other group controls a 
corporation, or the effects of differing balances in control across countries, where 
commentators generally disagree.  Despite this disagreement, on a fundamental basis, the 
literature on corporate governance is extremely consistent, in that nearly all contributions 
seem to agree on one vital point.  Control of the modern corporation is not seen as being 
widely dispersed, democratic, or open to all, but rather the preserve of a subset of those with 
an interest; an elite.   
 
The exact make-up of this controlling elite is likely to change from country to country, and 
thus the behaviour of this elite will also vary, reflecting the individual conditions that exist in 
each locality. Constraints on the strategy space available are likely to vary from country to 
country and indeed the influences that exist within the elites themselves will also vary, 
reflecting the differing constituents of the elite.  Nevertheless, the fundamental characteristic 
across countries is that controlling elites exist. 
 
 47 
This is of profound importance because different groups have different preferences about the 
strategy the corporation should pursue. The impact upon society of a corporation will 
therefore differ depending on which strategy is adopted, and so the ability to select the path of 
a corporation is the crucial determinant in shaping its influence upon society.  It is to this 
fundamental issue, and to the implications of corporate control being in the hands of an elite, 
that we now explore in Chapter Two.  In order to make this theory accessible, we examine the 
issues by considering the specific example of utility companies and the provision of utility 
services.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PUBLIC UTILITIES 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A public utility company, by definition, is the provider of important (one might say essential) 
basic services (such as electricity, water or gas) to the general public.   It is often said that 
because the services that utility companies provide are so important to everyday life, they 
should be given special consideration, and consequently that the governance of utility 
companies should be treated differently from other, less ‘essential’ companies.  This is not our 
view; in this Chapter we use the case of public utilities to explore the wider issues of elite 
control of the modern corporation.  Our findings will therefore be relevant and applicable to 
the governance of corporations more generally.
1
   
 
Chapter One explored the strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm and the 
implications this has for corporate governance.  It concluded that control of the modern 
corporation resides with an elite; a subset of those who have an interest in its activities.  
Standard economic thinking would suggest that members of such an elite (like all individuals) 
would exercise their control so as to further their own interests.  In this Chapter we argue that 
it is desirable that public utilities – and hence other corporations more widely – are run, and 
thus governed, in the interest of the public they serve.   To do otherwise, is to allow strategic 
failure. To that end practical steps to avoid the enduring strategic failure of elite control are 
outlined and examined. 
                                                 
1
 The exact definition of a public utility is relatively unimportant in this context since utility companies are just 
being used as an example to illustrate our theories of company control.  For the sake of clarity, public utilities 
have been defined herein as including corporations that supply services such as gas, electricity, telephone, water 
and major transport links (such as rail or bus facilities).  
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In order to pursue these ideas, Section II initially positions itself by illustrating how strategic 
decisions, and thus the strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm, can be 
applied to utility industries.  These practical illustrations are then utilised to establish how 
preferences over potential strategic decisions can vary between those who have an interest in 
the activities of a particular corporation.  This varying of preferences is then used to suggest 
that having control of the modern corporation in the hands of a subset of those who have an 
interest in its activities, leads to decisions being taken in the interests of that elite, and thus 
perhaps not in the interests of the wider public; that decision-making is not taken in the public 
interest.  
 
In light of these findings, Section III examines what might be changed to ensure that utility 
companies are controlled so as to serve the wider public interest.  In other words, how the 
governance of such companies could be constructed around a more inclusive and democratic 
structure.  We propose the notion that companies should be controlled by their members, 
where members consist of all those different groups who have a specific interest in the 
activities of a particular company.  This is strikingly different from current practice where the 
only members are shareholders.  The analysis is completed by examining practical and 
immediate ways forward that might address these issues in the utility sector.  Our concluding 
comments are then presented in Section IV. 
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II. STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
II.i Strategic Decisions 
Chapter One argued that to control the strategic decision-making process of a corporation is in 
essence to control the corporation.  It was suggested that strategic decisions are the important 
decisions that give rise to corporate strategies, the broad plans that are the crucial 
determinates of the activities with which a corporation is associated.  Following Zeitlin (1974, 
pp.1091-1092), we proffered that such policies could be conceptualised in broad terms as 
things like the power to decide where a corporation locates its facilities, the relationships it 
develops with workers and governments in those locations, how it interacts with rival 
corporations, or how it sources the required raw materials.   However, such relatively abstract 
strategic decisions can be readily illustrated in a more meaningful way by reference to the 
utility sector. 
 
This sector, especially in regards those corporations involved with water, electricity or 
telecommunications, often has extensive overseas activities.  In many cases, former monopoly 
corporations were privatised and/or liberalised prior to the expansion of the overseas 
operations.  Expansion into overseas markets reflects a strategic decision on the part of those 
in control of the utility company to diversify away from their historical base.   Indeed, as well 
as expanding the span of their geographical interests, many corporations have also diversified 
into new areas, thus expanding the number of activities with which they are associated.  This 
is again a strategic decision. 
 
Consider the specific example of ScottishPower.  The company was privatised in 1991 as an 
integrated electricity company, providing generation, transmission, distribution and supply of 
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electricity in its historical franchise area of Scotland (Thomas, 1996a).
2
  Since this time, a 
series of strategic decisions have been taken which have considerably altered the business.  
The company now operates in the USA as well as in the UK (as opposed to just Scotland), 
having electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and supply activities in both 
countries, as well as coal mining and gas storage/hub services in the US, and gas supply 
interests in the UK.
3
  In the years following privatisation, the group also developed significant 
interests in telecommunications although these have subsequently been demerged into the 
THUS Group Plc.
4
  The decision to demerge these telecommunication interests, just like the 
initial decision to develop them or the other activities and/or countries added since 
privatisation, is an example of a strategic decision taken by those who control the 
ScottishPower group. 
 
Furthermore, those in charge of ScottishPower will have also taken many other strategic 
decisions, such as the location and technical type of new generating plant to be built or 
acquired.  In early 2001, for example, ScottishPower acquired the Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) Rye House power station from PowerGen (another UK based power group 
created during the privatisation process). Indeed, the decision of ScottishPower to purchase 
the Rye House power station was possible because those in a position to exercise control over 
Powergen had decided to sell the plant and had taken a number of strategic decisions in the 
                                                 
2
 The company was actually created when the industry was reorganised in 1990. See Chapter Five for further 
details of electricity reorganisation and privatisation in Great Britain. 
3
 See http://www.scottishpower.com/pages/aboutus_companyprofile (accessed on 13
th
 August 2002). 
4
 See http://www.thus.net/index_2.htm , About Thus, Company History section. (accessed on 13
th
 August 2002).  
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early 1990s when they decided to build a power station at that location, and chose the CCGT 
technology.
5
 
 
II.ii Variation of Interests 
To be able to exert corporate control is of profound importance because the actions of 
corporations are widely felt within society, especially when those corporations are involved 
with the utility sector.  Each strategic decision will impact upon communities in a different 
way (both good and bad) and so to control a corporation is to determine its impact upon 
society.  The significance of this lies in the fact that interests vary across those concerned 
about, and affected by, a corporation’s activities; not everyone with an interest draws equal 
benefit, or bears an equal burden.   
 
This variation would inevitably entail different strategic decisions being preferred because 
each potential decision each would yield differing effects in the ways in which corporations 
influence economies and hence societies.  Zeitlin (1974, p.1091) implicitly recognised this 
variation in interests when he argued that controlling a corporation actually implies the ability 
to determine broad corporate objectives “despite resistance from others” - such resistance can 
only exist if there is disagreement concerning the decisions to be taken.   Indeed, Brancato 
(1997) also recognises the fact that interests vary within corporate governance when she 
comments that “it is crucial to remember that creating shareholder value means different 
things to different shareholders” (Brancato, 1997, p.xiv).  Furthermore, this concept can be 
illustrated in the specific case of the utility sector. 
                                                 
5
 See Rye House section of  
http://www.scottishpower.com/pages/aboutus_scottishpowerbusinesses_ukdivision_powergeneration?nav=about
us_scottishpowerbusinesses_ukdivision_powergeneration (accessed on 13
th
 August 2002). 
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Shareholders currently dominate systems of corporate governance, and because of their 
financial stake, they clearly have a particular interest in ensuring that the corporation, and thus 
their shareholding, remains profitable.  Consider the troubled British railway network 
infrastructure company, Railtrack, which was placed in administration during October 2001.
6
  
In an effort to resurrect Britain’s railway infrastructure, the assets of Railtrack were sold to a 
new ‘not-for-dividend’ company, Network Rail.
7
  The decision to enter into this sale, 
however, was not universally welcomed by all Railtrack shareholders.   Many smaller 
shareholders objected to the sale but it was nevertheless passed at the extraordinary meeting 
thanks to institutional investors who voted in favour.  Indeed, 1,000 small shareholders 
registered their protest at the sale during the meeting via three-and-a-half hours of attacks on 
the board,
8
 but ultimately 97% of votes were cast in favour of the sale.
9
  That this was not 
totally unanimous illustrates that shareholders are not one homogenous group who agree on 
every issue. 
 
Subsets of shareholders are not the only groups to have an interest in the activities of a 
particular utility company.  Such companies are, by their nature, companies with large 
numbers of employees.  At the extreme, for example, the Deutsche Telekom Group workforce 
on 30
th
 September 2001 stood at 246,192  (Deutsche Telekom, 2001, p.2), whilst the BT 
Group’s workforce stood at 108,600 on 31
st
 March 2002,
10
 and Vivendi Environnement (A 
                                                 
6
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/scotland/1586086.stm (accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
7
 Network Rail has no shareholders but is run along commercial lines, with any operating surplus being re-
invested in the rail network. The company board is held accountable for its performance by 115 members who 
are individuals and organisations with an interest in the future of the rail sector (Network Rail, 2002a).  The issue 
of membership of Network Rail is discussed later in this Chapter.  
8
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,762181,00.html (accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
9
 See http://www.railtrack-group.co.uk/news/article.cfm?id=1251  (accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
10
 http://www.groupbt.com/Corporateinformation/Chartingourprogress/charts2/charts.pdf   (accessed on 13
th
 
August 2002).  
 54 
France based environmental services company) employed approximately 239,000 people in 
2001.
11
  Whilst companies with such high employee numbers are relatively few in number, 
many of the smaller utility companies still employ significant numbers of workers.  British 
Energy (UK based energy company), for instance, employs approximately 8,200 workers, 
whilst Severn Trent Plc (UK based environmental services group) employs over 14,000 
people.
12
  It is inconceivable to believe that all of the employees in such companies share 
exactly the same vision for the company's strategic decisions or, for that matter, agree with all 
the strategic decisions taken by those in control.   
 
Consider, for example, the decision of British Telecom to demerge its mobile phone business 
in 2001.  Members of the Communication Workers Union opposed this action as they were 
said to believe that it would lead to a take-over and then job losses.
13
  This clearly illustrates 
that those in control of British Telecom’s strategic decision-making process, and (at least 
some of) the workers held different preferences concerning the future of the mobile phone 
division.   Furthermore, in the summer of 2002, rail members of the Rail Maritime and 
Transport (RMT) Union voted on industrial action concerning a pay dispute with train 
operator First North Western.  The fact that only approximately 85% backed industrial action 
illustrates that workers are not one homogenous group that agree on every issue.
14
 
 
Moreover, there are other groups who have an interest in the activities of the various utility 
concerns.  Given the nature of utility companies, one of the most important amongst these 
                                                 
11
 The key figures section of; 
www.vivendienvironnement.com/en/services/infos/index.htm?garde=/en/services/infos/historique/garde.htm,  
(accessed on 13
th
 August 2002). 
12
 See http://www.british-energy.com/media/information/index.html and Employment section of 
http://www.severn-trent.com/obop/index.htm respectively  (Both accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
13
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1615100.stm (accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
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might be said to be consumers.   Consider the example of the coming of age of the Internet, 
which has started a revolution in the way in which telephony services are viewed, provided 
and utilised.  Many consumers (both household and business) would like improved access to 
the next generation of technology, which should provide cheap and quick access to the 
Internet.  However, as the Financial Times reported,  “in the US and Europe, 
telecommunication operators (like BT) have been reluctant to deploy new broadband access 
technologies ... because of their concerns that it would cannibalise their highly lucrative ISDN 
and leased line services” which are based on older (and hence slower) technologies.
15
  In this 
respect the interests of consumers and those in control of the telecommunication operators do 
not seem to coincide.  This does not mean, however, that consumers are a uniform group; 
there will be a multitude of subsets who hold diverging views on what they expect from a 
particular utility company.  Looking more widely, this might be in terms of the level of 
service they receive, such as the level of water quality or packages which include equipment 
rental and servicing. Consumers would also differ in other ways, such as in preference on the 
type of tariff structures, methods of payment or the ability of companies to offer discounts 
when they bundle utility services, like gas and electricity. 
 
Special interest groups, such as environmental pressure groups, would also have their own, 
and most likely distinct, opinions on company strategy.  In this case placing a heavier weight 
on environmental concerns than might other interest groups, such as shareholders or 
consumers.  Take, for instance, the case of power generation. Organisations such as 
Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth object to the use of certain types of fuel or technology (i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                        
14
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2159512.stm (accessed on 14
th
  August 2002). 
15
 Financial Times, 7
th
  April 1999, ‘Survey - Financial Times Information Technology: Speedier access Broad 
Band Access by Paul Taylor: Livelier content and improved services with transform the internet when users are 
no longer constrained by slow access’. 
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nuclear or fossil fuels) on the grounds of environmental desecration.
16
  For example, because 
of these views, such environmentalists were bitterly opposed to the plans for the construction 
of a new nuclear power station in Finland that was finally approved in May 2002 by the 
Finnish parliament.
17
 
 
Other identifiable interest groups are those involved with related firms, both direct 
competitors and utility companies in general, as they will also have an interest in the strategic 
decision of a specific company.  The strategic decisions of one firm may have potentially 
damaging or lucrative spillover effects on other utility companies.  In Britain, for example, the 
decision of Telewest (a cable company) to offer a ‘reasonable’ flat rate tariff for unlimited 
Internet access inclusive of phone charges put great pressure on other providers of telephony 
services to offer similar unmetered tariffs.
18
 A few days after Telewest made their 
announcement, NTL (another cable company) followed suit by offering free and unmetered 
Internet access, conditional on switching to the company's telephone service and spending a 
minimum of £10 a month on ordinary voice calls.  Such moves applied enormous pressure to 
BT (the former monopoly telephony company), forcing it to respond with several unmetered 
Internet access
19
 packages.
20
 
 
                                                 
16
 See  http://www.greenpeace.org/  for more information on the stance of Greenpeace, and http://www.foei.org/  
for information on Friends of the Earth (both accessed on 13
th
 August 2002).  
17
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2006191.stm (accessed on 13
th
 August 2002). 
18
 The Times, 6
th
 March 2000, ‘Blair Set to back calls for lower Net fees’. 
19
 The Times, 9
th
 March 2000, ‘BT seeks leeway to compete in Net war’. 
20
 This type of pressure has already been seen in the market for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) when 
Freeserve pioneered subscription-free Internet access (i.e. no monthly fee) in Europe. Freeserve was so 
successful after its launch, that many other ISPs were forced to follow its example and offer subscription-free 
access. - see the Financial Times, 17
th
 March 2000, ‘Companies and Finance: UK Early fame brings pitfalls and 
suits in the wings: Freeserve will need to rebrand itself to gain long term success, says Caroline Daniel’. 
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Another group that may be seen to have an interest in the activities of utility companies is 
Governments.
21
   Many, for example, regulate the price and quality of services that such 
companies provide, clearly illustrating that government has a different view of such strategic 
decisions from that of the companies.  One such case is the Office of Telecommunications, 
which is the regulator of the UK telecommunications industry and has thus set various price 
controls in place, leading to significant cuts in the real price of telephone charges.  The fact 
that these controls were needed to obtain lower telephone charges illustrates how government 
and corporations each have their own views. 
   
This does not mean, however, that Government is an identical or uniform group that agrees on 
every issue.  For example, the aforementioned Finnish decision to approve construction of a 
new nuclear power station was in no way unanimous since the idea had previously been voted 
down in the Finnish Parliament during 1993, and the May 2002 bill was only narrowly passed 
with 107 voting for, and 92 against.
22
  Indeed, it would seem that the issue of power 
generation is a divisive one since the ruling Norwegian coalition government collapsed in 
March 2000 after being defeated in a confidence vote surrounding the policy of building gas 
fired electricity power stations.  The Prime Minister lost the parliamentary vote 71-81 which 
again intimates that there were considerable differences of opinion.
23
    
 
 
II.iii The Challenge For Public Policy 
In short, many different groups can be identified, each with their own particular interest in the 
activities of a specific utility corporation.  These differing interests will lead to individual 
                                                 
21
 It could be argued that government does not have an interest itself, but is rather the representative of other 
interest groups such as consumers or employees.  Whilst this view is appealing in many respects, it doesn’t really 
account for the fact that government has a specific function and this may give rise to a unique interest.  
22
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2006191.stm (accessed on 14
th
 August 2002). 
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preferences for the strategic decisions to be taken, and thus by extension, the impact of the 
corporation upon society.  Sometimes these interests and preferences will coincide or overlap, 
whilst in other situations, they will be conflicting or opposing.   However, as this thesis has 
already suggested, control of the strategic decision-making process typically lies with an elite, 
a subset of those who have an interest in the activities of a particular corporation.  Economic 
theory suggests that individuals take decisions in their own self-interest, and so when taken in 
combination, these findings would seem to indicate a fundamental problem with the current 
system of corporate governance.   
 
The ability of an elite to take the strategic-decisions of the modern corporation (such as a 
utility company) suggests they do so in a way that best serves the interests of that specific 
group.  This is a serious problem if it is seen as desirable that corporations’ activities serve the 
interests of all people or interest groups, and thus the community in general; if it is considered 
desirable that corporations serve the public interest.  The problem is that elite decision-
making in such a manner negates the ability of the community to determine the strategic path 
of production in its own best interest.  Therefore, current decision-making, as seen from a 
community level, might be seen to be sub-optimal.   As Cowling and Sugden (1999, p.361) 
put it, elite decision-making means there is “strategic failure” in the current system of 
corporate governance.  Brancto (1997, p.xxi) implicitly recognises this strategic failure from a 
shareholder perspective when she says that “corporations cannot create shareholder value 
through one all-purpose strategy.  They must define which shareholders they intend to create 
value for and design strategies accordingly”.  Furthermore, Tirole (2001, p.23) identifies this 
failure when he comments upon the “various externalities imposed by profit maximising 
                                                                                                                                                        
23
 The Times, 10
th
 March 2000, 'Norway's coalition falls in dispute over gas pollution.'  
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choices on other stakeholders”, and later concludes that “undivided control … creates biased 
decision-making” (Tirole, 2001, p.30). 
 
To avoid such strategic failure, an obvious possibility is to follow the suggestion of Cowling 
and Sugden (1999, p.366) and search “for ways of appropriately involving more and more 
people affected by strategic decisions in the actual process of making those decisions; to 
design ways” of democratising governance.  A key aspect of this is to seek more participation 
and an effective democracy within the strategic decision-making processes of corporations.   
This is significantly different from the view presented in Tirole (2001, p.24) that “the firm 
should internalise the externalities [imposed] on the various stakeholders” and thus that 
“incentives should be designed that induce management to account for” these.  Whilst such a 
suggestion goes some way to accommodating the interests of wider groups, it is still lacking. 
To put in place the managerial incentives required to account for the externalities, there has to 
be some ‘guessing’ as to the interests of different interests groups and the extent to which they 
were affected by firm created externalities.  Furthermore, it would be impossible to identify, 
and therefore take account of, all the externalities imposed by the firm.  The internalisation of 
externalities would therefore be an inferior way of incorporating different viewpoints and 
interests, when compared with the introduction of democratic control.  (In many ways, the 
internalisation of externalities suffers from similar problems to regulation, a topic which is 
addressed in Section III.ii). 
 
One feature of the current system of corporate control is that shareholders are usually seen as 
the corporate risk takers, since they bear a financial risk for which they receive financial 
benefits in the form of dividends or capital growth.  However, we would argue that other 
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groups such as employees or specific localities also bear risks associated with a corporation, 
including for example, the risk of unemployment (if the corporation were to move its facilities 
to a different location) or pollution (if the corporation was careless, or its facilities suffered an 
accident).  In line with this, Tirole (2001, p.23) suggests that other stakeholders such as 
“management and workers … [invest] their human capital as well as off-work related capital 
(housing, spouse employment, schools, social relationship, etc.) in the employment relation”. 
The democratisation of decision-making may therefore also serve to address this issue in that 
those groups that currently bear risk may be able to gain a greater degree of control over the 
risk they face. 
 
It would be unrealistic, however, to assume that all (if any) of the controlling elite would be 
willing to voluntarily relinquish, or even diminish, their control of the corporation so that 
democratic control can be introduced.
24
  This therefore suggests that corporate governance 
needs to be made a central issue for public policy if strategic failure is to be meaningfully 
addressed.
25
 
  
II.iv Market Failure versus Strategic Failure 
The strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm thus gives rise to the notion 
that public policy should seek to address the issue of strategic failure in corporate governance.  
By contrast, the theories on economic welfare centred around markets suggest that the basis 
for public policy is market failure rather than strategic failure, and the public interest may still 
                                                 
24
 See Pitelis and Sugden (1986) for further discussion of control groups voluntarily relinquishing control. 
25
 Indeed, not only would such policies address the fundamental issues concerning the current strategic failure of 
decision-making, but evidence also suggests that widening involvement in strategic decision-making might be 
welfare enhancing in its own right. Frey and Stutzer (2000, p.918) report that interview data in Switzerland 
indicates “individuals are ceteris paribus happier, the better developed the institutions of direct democracy are in 
their area of residence”.   Therefore, by addressing the strategic failure of corporate governance as a matter of 
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be served even if corporations are governed by sectional interests which are left ‘free’ from 
Government ‘interference’.  An argument underlying such a view can be seen in extreme form 
in an Arrow-Debreu type general equilibrium model (see, for example, Debreu, 1959; and 
Arrow and Hahn, 1971). In this case, the presence of ubiquitous perfect competition ensures 
Pareto optimal outcomes in situations where producers and indeed all actors pursue their own 
interests.  Less extreme would be the situation where a corporation is governed by sectional 
interests but where those with other interests can make take-over bids in a competitive capital 
market or can establish new, competing corporations. The strategic failure analysis, in 
contrast, is founded on the significance of imperfect competition. 
 
The justification for this foundation can easily be illustrated in the case of utility companies 
with regard to the possibility of new entry.  It is not always possible for at least some of those 
with an interest in a particular utility company to establish a new, competing firm.  In many 
situations utility companies are natural monopolies, which by definition make it inefficient and 
hence impractical to create new companies with competing infrastructure.  The services 
provided by these companies have become essential, which means consumers are locked-in to 
this natural monopoly firm from which they have no possible means of escape.  
 
Even where natural monopolies do not exist, inertia on the part of the consuming public puts 
new ventures at an immediate disadvantage; the public has a great tendency to remain with 
their historical supplier.  For example, in Britain from September 1998, the market for 
electricity supply was fully liberalised so that all customers could choose which company 
supplied their electricity (OFFER, 1998, p.17).  Prior to this date, a number of companies had 
                                                                                                                                                        
purposive public policy, individuals will potentially benefit from the welfare enhancing effects of feeling 
involved with decision-making per se as well as from the public interest decision-making it implies. 
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enjoyed regional monopolies in their franchise areas (see Chapter Five of this thesis for a 
more detailed explanation of the liberalisation and privatisation of the British electricity 
sector).   As of February 28
th
 2002, only 35% of customers in Great Britain had switched 
electricity supplier from the former monopoly, even though in doing so the consumer could 
significantly reduce their bill.
26
 This leaves new ventures on the margin, fighting for 
involvement in a smaller market, serving the small number of consumers who are willing to 
actively seek alternatives. 
 
In addition to this inertia, utility companies often provide their services using expensive 
infrastructures (e.g. electricity grids or networks of water pipes) which exclude all but the 
most committed and wealthy from being potential entrants.  Those most in need of influence 
over the strategic decision-making process are those that currently have no or extremely little 
power, and it is unlikely that such wealthy individuals capable of creating an entrant could be 
described as such.  As we established in Chapter One, significant wealth leads to power 
through the ownership of significant shareholdings, and thus participation in the controlling 
elite.  Furthermore, even if the wealthy were not currently part of the controlling elite, the 
financial resources needed to start a competing firm might instead be used to bring their 
owners into the existing firm's strategic decision-making process thereby removing the need 
to create an entrant.  By contrast, those groups lacking wealth are most likely excluded from 
the current decision-making structures because they are unlikely to be large shareholders or 
senior management.  Consequently the representation of wider concerns in corporate 
                                                 
 
26
 Source: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/prices/switching.htm#elec,  accessed on 7
th
 August 2002.  A typical 
example of a significant saving might be what Energywatch classifies as a medium  user  (3,300kWh 
consumption) who pays by direct debit and  lives in the region of England where SWEB was the former 
monopoly supplier.  As of August 2002, such a customer being supplied by SWEB would face a bill of £261, 
which is 16.5% higher than if they were supplied by the cheapest company, Basic Power who charge £224  –  
calculated from information presented in Energywatch (2002). 
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governance requires new policies to enable all interests groups to have some bearing on a 
firm's strategic decision-making process.  This is the challenge faced by public policy. 
 
One of the implications of the differing perspectives of the market-centred and strategic 
failure approaches toward the nature of competition, is their respective emphases on 
Hirschman’s (1970) forces of exit and voice.  This has important implications for the nature 
of the purposive public policies we are advocating, as will become apparent later in this 
Chapter.  The nature of the market centred approach is such that it focuses upon the idea of 
exit.  Any problems encountered are because the market is not able to function freely; there 
are constraints acting upon entry and exist decisions.  In light of this, appropriate public 
policies (when adopting a market centred approach) would concentrate on achieving (or at 
least mimicking the effects of) contestibility to free up the natural operation of the market, 
and thus correct any problems encountered.  In other words, a market centred approach leads 
to public policy focusing upon the free operation of markets, and such an approach can be 
equated with Hirshman’s concept of exit. 
 
The strategic failure approach, by contrast, is built upon the assumption of imperfect 
competition and thus recognises the importance of both exit and voice in addressing 
problems.  It recognises that exit (or entry) is not always a viable option and thus voice, the 
expressing and articulation of ones opinions or preferences,  is therefore crucial.   That is not 
to suggest that policies toward exit have no place in a strategic failure approach, but rather 
that they only form part (instead of the entirety) of appropriate public policy.  This is quite a 
departure for the justification behind, and thus the nature and scope of, appropriate public 
 64 
policy, especially since the concept of voice is so much less precise than exit.  As Hirshman 
(1970, pp.15-16) observes, exit is  
“the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat – one either exits or one 
does not; it is impersonal – any face-to-face confrontation between customer and 
firm with its imponderable and unpredictable elements is avoided and success and 
failure of the organisation are communicated to it by a set of statistics; and it is 
indirect – any recovery on the part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the 
Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product of the customer’s decision to shift.  
In all these respects voice is just the opposite of exit. It is a far more ‘messy’ 
concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent 
protest; it implies articulation of one’s critical opinions rather than a private, 
‘secret’ vote in the anonymity of the supermarket; and finally, it is direct and 
straightforward rather than roundabout”.   
 
Consequently, voice is at the very heart of public interest decision-making; the democratic 
process at the core of its essence entails “the digging, the use, and hopefully the slow 
improvement” (Hirschman, 1970, p.17) of channels of voice, and “while exit requires nothing 
but a clearcut either-or decision, voice is essentially an art constantly evolving in new 
directions”  (Hirschman, 1970, p.43). The challenge is to design specific policies that 
recognise and nurture this constantly evolving art (and that maintain an appropriate mix and 
balance of voice and exit processes).   It is to the design of such specific policies that we now 
turn in the next Section of this Chapter.  Whilst these discussions are focussed upon the utility 
sector, the ideas are still broadly applicable to other sectors. 
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III. GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
As the previous Section outlined, governance in the public interest requires that governance 
be democratised so that all of those with an interest in the activities of a particular utility 
corporation can have a voice in determining its strategy, and thus its impact upon society.   
The organisation of production in this manner would be a deep-seated, fundamental change 
which requires an alteration to the very nature of the shareholder focussed system currently in 
place.  We do not suggest that such a fundamental transformation towards an inclusive, 
democratic system of governance could, or indeed, should be achieved immediately.  Rather, 
we suggest that it should be society’s long-term aim and objective.     
 
The attainment of such an objective requires that long-term plans be adopted which seek to 
implement the more fundamental changes required to the current system.   However, these 
long-term plans, by their very nature, may extend deep into the future and thus may mean 
fundamental change will take a significant amount of time.  Such policies therefore need to be 
supported and supplemented by more short-term measures which can more immediately start 
to address concerns with the exclusion of many interest groups from strategic decision-
making.  To that end, we first turn to some potential long-term policies in Sub-Section III.i 
before addressing more immediate measures and initiatives that might be taken in Sub-
Section III.ii. 
 
The policies we discuss in the following Sub-Sections are not about imposing or forcing our 
view of appropriate governance mechanisms upon society.  They are designed to facilitate 
society’s use of governance instruments, and are about enabling and awakening the power 
that is currently dormant within us. As Wheatley (2002, pp.48-49) observes, “there is no 
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power for change greater than a community discovering what it cares about”.  We are 
therefore seeking to proffer policies that may facilitate and help utilise the power that exists 
within all of the diverse and varied aspects of society.   Furthermore, policies based around 
the idea of the empowerment of society allow individuals to decide for themselves what 
issues (and thus decision-making processes) they care enough about to become involved with, 
instead of merely allowing participation in a number of externally decided decisions, which 
may or may not be appropriate.   
 
III.i A Reformed Legal Framework 
One vital possibility that might be a step in the appropriate direction is to consider the 
provisions of company law to introduce changes that would widen involvement in strategic 
decision-making.  To pursue this we examine English experience as an illustration.
27
 
 
In Chapter One, we argued that the existing corporate governance literature places de facto 
control of the typical large, modern corporation between an elite group of (large) shareholders 
and senior managers/the company board.   Drawing upon the law literature, Branston et al. 
(2001a) identify that this is reflected in English company law in the notion that certain 
shareholders are a company’s ‘members’ who elect and in theory monitor the board of 
directors.  Furthermore, they highlight that the prime duty of directors is to act in the interests 
of the company, but that this is essentially equated with the shareholders’ interests.  Whilst 
secondary duties towards company creditors and employees are highlighted, these are said to 
be of little consequence. 
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Branston et al. (2001a) go on characterise the US legal situation as being broadly similar 
although they highlight that there are contrasts with other systems such as Japan or Germany, 
where companies are seen as serving both shareholders and employees.  This is not to 
contradict the argument in Chapter One that economic control rests with an elite in Japan and 
Germany, rather it is to comment upon the formal legal duties of those elite and on the legal 
constraints that the elites face. Whilst these formalities and constraints need not be irrelevant, 
our focus is the possibilities for democratising governance, for moving away from governance 
by an elite towards effective participation by all interested parties.  An English legal system in 
which directors owe a duty to shareholders does not mean that all shareholders are effectively 
participating in economic governance.  Similarly, a Japanese or German legal system serving 
employees does not necessarily mean that employees have economic control. 
 
One possibility for change in England to increase participation in a corporation’s strategic 
decision-making is to build on the concept of membership of a company and the requirement 
that senior management must act in the interest of members.  The idea is to reform company 
law in order to widen membership beyond shareholders, including as members others with an 
interest in the corporation’s activities. 
 
This sort of development has been discussed in earlier literature, see for example Farrar and 
Hannigan (1998), and Mayson et al. (1999) on the debate regarding the interests of 
‘stakeholders’, also Sternberg (1997) and Tirole (2001) on the definition and use of this 
concept.   Indeed, these contributions together with that of Kelly et al. (1997), clearly reveal 
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 Examination of one country is not to deny the possibility of countries co-operating with each other to pursue 
change. This option might be interesting in the European Union, building on the history of the Vredeling 
directive, see European Commission (1980).  
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the very narrow conceptualisation of stakeholding that is adhered to by many.
28
   Moreover, 
the prospect of senior management having a duty towards all of those interest groups with a 
stake in a company has recently been rejected by the Hampel Committee on Corporate 
Governance, which concluded that : 
“to redefine the director’s responsibilities in terms of the shareholders would 
mean identifying all the various stakeholder groups; and deciding the nature and 
extent of the director’s  responsibility to each.  The result would be that the 
directors were not effectively accountable to anyone since there would be no clear 
yardstick for judging their performance.  This is a recipe neither for good 
governance nor for corporate success” (Hampel Committee Report, 1998, 
paragraph 1.17). 
 
However, it would seem to us that, in the light of the economic argument outlined herein, this 
issue is far from closed.  In addition, it is curious that whilst some consider it appropriate for a 
corporation to be governed in the interests of only one group amongst a set of stakeholders, 
the same is not considered appropriate for a nation.  According to the Hampel Committee, the 
directors of a particular utility company would not be accountable to anyone if they owed 
significant duties to shareholders and to others.  Yet it is commonly argued that the British 
Government, for instance, is in some sense accountable to the British electorate, an electorate 
made up of many varied and diverse interests.  Furthermore, existing English company law 
means that buying shares generally means the buying of votes and hence a degree of control 
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 Will Hutton (who has made a number of contributions to the stakeholder debate) argues that  “shareholders 
property rights are not absolute, that those shareholders live in society too, and the exercise of their rights is 
subject to the claims of others”.  To this end he suggests that “corporate law should widen the number of 
stakeholders who have a legitimate claim on decision-making” (The Observer, 9
th
 April 2000). Hutton is also a 
contributor to Kelly et  al. (1997).  He favours social and economic inclusion but then argues that the big 
question is where the market should end and the relationships of inclusion begin. Our analysis does not recognise 
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over the strategic decision-making process.  This is again strikingly different from what is 
widely perceived as being appropriate for the governance of a country; the use of money to 
buy votes in British parliamentary elections (and indeed in countries more widely) was 
eradicated in the nineteenth century, even though a similar system still persists in the 
governance structure of publicly owned corporations.
29
 
 
The exact way the widening of membership is achieved and how company directors are 
bestowed with attainable duties towards all those members is something that would need 
imaginative consideration, and it is likely something that would need to be developed and 
evolved over time, learning from experience.  The same process could not be uniformly 
applied to every corporation; each sector, and perhaps corporation, has unique considerations 
that need to be taken into account.  In general, however, it would be infeasible to attempt to 
provide all interests with an appropriate voice in the strategic decision-making process 
simultaneously, and one option is to focus attention consecutively on particular sectors and 
groups. In the case of utility companies, we have identified different groups of shareholders, 
of people working for the companies, special interest groups and of customers, as all having 
an interest.  One possibility might be to focus in the first instance on the feasibility of 
employees being made company members, or perhaps the nature of such companies suggests 
the initial focus should be on customers.  Within this there could be further focussing; perhaps 
on customers who take more than one service from the utility company, for example where 
the company acts as the supplier of both gas and electricity services.  Another illustration 
might be railway season ticket holders who use the train for their daily commute.  Both of 
                                                                                                                                                        
this border, instead suggesting that inclusion needs to be the fundamental determinant of the nature and form of 
all relationships, including market relationships.  
29
 In practice, the buying of votes in national elections implicitly continues via the use of lobbyists, publicity and  
spin doctors. 
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these examples might be seen as implying a level of commitment and dependence towards a 
particular company and hence a corresponding interest that stands such people apart from 
others. 
 
When deciding which interest group to make the focus of the initial process to widen 
membership, it would not be appropriate to make this focus on larger interest groups, such as 
large customers.  These are the groups that are more likely to have influence over the existing 
strategic decision-making process and are thus less in need of policy intervention to improve 
their influence over the strategic decision-making process.  It should be the smaller interest 
groups, the ones with the least influence over the existing strategic decision-making process 
that are made the initial focus.  This way, membership would be widened significantly from 
the start of the process, making a real difference to corporate governance.
30
 
 
In widening membership of companies there would be difficulties in developing a practical 
system that allows effective corporate governance.  One of the most important of these 
difficulties being the allocation of votes for electing the board of directors, since this needs to 
be done in a way that enables real power sharing whilst also maintaining a practical and 
workable system.  For example, to have a situation where each customer member has a vote 
together with one vote per share would give a significantly different result to a system with 
one member one vote.  Indeed it could be the case in both situations that either shareholder or 
customer members were capable of swamping the other, depending on the numbers involved.   
 
                                                 
30
 Here we use size as a way of distinguishing between the existing power of different interest groups, although 
this might equally be done on other grounds such as financial resources  (as mentioned earlier).   
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Another practical problem that would need to be addressed is how new company members are 
to be identified.  If, for example, customers are to be company members, criteria will be 
required in order to define those able to become a ‘customer member’.  Such an identification 
process would not be an easy one.  By their very nature, utility companies are service 
providers and so the ability to easily identify suitable groups will vary from company to 
company, but this is a problem with many potential solutions; a significant membership fee 
might be considered as one desirable option as this might imply that only customers with a 
significant dependency on the utility company would incur the cost of becoming members.  
This fee could take many different forms but a one-time fee, returnable on the decision to 
cease being a member presents an attractive possibility.  To reduce the exclusion of those 
financially constrained, such a fee might be paid over time, perhaps via a monthly salary 
contribution.  The fee could then be placed in some form of interest bearing trust to act like a 
bank account, giving a guaranteed return disparate from company performance and profits.  In 
this situation, the fee is acting as a bond between the new member and company, whilst 
maintaining the distinction between shareholders and other company members. The fee might 
also be returnable if, for example, the member decided they no longer wished to be involved 
in the governance process.
31
   
 
Conversely, it might be deemed appropriate to automatically give such membership rights to 
certain types of customers, such as rail season ticket holders, or as mentioned earlier, those 
                                                 
31
 On first impression, requiring a membership fee might be seen as little different to defining company 
membership exclusively in terms of those buying a share in the company; if both customer and shareholder 
members are defined (in part) by their willingness to make a financial commitment, why not simplify matters by 
requiring all company members to have a shareholding, whether or not those members be customers?  The 
reason why not is that customers have interests as customers and as distinct from shareholders; if customers are 
to qualify as members by virtue of a shareholding, the significance of customers qua customers is in danger of 
being lost. By having a fee that is separated from company performance, this distinction is not lost. There is a 
similar argument against the view that employees who are also shareholders are appropriately accounted for 
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who take more than one utility service from the same company.  To ensure only committed 
individuals claimed such rights, membership could be made conditional on their participation 
in some active and perhaps time-consuming registration process, to ensure there is some 
‘cost’ of becoming such a member and thus that it is not entered into lightly. 
 
It is, however, unrealistic to assume that every consumer (or other interest group) would 
immediately want to become a member of the company.  Although the numbers would differ 
from sector to sector, in many cases it would only be those few who have a special interest 
that would exercise their right.   This might be seen to imply broad satisfaction, or at least low 
levels of dissatisfaction, with the company existing strategic decisions and hence governance.  
In times of (extreme) public dissatisfaction we envisage the right to become members being 
more highly utilised, changing the governance balance between shareholders and other 
members.  This shifting balance would therefore be a process that helps affect change.   
 
Such thinking is inline with the views of Hirschman (1970, p.32), who suggested that “a 
mixture of alert and inert citizens, or even an alternation of involvement and withdrawal, may 
actually serve democracy better than either total, permanent activism or total apathy”.  
Hirschman (1970, p.32) went on to explain that “one reason … is that the ordinary failure, on 
the part of most citizens, to use their potential political forces to the full makes it possible for 
them to react with unexpected vigour – by using normally unused reserves of political power 
and influence – whenever their vital interests are directly threatened”.  Furthermore, it was 
also suggested that the use of voice needs to be followed by a period in which representatives 
                                                                                                                                                        
merely by reason of their shareholdings.  See Knight and Sugden (1990) for more details on this and related 
issues. 
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of the corporation have time to “respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it” 
(Hirschman, 1970, p.33). 
 
The ability to become a member is therefore important for giving a voice to those who 
currently have none, even if it appears (at least superficially) that it is not always (fully) 
utilised.  For example, it is unlikely that many customers would become members of British 
electricity supply companies at this time, since there are low levels of public dissatisfaction 
with their service; there were just 0.05 complaints (customer account complaints excluding 
direct selling and transfer complaints) per 100,000 customers in December 2001.
32
  However, 
given the same rights, customers of the private rail companies in Britain are far more likely to 
be active in seeking membership, reflecting the almost universal public dissatisfaction with 
the performance of these companies; Train Operating Companies registered 126 complaints 
per 100,000 passenger journeys in the fourth quarter of 2001-2002 (Strategic Rail Authority, 
2002, Table 2.2, p.18).   
 
It may also be the case that the choice to become a member would be influenced by the 
quantity and quality of available ‘performance’ indicators.  Consider the examples used 
above.  Electricity consumers mainly rely on price and the reliability of service but for rail 
travellers there are far more criteria on which to judge (and hence be dissatisfied with) - price, 
delays, cleanliness of rolling stock, journey times and so on.  On this basis, electricity 
customers in California, who have recently faced uncertain supplies, power cuts and steep 
price rises, would be highly likely to be actively seeking membership. 
 
                                                 
32
 http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/Electricity_Customer_Account_Complaints_December_2001.doc 
accessed on 9
th
 August  2002. 
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This example highlights the fundamental issue of information.  We see information as being 
central for effective corporate governance, as it is unrealistic to assume that members can 
exert proper control if they are blindfolded and handicapped by lack of information.  Indeed, 
in Chapter One we reported the view that existing members (i.e. shareholders) lack sufficient 
information, which is a well-known problem that needs to be resolved.  Membership cannot 
be truly widened if information is restricted.  Interest groups need information so that they can 
appropriately assess the existing strategic decision-making process.  By giving interest groups 
more information, the company is making accessible more grounds on which it can be judged.  
In this respect, policy therefore needs to be directed to actively ensure that the appropriate 
information is more widely available to all actual and potential members.  Such a policy 
would have to balance these concerns against the need to guarantee that the companies’ most 
sensitive information is not freely given to rival organisations.   However, the even 
application of such a policy to all firms would go a long way towards mitigating potential 
secrecy concerns.  Moreover such a process could be seen as a good thing; reducing the secret 
nature of society would help to build trust, changing the relationship between customer (or 
other interest group) and company from antagonism, suspicion and distrust, to one of 
engagement and proactive involvement. 
 
One policy possibility in line this with this thinking is suggested by Bailey et al. (1994, 1999), 
who propose the idea of ‘transnational corporation monitoring units’ - units “designed to  
collect information on transnationals’ performance and impact, to prepare accounts and to use 
these to influence economic policy and attitudes of and towards transnationals” (Bailey et al., 
1994, p.316).  Although the focus of the argument in Bailey et al. (1994) is to aid 
governments with their dealings with transnational corporations, Bailey et al. (1999) suggests 
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that the monitoring unit could act like a ‘clearing house’, where various interest groups could 
pool any information they have, allowing the widespread dissemination of information.  Such 
a system could be readily adapted to the utility sector (especially since many of the groups are 
now transnational corporations) and would be invaluable in helping the various interest 
groups gain the necessary information that they would need in order to have a real voice in the 
corporate governance process of utility companies. 
 
The deficit of appropriate information illustrates that introducing new interest groups into the 
membership of companies is not enough.  For such action to really start the process of 
democratising strategic decision-making, such groups need to have real power within the 
corporation.  In the existing structure of companies, this equates to the ability to monitor, and 
indeed elect, the board of directors.  Furthermore, the whole nature of company directors 
would have to change.  At present, a company director might be said to be only truly 
responsible to the corporation's shareholders, who are themselves the only form of company 
‘member’ that currently exist.  However, we have seen that in the case of utility companies 
that there are in fact a significant number of groups who might like to be members.  For this 
to happen, the nature of company director would have to evolve from being responsible to just 
this one type of company member, to being answerable to a multitude of different members.  
In doing so, the role of company director would evolve from being one of almost de facto 
direct company control, to one of arbitration and negotiation; to mediate between the interests 
of all members.  With the many varying interests of a large number of company members, 
many of these views will be conflicting.  It might even be said that directors specific duty 
should be to facilitate, and to provide a forum where such opposing views could be presented, 
discussed, debated, and eventually to explicate an acceptable agreement.  Such a change 
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would be a significant step in broadening, and hence democratising, the strategic decision-
making process.
33
 
 
Whilst being a considerable departure from the current system, the policies advocated above 
are not so radically different from current practice as to be totally infeasible, and indeed not 
without some precedence in the UK.  Consider once again the case of Network Rail, the ‘not-
for-dividend’ company that assumed control of Britain’s railway infrastructure in October 
2002.  This company has no shareholders, but has instead 115 ‘members’ who are supposed to 
“ensure independent oversight, strong accountability and high standards of corporate 
governance” (Network Rail, 2002a, p.1).  These members were appointed following a 
nationwide advertising campaign to which virtually anybody could apply, and include 
individual public members, members “drawn from a wide variety of stakeholder organisations 
including passenger authorities, regional transport executives, disabled access groups and 
business representatives” (Network Rail, 2002a, p.2), and industry members.  The latter two 
categories include representative from both the public and private sectors. See Network Rail 
(2002a) for further details on membership.  Whilst it still remains to be seen if these members 
are public interest members as we see them, or indeed how much (if any) power they possess, 
the fact that such a concept is being talked about and implemented, illustrates that our ideas 
are not so far from current practice as to be obviously out of place.
34
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 It is interesting to note that this system would endogenise preferences to decision-making, since preferences 
would be evolving within the system as the negotiations between all the different interest groups took place.  
This is in stark contrast to the exogeneity assumption characterising Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem, once 
again emphasising the difference between the market failure and the strategic failure reasoning behind public 
policy. 
34
 Whilst Network Rail is moving in the general direction we are advocating, there are still issues to be 
addressed.  Most significant amongst these is a potential conflict of interests for the board of directors since they 
have ultimate power over the appointment or removal of the members; the very group supposed to hold the 
board accountable.  There is therefore an incentive and mechanism to remove those members who make life 
difficult for the directors, and appoint those who won’t, as Hirschmann (1970, p.30) put it, “kick a fuss”. See 
Network Rail  (2002b) for further details. 
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III.ii More Immediate Ways Forward 
We have briefly indicated some of the issues in (English) company law that must be 
addressed if there is to be effective economic democracy and in so doing have commented on 
some of the fundamental requirements of reform.  The complexity of the issues, however, is 
indicative of the need for a long-run project that addresses a wide range of considerations if 
strategic failures are to be overcome, and new ways forward are to be found.  Meanwhile, it is 
necessary to ensure that economies progress in the (immediate) future in ways which ideally 
facilitate, but which certainly do not undermine this long-run, fundamental change towards 
effective democracy.   
 
With this in mind, one obvious and practical step is to ensure that democratically controlled 
public agencies have the responsibility and ability to monitor firms’ strategic activity.  Using 
this knowledge, such agencies might then act to ensure more effective representation of the 
public interest in the strategic decision-making process of corporations.  Even where a utility 
company is otherwise under the control of an elite few pursuing their own agenda, the welfare 
interests of others groups could be represented by appropriate public agencies acting on their 
behalf.   It is, however, unrealistic to assume that such an agency would have an all- 
encompassing effect; public agencies cannot costlessly monitor all of the strategic decisions 
that occur in a particular economy.  The costs of such actions dictate that it could have a 
limited effect.  Indeed, it is unlikely that a public agency could successfully represent all the 
varying interests of those currently excluded from the strategic decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, such an organisation would provide a limited, but definite, increase in 
participation of the strategic decision-making process. 
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It is important to reiterate that such a regulatory agency is not a substitute for the introduction 
of direct and genuine democracy, but rather an intermediate step to be taken whilst the long-
term measures are put in place.  Whilst discussing network utilities, Newbery (1997, p.357) 
argues that “regulation is inevitably inefficient” because it cannot replicate the effects of 
competition, although we propose that the limits of regulation extend significantly beyond this 
simple competition focus.  Regulation is essentially an arms-length response to failures in 
arms-length relationships, whereas the very essence of economic democracy entails inclusive, 
dynamic processes for shaping preferences and possibilities. When Hirschman (1970) refers 
to the development of democracy as a constantly evolving art, he is identifying a process that 
cannot be attained via regulation of an undemocratic process. The democratic process itself 
implies evolution, change and consequently different outcomes.  No arms-length regulation of 
an undemocratic process could mirror this, not least because, in its absence, there is no way to 
know what the democratic process would yield.   
 
Public agencies currently in existence are already given roles which are, to some degree, in 
line with our suggestion.  In Britain, for example, many of the privatised utility industries are 
subject to industry specific regulation.  These regulatory agencies have set the precedent that 
public intervention can exist to actively restrain a company's strategic decisions but thus far 
they have only had a competition focus; the broader concerns that we are advocating have not 
been emphasised.  Indeed MacKerron and Boira-Segarra (1996, p.95) comment that: 
“In the privatised British system, regulation has been rather narrowly focused: 
apart from protection against monopoly abuses, it has concerned itself almost 
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entirely with issues of economic efficiency, which are themselves held always to 
be advanced by the promotion of competition”. 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of these regulators represents a platform from which future 
developments can occur.  The remit of regulatory agencies needs to be extended to include the 
responsibility (and the ability) to monitor the strategic activity of corporations and their 
controllers, and to act to secure effective representation of the public interest when important 
strategic decisions are made. For such a measure to widen involvement in strategic decision 
making with real effect, it is important that the public interest be explicitly identified in terms 
of different sub-groups of the public having varied concerns in the strategic direction of a 
company, where that strategic direction is recognised as the central issue.  Serving the public 
interest needs to be seen in terms of the different interests being represented effectively; 
whilst each interest in isolation might prefer a different strategic direction, taking account of 
all interests requires the search for compromise and consensus, thus a concern with promoting 
mutual awareness and with mediating a suitable development path.   
 
Such action needs to take place within a framework of democratising the regulatory agencies 
themselves, to ensure that it is the public interest that is followed, as there are concerns as to 
how democratic these existing regulatory agencies are in practice.  While discussing the 
agency for the electricity sector (the Office of Electricity Regulation, OFFER
35
), MacKerron 
and Boira-Segarra (1996, pp.96/97) go on to say: 
“OFFER is an agency of the state but is not directly responsible to any Government 
department: it is a non-departmental agency ...  … If OFFER is not really 
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 The electricity regulator has now been merged with the gas regulator to form the Office of Gas and Electricity 
markets (OFGEM). 
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responsible to Government, the question remains as to whom or what it is 
accountable.” 
 
Recent Government legislation, the Utilities Act 2000, presents a possibility for more public 
interest involvement although it has so far failed in this regard.  However, prior to the 
legislation being adopted into law in the summer of 2000, Stephen Littlechild, the former 
Director General of Electricity Supply (the person heading the electricity regulator), 
commented that the (then proposed) legislation  
“would undermine the priority given to competition and give the Government 
much more control over supposedly independent regulators.”
36
 
These comments clearly indicate that Littlechild believed the new Bill would give the 
regulators wider responsibilities when regulating the utility firms, replacing the previous 
focus on competition.   Whilst this has not happened, the reasoning behind these views can be 
explicitly seen in the Act, which states that  
“the principle objective of Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority in carrying out their respective functions … is to protect the interests of 
consumers in relation to electricity conveyed by distribution systems, wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition ...” (UK Parliament, 2000, Part II, 
section 12, subsection 1).  
But it goes on to say that   
“….the Secretary of State  or the Authority (i.e. the regulatory agency) shall have regard 
to the interests of -  
(a) individuals who are disabled or chronically sick; 
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 “Littlechild criticises Bill”, The Times,  Monday 8
th
 February 2000.  
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(b) individuals of pensionable age; 
(c) individuals with low incomes; and 
(d) individuals residing in rural areas. 
but that is not to be taken as implying that regard may not be had to the interests of 
other descriptions of consumer.” (UK Parliament, 2000,  Part II, section 12, subsection 
3).  
 
 
This piece of legislation (at least in theory) therefore requires that the regulator explicitly 
consider these different interest groups, and not simply assume that competition is sufficient 
to ensure that the diverse concerns of different interest groups are met.  Furthermore, the Act 
should also give the Government more control over the regulators, which ought to make them 
more accountable to the public, via their democratically elected Government.   
 
Drawing upon Branston et al. (2001a), we have already noted that existing company law 
imposes a duty on company directors to take account of the interests of employees, but in 
practice this is dominated by the duty to shareholders to such an extent that it is virtually 
meaningless.  Unfortunately, it would seem that the Utilities Act 2000 is similarly ineffective 
in securing the public interest in that it has made no noticeable difference to the way in which 
industry specific regulation occurs.   Indeed during the time the act has been in force, 
OFGEM (the gas and electricity regulator) has removed direct price controls on domestic gas 
and electricity supply, thus relying totally on competition to ensure a public interest outcome 
in this sector (OFGEM, 2002, p.38).   
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Nevertheless, the very existence of the Utilities Act 2000 is something on which more can be 
built; whilst it focuses on the interests of consumers and not those required for the public 
interest more widely, it does provide a way in which interest groups can quickly start to be 
more explicitly considered in regulation.  It is far from being the inclusive piece of legislation 
that we would ultimately envisage, but the Utilities Act 2000, together with the existence of 
the current regulators, does show that our proposals are not so radically different from current 
practice as to be utterly infeasible in the immediate future.  
 
It would be naïve to suggest that such democratic public interest regulators should be 
established for every individual sector of the economy; cost considerations alone would make 
this inappropriate.  However, it is crucial for the particularly important sectors of an economy, 
such as utilities since such a policy has the potential to make a real difference in the 
immediate future.
37
 
 
Furthermore, the evolution of an effective organisation for take-over and merger control 
would be the ideal complement to the reformed regulatory agencies that we are advocating.  
In this regard, regulators are not the only precedent for public agencies intervening in the 
strategic decisions of companies.  Britain, like many other countries, has for many years had 
an organisation that has responsibility for take-over and merger control (the Competition 
Commission which succeeded the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on 1
st
 April 1999).
38
  
Unfortunately, in practice this body, like the existing industry regulators, sees the public 
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 As we have already indicated, the effective democratisation of governance requires appropriate 
communication amongst interested parties, which itself necessitates a communications sector that is 
democratically controlled.  Perhaps communications should therefore also be a priority sector, both in terms of a 
public interest regulator, but also in terms of a long-run reform project.  Democratisation of communications is 
explored in Cowling (1985).   
38
 This is a result of Section 45 of the 1998 Competition Act. For more details see Keenan (2000). 
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interest to be invariably represented by promoting competition, and not the wider interests 
that we have already identified.
39
 
 
In practical terms, only certain cases qualify for reference since  “the principal objective of the 
reference policy is the control of mergers that would have adverse effects on competition in 
the UK” (Farrar and Hannigan, 1998, p.615).
40
  However, whilst investigating, the 
Commission  
“must take into account all matters that appear to be relevant in considering the 
public interest but in particular it must have regard to the desirability of 
maintaining and promoting competition in the UK, of promoting the interests of 
consumers, purchasers and other users of goods and services in the UK in respect 
of prices, quality and variety of goods and services; efficiency and innovation, the 
balanced distribution of industry and employment, and exports” (Farrar and 
Hannigan, 1998, p.615).
41
 
Competition is thus clearly given priority but, at least in theory, public interest is explicitly 
framed to be wider than this one issue. 
 
The actual operation of the Commission can be clearly seen in the British utility sector, where 
much of the take-over and merger activity of the privatised companies was referred to the 
Competition Commission (or rather the MMC as it was then). For example, the 1996 report 
on the take-over of South West Water Plc by Wessex Water Plc concluded that the acquisition 
“may be expected to operate against the public interest” as it would impinge upon the ability 
                                                 
39
 Mergers that impact on other European Union member-states must also take into account European Union 
rules, see Keenan (2000). 
 
40
 Farrar and Hannigan are actually referring to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission which is the precursor 
of the current organisation the Competition Commission.  
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of the regulator to make comparisons between different water companies and reduce future 
opportunities for competition (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1996, summary 
section).  There are many other examples of reports written on Utility companies, and indeed 
many other companies, all of which share a common thread; the Commission (like the MMC 
before it) has adopted a narrow interpretation of its existence and what constitutes the public 
interest, resulting in competition being particularly emphasised.
42
 Indeed, policy surrounding 
the likes of the Commission is nowadays typically labelled ‘competition policy’.
 
 
 
A preoccupation with competition is more in line with the market failure, market-centred 
approach to policy, and insofar as the Commission has an economic rationale, it is rooted in 
the market failure perspective.  Nevertheless, its terms of reference appear quite broad and 
flexible, the concern with public interest apparently allowing a strategic decision-making 
approach to economic welfare to be pursued, if there is the necessary political will.   The 
existing institutions would not need drastic reform to be able to follow a broader and hence 
inclusive definition of what constitutes the public interest.  Indeed, although a slight diversion 
from our utilities focus, this is illustrated by the Commission itself during its 1998/9 
investigation of the BSkyB proposal to take-over the football club Manchester United:  
“many of the points put to us went well beyond the competition and consumer 
concerns that normally arise in merger enquiries.  However, in considering this 
merger we are directed by section 84 of the [Fair Trading Act] to take into account 
when assessing the public interest ‘all matters which appear to [us] to be relevant’.  
We have therefore looked at these wider football issues” (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, 1999, point 2.184, p.42).   
                                                                                                                                                        
41
 Farrar and Hannigan are actually referring to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.  
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This has therefore established the precedent of a wider definition of what constitutes the 
public interest, which again illustrates that our proposals are not so different from current 
practice as to be unworkable.  Indeed, the British government is currently in the process of 
bringing in new legislation (the Enterprise Bill) which may affect Competition Commission 
investigations as it amongst other things contains specific provisions for “Public Interest 
Cases” (UK Parliament, 2002). 
 
The offices that we are advocating (reformed take-over body and regulatory agencies) could 
be charged with safeguarding the public interest in all strategic decision-making (albeit 
control of the public agencies in the public interest would also need to be ensured, itself no 
foregone conclusion).  On occasions there might be tension between a public body concerned 
with mergers and the public interest, versus one concerned with strategic decisions more 
generally and the public interest.  We suggest that such tension could be creative and fruitful, 
if appropriately managed, and should neither be feared nor necessarily avoided; its presence, 
accommodation and deliberate stimulation could be a positive dimension in a process for 
promoting mutual awareness and for drawing out a suitable development path.    
 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS. 
Building upon the foundations established in Chapter One, this Chapter has taken that 
analysis further by examining the implications of our conclusions on strategic decision-
making and corporate governance.  We illustrate that interests vary between (and within) all 
of the groups that have an interest in the activities of a particular corporation, and that this 
varying interest will result in differing preferences over strategic decisions.  Given that 
                                                                                                                                                        
42
 This presumably explains (at least in part) transference of the responsibilities of the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission to the newly formed Competition Commission. 
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individuals take decisions in their own best interest, corporations controlled by an elite 
implies that strategic decisions are taken in the interests of that elite and not in the interests of 
the wider public; that decision-making is not taken in the public interest. 
 
In order to avoid this strategic failure, one possibility is to reform the governance of the 
modern corporation so that it is constructed around a more inclusive and democratic structure. 
Using English company law as an example, we suggested that one possibility in line with this 
thinking is to reform company law so that shareholders no longer dominate as the only 
‘members’ of corporation.  Other ‘members’ could also be included so that all of those with 
an interest in the activities of a corporation have a real voice in the decision-making process. 
 
Given that this is fundamentally different from the current system, we also examined more 
immediate ways forward which might address such issues in the near future.  These included 
amongst other things, the use of existing public agencies such as the Competition 
Commission or the industry specific utility regulators, in order to incorporate wider interests 
in decision-making, and thus help secure more public interest outcomes in the immediate 
future.  
 
In short, this Chapter sought to investigate the implications of corporations being controlled 
by an elite, and the requirements of public policy if this was to be avoided in the future.  In 
order to do this, the Chapter utilised the specific example of utility companies and the 
provision of utility services.  The choice of this particular case was not intended to imply that 
the theory or potential mechanisms it helped highlight were only applicable in this way to this 
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case, but it was rather chosen as an interesting and topical application of a more widely 
applicable theory.   
 
The next Chapter of this thesis further extends the use of this example in that it applies the 
broad theoretical analysis to the debate surrounding the proposed reform of the electricity 
sector in Mexico.  This practical application illustrates how measures to address concerns 
surrounding public interest decision-making can be implemented in the real world, even in 
such a situation as that which exists in Mexico, where the policy space available is 
constrained by numerous internal and external factors.  Specifically, we suggest one avenue 
for consideration that aims to amalgamate economic (and other forms of) efficiency with 
concerns surrounding the need for economic democracy.   It is to this that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CREATING PUBLIC INTEREST DECISION-MAKING: THE CASE OF 
ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION IN MEXICO 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the major implications of privatisation is the transfer of ownership, and as we have 
previously outlined, current governance systems mean that there are associations between 
ownership and the notion of company control.  Furthermore, governance is not the only thing 
to change during privatisation, as it is a process during which industry re-organisation and 
other changes often occur.  It therefore presents an opportunity in which to make the sort of 
fundamental governance changes that the previous Chapters have suggested are required if the 
public interest is to be achieved.    
 
Moreover, the nature of privatisation as the transfer of activities from the public sector into 
the private sector implies a change from public to private control.  Such a change could be 
argued to be a backward step for public interest decision-making in that it may be a move that 
furthers the elite control that we have suggested exists within the private corporation.1   
Privatisation might therefore be regarded as a particularly important policy if elite control of 
the corporation is to be fundamentally addressed. 
 
The previous discussions in this thesis surrounding what might be done to address the 
strategic failure associated with elite control of the modern corporation has in many respects 
been rather general and theoretical, insofar as it has focussed on broad policies that might be 
                                                 
1 Elite control of publicly owned industries is still a distinct possibility, but given that government is the ultimate 
owner (and often has a high degree of influence over the running of the corporations in question), the possibility 
of more public interest type decisions being arrived upon might be seen to be greater. 
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applied in the utilities sector, and hence elsewhere.  Privatisation, however, is a very specific 
policy that has to take account of the unique industry and company settings to which it is 
being directed, and this makes such broad generalisation problematic.  Therefore, our 
discussions for the possibilities that privatisation presents for introducing economic 
democracy are based around the indicative example of the proposed electricity reform in 
Mexico.   
 
Whilst the choice of this specific case is rather arbitrary (and thus other examples could have 
been chosen), it is an especially interesting practical example because of the forces at work 
within and upon Mexico, the importance of the electricity sector in such a ‘developing 
country’ setting, and thus the constrained nature of the available policy space.   Whilst this 
means that we are going to be dealing with a constrained solution (i.e. not the first best) from 
the point of view of attaining economic democracy, this specific example has (at least in part) 
been chosen because it illustrates how a long-term project is needed to reform the essence of 
the broad economic system, so that the policy space available is not so constrained.   
 
In order to pursue this examination of privatisation, the Chapter is organised as follows.  
Section II examines the attractiveness of, and drive towards, privatisation in ‘developing 
country’ situations such as Mexico, and goes on to highlight some of the concerns with 
privatisation, especially those surrounding governance.  The link between democratic 
governance and the process of development is also highlighted.  In Section III we then outline 
the current structure of the Mexican electricity sector, and suggest one possible avenue for its 
privatisation based around principles of democratic decision-making and involving Mexican 
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pension funds as a key actor.  Section IV discusses this possibility in more practical detail, 
and finally our concluding comments are presented in Section V. 
 
II. PRIVATISATION AND DEMOCRACY  
II.i The Drive Towards Privatisation 
The reform of the electricity sector in Mexico is currently a topical issue, and one that is 
mirrored in many other ‘less developed’ countries across the world.  Within this debate, there 
is a particular focus on the possibilities for privatisation.2  Privatisation in some form may be 
an attractive option for countries such as Mexico, both in terms of the flow of funds that can 
be generated by government to boost spending in other important areas, and in terms of the 
ideological credence that the process gives them with important donor and investment 
partners.   
 
Many less developed countries are characterised by public industries that are in dire need of 
investment, while the governments’ spending ability is severely limited, and priorities are 
often in other areas such as education and healthcare, or servicing government debt 
(Tenenbaum et al., 1992).  It is estimated, for example, that $25 billion of investment is 
required in the electricity sector in Mexico over the next six years to provide the capacity 
needed to meet growth in demand, which is expected to be not less than six percent per 
annum (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.4/17).  Private investment, through encouraging private 
ownership, is often perceived as a desirable solution to this investment gap.  Moreover, the 
use of markets in organising production (of which privatisation is thought to be a necessary 
component) arguably has the potential to bring significant economic efficiency gains.  From 
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the perspective of government, therefore, longer-term efficiency savings can potentially be 
made in the funds that need to be set aside to subsidise public services.  In Mexico the 
potential for savings may be large, as general subsidies for electricity tariffs amounted to 
around US$3.1 billion in 1998 (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.53). 
 
In addition to these perceived benefits, Branston et al. (2001b) suggest that there is strong 
ideological pressure that reform in such situations includes privatisation.  Influences in the 
British experiences were identified and, more generally, in the drive towards an integrated 
capitalist system, organised around transnational capital.  Such an agenda was seen as having 
been actively pursued by the Washington institutions3 through their influence on the policies 
adopted by less developed countries, and in particular through emphasis on privatisation in 
the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Indeed, 
Branston et al. (2001b) go on to intimate that the overall international environment under the 
so-called ‘Washington consensus’ places significant pressure on less developed countries to 
accelerate the transfer of public industries to the private sector, and allows very little room to 
manoeuvre policy in alternative directions.4 
 
II.ii The Dangers of Privatisation 
There is a danger that, in being swept along by this tide, insufficient attention is given to key 
concerns around privatisation.  There is a commonly held perception that privatisation is 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See, for example: Islas and Jerónimo (2000); “Propone senador revisar esquema de subsidios a tarifas 
eléctricas”, El Economista, 15th October 2001; and “La apetura del sector eléctrico, una trampa: Ortega”, La 
Journada, 20th August 2001.  
3 The two key Washington institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
4 A good example cited in Branston et al. (2001b) is the case of Argentina where Nochteff and Abeles (2000, 
p.69), argue that “the government was faced with a sort of desperate political and ideological urgency to 
privatise and deregulate…ushered in by its seeking to gain the confidence of both the “Washington Consensus 
overconfident investors” and the international organisations (IMF, World Bank); (and)…by the intellectual 
pressure of neoliberalism (and its prestige as the “only conceivable economic wisdom”)”.  
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automatically associated with gains in economic efficiency, but this is being challenged in a 
growing literature.  In a review of earlier evidence on privatisation, Kay and Thompson 
(1986, p.23) argue that “it does not seem that there is anything intrinsically superior about 
performance under private ownership”.  Similarly, Parker and Willner (2000, p.4) conclude 
that several studies have reported “no statistically significant differences” between public and 
private ownership and go on to reject “any simplistic and axiomatic relationship between 
private and public ownership” (p.10).   Furthermore, Parker and Saal (2001, p.62) cite a 
number of studies that suggest, “performance improvement is by no means guaranteed and 
that efficiency may be related to product market competition rather than ownership per se”.5 
 
More fundamental, however, is the issue of governance in the privatisation process.  The 
simple transfer of government run organisations into the (international) private sector may 
facilitate elite control of the resulting corporations.  Whilst these corporations might be 
subject to (industry specific) regulation, as we have already argued, this would only serve to 
constrain the policy space available to the controlling elite, and thus do little to incorporate 
the variation of interests inherent to such an industry.  Indeed, the variation in interests in a 
setting such as Mexico is likely to especially great because of the developing nature of the 
Mexican economy.   
 
Take, for example, the issue of pricing.  Prices have been heavily subsidised, such that in 
2000 the average price per kWh was US$0.07, but varied from US$0.028 for agriculture to 
US$0.13 for commercial/general uses  (Office of the President, 2000).  In 1998, for example, 
the total subsidy was US$3.1 billion (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.53).  It is clear that such 
                                                 
5 See also the work on British electricity privatisation contained within Part Two of this thesis. 
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tariffs did not fully reflect costs, and hence it is highly likely that reform would bring pricing 
revision.6  Different groups, however, will have separate interests in the nature of such 
revisions.  While industrial consumers might favour low tariffs for high users, for instance, 
domestic consumers might prefer discounts for the smaller user, as might small or micro 
firms.  Moreover, the owners of the electricity industry would no doubt prefer to be free to set 
profit maximising prices from the outset.  Such views themselves might be misaligned with 
those of the Mexican government, or with poorer communities, who might prefer pricing 
strategies that are geared towards facilitating development.  Indeed, in February 2002 the 
pricing structure in Mexico was modified,7 and the subsequent debate across groups within 
the country clearly reflects the variation of interests around such decisions.  
  
For different sectors and groups within the economy there are other relevant strategic 
decisions where interests vary.  For instance, domestic fuel suppliers (such as Petróleos 
Mexicanos) would have a particular interest in decisions taken regarding the choice of fuel for 
future power stations, or indeed how the existing generating plant is used to generate 
electricity.  Such opinions may well be in conflict with the views of other interested groups, 
such as environmentalists, employees or affected local communities, who may prefer a 
different strategy.  Employees within the industry have a particular interest in strategic 
decisions concerning all aspects of the industry, given that this is the source of their livelihood 
and dominates their waking hours.  Again, their interests on particular decisions may differ 
from those of other groups. 
 
 
                                                 
6 In most international experience of privatisation modifications to tariffs have been observed.  For the case of 
Britain, see for example Clarke (1993) or the work presented in Part Two of this thesis.  
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An area where significant variation of interests may exist in a developing country such as 
Mexico is the extent of electricity availability within the community, as currently not all of 
the population has access to the electricity system. Approximately 94% of households had 
access in 1997, representing an increment of 7 percentage points from 1990.  However, the 
progress has not been equally distributed; in rural areas the access is as low as 87%, compared 
to almost 100% in urban areas (INEGI, 2000).  This inequality reflects the great difficulty 
inherent in providing services in a large country where 26% of the total population live in 
rural areas (INEGI, 2000).8   
 
Figure One (overleaf) illustrates both the percentage of people with access to electricity in the 
different states of Mexico (line) and the individual states’ share of the total electricity 
production (bar).  The states of Chiapas and Veracruz demonstrate clearly the current 
disparate nature of electricity production and supply.  Chiapas, for example, contributes 10% 
of the country's output, and yet almost 15% of its households do not have access to the 
service.  This is in stark comparison to the conditions that exist in cities, such as Distrito 
Federal (Mexico City), where there is virtually no production but almost universal access to 
electricity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 See Diario de la Federación, 7th February 2002. 
8 Approximately 32% of the population lives in communities with less than 5,000 habitants.  (INEGI, 2000) 
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Data sources: Access data from INEGI (2000) and production data from Office of the President (2000) 
Figure One
 Electricity Production and Access in Mexico
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Situations such as this provide further evidence of the need for more active participation of 
the various different interest groups in the strategic decision-making of the sector.  Potential 
consumers in Chiapas or Veracruz, for example, will have a separate interest that is distinct 
from existing customers in Distrito Federal; existing customers might prefer a strategic 
decision to make the current system cheap and reliable, whilst potential customers might 
prefer to use such resources to expand the network so that they can become customers.  It is 
therefore imperative to find ways of giving such groups an effective voice in the decision-
making process underlying the electricity sector. 
 
In line with this, in Chapter Two we discussed some measures that might be taken to 
democratise decision-making.  Privatisation, if implemented in a suitable manner, might be a 
complimentary policy that helps to achieve this.  Our argument here is not one for or against 
privatisation.  What we are suggesting is that if privatisation is to take place, it presents an 
opportunity to address governance concerns, but if nothing is done about governance, then 
privatisation could perpetuate and expand strategic failure. 
 
II.iii Privatisation, Democracy and Development 
Furthermore, the electricity sector of a ‘developing’ country such as Mexico is arguably a 
particularly critical sector because of the role it plays in the more general development of the 
economy.  Provision of electricity is fundamentally linked to the development aspirations of a 
country, and those of individual communities within that country.  A commonly used 
‘development’ indicator, for example, is the number of households that have access to 
electricity, and therefore to important welfare enhancing goods such as electric lights, radios 
and refrigerators.  Moreover, there are vital links between the provision of reliable and 
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appropriately priced electricity and the development of local economies and industries, which 
in turn provide employment for local people.  Indeed, the strategic importance of the 
electricity sector for the overall development of communities implies that its privatisation be 
implemented in a way that is sensitive to the sector’s role in development.  In the case of 
Mexico such concerns were highlighted by the Ministry of Energy, who stated in 1999 (p.4, 
emphasis added) that “the indicators of quality and reliability of service, especially in the 
centre of the country, are below those required for proper development.” 
 
The democratisation of strategic decision-making in the electricity sector may serve to help in 
the development process, especially if the view of development advocated in Sugden and 
Wilson (2002) is adopted.  They suggest that development should not be viewed as in the 
conventional sense of the attainment of a specific set of externally set indicators, but should 
rather be conceptualised and defined as the attainment of the aims and objectives of those 
seeking to develop.   If different interest groups are able to have a real voice in the decision-
making process, their views on the electricity sector and its significance to the development of 
Mexico can be taken into consideration.    Decisions may then be taken which amongst other 
things help facilitate, or at least do not undermine, the development aims of the communities 
within Mexico.   This potential outcome is in stark contrast to that which would follow if the 
sector were simply transferred to a group of international investors who were free to pursue 
their own interests, which are unlikely to be fully aligned with Mexican communities.  Such a 
privatisation would potentially limit the development of these communities and certain sectors 
within the economy.  For example, isolated communities where service provision is 
(relatively) unprofitable or unduly risky may be excluded or marginalised.  This can be seen, 
for example, from the South African experience with water privatisation, where, in the town 
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of Stutterheim, a large foreign firm ‘cherry-picked’ the lucrative areas, leaving many others 
unconnected (Mncwabeni and Bond, 1999). 
 
We therefore now turn to the situation that currently exists within Mexico, and proffer a 
potential privatisation structure that moves in the direction of the principles we have 
advocated.  It is recognised, however, that such concerns must be balanced with practical 
considerations over issues such as funding, which may, for example, be reliant on 
international capital markets, and thus strongly influenced by prevailing attitudes in the 
international community.  As such our suggestion is at best a second best result. 
 
III. MEXICAN ELECTRICITY 
III.i The Current Structure 
The electricity system in Mexico is currently focused around two vertically integrated public 
entities, the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LFC). 
Together, these are responsible for the transmission, distribution and supply of electricity for 
public service,9 and generate the vast majority of electricity.10   In 1999 they accounted for 
more than 92% of Mexican generating capacity (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.14).   The 
remaining generating capacity was owned by private self-generators, co-generators and, 
following an amendment to the law in December 1992, several independent power producers 
(IPPs).11  However, in the absence of a market for electricity, self-generators and co-
generators only satisfied their own needs.  IPP involvement was also low, accounting for only 
                                                 
9 Transmission refers to the use of the high voltage national electricity grid, distribution refers to the low voltage 
local electricity lines and supply refers to the sale of electricity to the final consumer.  
10 CFE covers the entire national territory with the exception of the Distrito Federal and parts of the states of 
Morelos, Hidalgo and Puebla (i.e. the central area), where LFC has responsibility. 
11 Co-generation refers to electricity that is generated simultaneously with steam or other types of thermal energy 
used in an industrial process, or generation from the waste heat of an industrial process.  Self-generation refers to 
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3.3% of generating capacity in 1999  (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.17), reflecting the 
unattractiveness of selling under long-term contract in a monopsony market where CFE is the 
only buyer. 
 
The current structure is characterised by significant inefficiencies that have arisen due to lack 
of investment.  The transmission grid has high electrical losses, with some sections 
experiencing capacity and reliability problems.  These constraints impinge upon the efficient 
operation of the system because some low cost generating plant is unable to operate at full 
capacity, increasing the total cost of electricity production.  A similar picture can be observed 
in the distribution sector, which experiences technical losses equivalent to 10% of low voltage 
sales due to overloading, and further losses caused by shortages of meters and other 
equipment (Ministry of Energy, 1999, p.18).  In short, the current system is vertically 
integrated, relatively technically inefficient, and one which the Ministry of Energy (1999, 
p.18) identified as needing significant investment in generation, transmission and 
distribution.12 
 
III.ii Democratic Privatisation Using Mexican Pension Funds 
The implication of our conceptual analysis and of the current state of the Mexican electricity 
industry is that successful privatisation of the sector would (at least) need to combine two 
goals: the infusion of democracy and an increase in investment.  A typical argument would be 
that foreign capital could solve the investment problem, but as we have already suggested, 
privatising to a small elite of international investors does not to address concerns over the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the generation of energy to meet a producer’s own physical or contractual needs (Ministry of Energy, 1999, 
pp.71-73). 
12 More recent concerns over the urgent need for investment are reflected in “México dependerá más del acpital 
privado por la limitación del presupuesto”, La Journada, 14th May 2001.  
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strategic failure of governance.  Moreover, it would most likely to a backward step in this 
regard. 
 
Branston et al. (2001b), drawing upon Clarke and Pitelis (1993), and Reed and Anthony 
(1993), suggest that previous international experience in privatisation has made much of the 
desire to expand ‘popular capitalism’, by widening share ownership.  While such sentiments 
are broadly in line with our principles of democracy, they are identified as being superficial 
by Cowling and Sugden (1993).  Investments in shares are just that; simple, financial 
investments designed to make financial returns.  In line with this, Branston et al. (2001b), 
again drawing upon Clarke and Pitelis (1993), highlight the example of British experience, 
where mechanisms to widen share ownership failed to encourage long-term small investors, 
and most of the time only promoted speculation by foreign investors.  Moreover, we have 
already seen in Chapter One that small shareholders are excluded from governance and so in 
many ways this failure to secure long-term investment in shares is a moot point.   Nothing 
fundamental has changed; interest groups continue to remain excluded from decision-making.  
Learning from this experience, it is imperative to find alternative ways of introducing 
economic democracy; thus reducing speculation and encouraging active community 
participation. 
 
Given the constraints in place, one potentially attractive alternative is to introduce institutional 
investors, such as domestic pension funds.  This possibility has been voiced by various high-
profile figures in Mexico, including Antonio Dávila, Secretary of the Commission for Energy 
in the House of Representatives.13  Pension funds are in essence ‘delegated monitors’ of 
                                                 
13 See “Propone diputado usar recursos de Afores en electricidad”, La Economista, 16th October 2001.  Recently 
it has been suggested that the resources of the pension funds could be used by private investors as a source of 
 101 
millions of workers.  Therefore, if they are incorporated in a privatisation solution, the 
participation of a major part of society is automatically guaranteed, most likely in a long-term 
relationship.14 Moreover, Branston et al. (2001b) identify that pension fund investments have 
already been involved in privatisations in other Latin American countries, and elsewhere.   
 
The potential for using pension funds in Mexico is clearly significant.  In the mid 1990s, the 
Mexican government undertook a reform of the pension system.15  This reform created a 
group of new institutional investors within the financial system, and in the near future these 
funds are likely to become the largest institutional investors in Mexico.  At the end of 2000 
the value of the funds stood at around US$10.4 billion (CONSAR, 2001), and considerable 
growth is expected in future years.  As such they have a key role in expanding asset holdings 
within Mexican society, but also in promoting development, using pension savings to finance 
sound economic activities.  One way of doing this is for them to play a major role in 
electricity privatisation. 
 
The pension funds began with a very restrictive investment regime.  Amongst the 17 active 
pension funds in Mexico only approximately three percent of their portfolios are invested in 
shares, with the remainder held in government debt instruments and high-rated private debt 
(CONSAR, 2001).  However, government debt has been declining in the last 10 years, while 
the funds are continuously growing, and thus there are large pressures to relax the present 
investment regime.  The reality is that the funds may grow faster than the available 
                                                                                                                                                        
finance for electricity projects ( “Indispensables, los cambios constitucionales en energia”, El Financiero, 28th 
May 2002).  
14 There are other alternatives, such as facilitating the participation of municipalities.  However, in Mexico (and 
many other countries) there is currently no market for municipal debt, and so their avenues for providing the 
required funding are limited. 
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investment opportunities in relatively safe assets.  Some solutions to this dilemma point 
towards a liberalisation of the investment regime, including allowing overseas investments 
(Srinivas and Yermo, 2000; Mitchell, 1999; Vittas, 1996).16  Other Latin American countries, 
such as Chile, Argentina and Peru already allow investment in foreign securities.  Although 
Chile sets a maximum limit, this is as high as 20% of the total portfolio (Srinivas and Yermo, 
2000).  The potential problem is that outward foreign investment is an export of domestic 
capital; resources that could otherwise be used to nurture development of the local economy.  
 
Participation by pension funds in the reform of the electricity sector could form an attractive 
option for new investment strategies given the funds they have available.  It might seem that 
there exists a trade-off between maintaining the security of the pension funds and investing 
long-term in potentially higher-risk Mexican firms.  However, the Ministry of Energy 
recognised in 1999 (p.62) that “electricity companies are considered to have low risk in a 
growing industry” and therefore suggested that “pension funds will be able to participate in 
ownership of these companies, either as direct shareholders or through financial markets.”  
Indeed, it could be argued that the high-growth electricity sector constitutes a potentially 
lower risk than investment in currently volatile international securities. 
 
Moreover, there is an inherent meeting of interests in such a solution. Mexicans owning 
pension funds have interests both in their private savings and as individual consumers (or 
potential consumers) of electricity. More generally, they also have an interest in the 
development of the economy, which we have suggested is strongly influenced by a key sector 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 There are large social and fiscal implications from this reform that are beyond the scope of this analysis.  For a 
brief summary of the Mexican pension reforms see Branston et al. (2001b), or for a more detailed background 
and discussion see Sales-Sarrapy et al. (1998).  
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such as electricity.  This provides strong incentives for the type of involvement in decision-
making that we have previously identified as important.  Together, these arguments provide a 
compelling case for analysing the feasibility of involving pension funds in the privatisation.   
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION, FUNDING AND GOVERNANCE 
The industry structure put in place during the restructuring and privatisation process will have 
profound consequences for the subsequent ability of the industry to meet the goals we have 
set in terms of technical efficiency and participation in the strategic decision-making process.  
This does not mean to say that technical efficiency and economic democracy are incompatible 
goals.17  They should instead be viewed as two issues that need to be successfully combined 
in any privatisation process.  It is, however, by no means certain that this will be the case, 
since under certain circumstances one may serve to exclude the other.  Thus the choice of 
structure is crucial in order to allow both goals to be realistically achieved.18 
 
IV.i A Potential Industry Structure 
One potential structure that could achieve these goals is that which was proposed by the 
Mexican Ministry of Energy in 1999.  This resembled the structure of the industry in England 
and Wales when that was reorganised and privatised in 1990 (see Part Two of this thesis for 
further details).19  The proposed structure would have separated generation into multiple units 
to encourage competition and hence economic efficiency.  Electricity generated by these 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 The arguments of these authors are mainly sustained on diversification gains and the lack of safe investment 
opportunities in developing countries.  
17 Economic democracy could be argued to lead to social efficiency as opposed to a more narrow (technical) 
conceptualisation of economic efficiency. 
18 Learning from experiences in Britain and elsewhere, it would seem optimal for reorganisation  to take place 
significantly prior to privatisation so that the new structures and companies  would be able to establish 
themselves, and efficient system operations verified, before the system is transferred to the private sector - see 
Tenenbaum et al. (1992) and the work in Part Two of this thesis. 
 104 
companies would then be sold via a co-ordinated market mechanism and transmitted by a 
national transmission grid, owned by a single company.  Finally, a number of regional 
companies would then distribute and supply this electricity to end-users. 
 
We would, however, advocate that this structure be supplemented via the creation of an 
additional body to ensure that there exists co-ordination between these different companies.  
Indeed, such a body could also assume the role of industry regulator to ensure that the natural 
monopolies (transmission and distribution) do no unfairly exploit their position. Whilst the 
system proposed by the Ministry of Energy in 1999 does allow for a new body overseeing 
system operation and dispatch, this seems to be limited to day-to-day operation.  Provision is 
made separately to strengthen regulation, currently undertaken by the Comisión Reguladora 
de Energía.  We suggest that it would be better to combine both of these in a single body, 
which could also take a long term view, co-ordinating the efforts of the various companies as 
they seek to expand and consolidate the industry.20  It is important that such a body itself 
incorporates means of democratic control, so that it does not undermine our stated 
privatisation aim of increased participation in decision-making. 
 
IV.ii Ownership, Funding And Control 
Within such a general structure, we then propose an ownership and control configuration that 
contains three key participants: Mexican pension funds; other financial investors; and 
Mexican citizens.  Pension funds, as mentioned previously, present a way of raising private 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 There are currently constitutional barriers to introducing such changes in Mexico, but they do offer an 
analytical starting point for the more fundamental points we seek to raise via the use of this example. 
20 Such a body might resemble the Strategic Rail Authority of the UK, which has the role of guiding the industry 
towards a ‘bigger, better, safer railway’.  This does not however, have responsibility for regulation which is 
carried out by a separate body and so differs from our proposal in this respect – see http://www.sra.gov.uk/sra/ 
for more details (accessed on 16th August 2002). 
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capital for the necessary investment, while still achieving a degree of community based 
control.  Pension funds could therefore be given preferential treatment, for example in terms 
of first refusal on any shares sold (both now and in the future), so as to maximise their 
involvement.  Although the current size of pension funds is not sufficient to provide all (or 
even a majority) of the required funds, as low risk and expanding institutions they could 
borrow at preferential rates using as collateral the value of future contributions.  We also 
recognise, however, that other financial investors (domestic companies, transnational 
corporations, etc.) will also be required to play an important role in providing both financial 
and operational backing, and expertise.   
  
Given concern with the undemocratic nature of strategic decision-making, the rights of these 
two investors need to be balanced further against the interests of communities within Mexico.  
Although pension funds provide a great many Mexicans with a potential for voice in key 
decisions, they are by no means wholly inclusive institutions.  Indeed, CONSAR (the pension 
funds supervisory authority) estimated in December 2000 that there were 17.8 million 
workers registered with the funds,21 representing only a fraction of the Mexican labour force 
of around 38 million.  There is a danger, therefore, that decision-making structures would 
exclude a large segment of the population. Crucially, those Mexicans not linked to the 
pension system, and therefore excluded from decision-making, would be likely to correspond 
to the poorer, rural groups in society, and the majority of those currently without access to 
electricity.  In order to balance this tendency, a third control group could be formulated to 
involve all Mexicans.  Specifically, this could take the form of an in-built right, realised at 
birth and relinquished upon death, for all citizens of Mexico to have some level of 
                                                 
21 Only 89.1% of these made at least one payment (contribution). 
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participation in decision-making within the electricity sector.  It is unlikely that this 
participation could be in the form of a financial stake, given the imperative of raising the $25 
billion of required investment (i.e. the granting of shares to all Mexican citizens).  However, 
there is no reason why this should be necessary for effective participation in decision-making, 
as our discussions in Chapter Two on broadening company membership illustrated. 
 
An industry structure along the lines of that outlined in Section IV.i above, would enable the 
level of participation (or indeed balance of ownership) to vary across different parts of the 
industry, and thus to reflect the importance given to decision-making in each different part.  It 
may be considered, for example, that in generation there are fewer grounds for community 
involvement in decision-making, as one of the key imperatives is simply to generate 
electricity as efficiently as possible; although this is not to deny that groups such as workers 
would require decision-making channels.  Given a sufficiently large number of companies to 
ensure competition, and given democratic channels through which workers can input into key 
decisions, it might not be inappropriate for each company to be owned by a particular group 
(e.g. pension fund, transnational corporation).  The third control group would then be 
essentially a safeguard to the system, acting where particular and uncommon issues/tensions 
arise.22  However, in sectors that are seen to have greater strategic importance, such as 
transmission or distribution, more care may need to be taken.  This might mean a more 
balanced ownership and control system, perhaps implying that pension funds hold a larger 
amount of equity in the companies responsible, and that the potential for community 
involvement through the third control group is more fully utilised.  The exact balance of 
                                                 
22 For example over decisions such as location and type of power plant, in which local communities may wish to 
be involved. 
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ownership and voting rights is something that would need to be adjusted and refined, learning 
from experience, varying from company to company, and from sector to sector. 
 
One potential criticism of this type of system would be that private investors who actually 
own shares in the companies could be put off by the possibility of being held ‘hostage’ by the 
voice of the community.  However, current practice shows that this need not be the case.  In 
Britain, many of the privatisation experiences incorporated the idea of a ‘golden share’ for 
many years.  These were held by the government to enable them to exert a disproportionate 
degree of control in unusual circumstances, such as at times of potential foreign take-over 
(Thomas, 1996b).  Moreover, German companies are legally bound to have a second board, 
which contains worker representatives.  This board has to approve all high level decisions, 
which means it can actively restrain the activities of the company (Davies, 1999).  These 
examples are from systems that functioned, and indeed thrived, suggesting that the idea of 
giving communities a voice in decision-making is not so far from current practice as to be 
unworkable. 
 
For such a structure and control configuration to effectively enhance democratic decision-
making, it is necessary to address the practical issues of participation and governance.  To this 
end, we first examine the governance of the pension funds, and before looking at the 
electricity sector more widely. 
 
IV.iii Pension Fund Governance 
If pension funds are to play a meaningful role in a privatisation process designed to enhance 
economic democracy, the governance of these pension funds must also be addressed and 
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integrated into the governance of the electricity sector.  Pension fund ownership of a 
significant proportion of the electricity sector could create a large number of ways for 
participation in the decision-making process.  As owners, pension funds would essentially 
supervise management within the electricity sector, and thus have input into key decisions 
around economic and financial strategy.  Indeed, pension funds essentially concentrate 
ownership, which, as described by Stiglitz (1985), is probably the most effective method of 
reducing agency problems.  If pension funds have a significant shareholding, they will have 
incentives to produce and analyse information for monitoring; the size of their investments 
will allow them to have dedicated resources for analysis and strategy evaluation. 
 
In realising this element of control, pension funds can be seen as having two distinct duties.  
The first, more conventional duty, is to assure a certain balance of risk and return for their 
contributors.  In this sense they are simply ‘delegated investors’, searching for an attractive 
rate of return.  However, pension funds are also ‘delegated monitors’ of workers’ interests.  It 
must be recognised in this regard that workers have interests that are wider than the financial 
status of their pension.  As consumers of electricity they are concerned with quality of service 
and fair prices from the sector, and as citizens they have interests in the wider development of 
their communities, of which the electricity sector is a key component.  In this regard 
contributors to pension funds face inter-temporal, and often conflicting, decisions.  Fund 
managers could thus have a duty to balance these interests in a process of mediation, in order 
to elicit compromise and agreement.  Indeed, from the perspective of government, this 
balance is also crucial.  While pension fund returns are important to negate the need for 
pensioner assistance in the future, government also has strong interests in the development of 
the economy, and how this is influenced by key decisions in the electricity sector.   
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There are therefore two main challenges for strategic decision-making.  Firstly, pension fund 
managers will be required to participate intensively in the strategic decisions of electricity 
firms, in order to look after the investments and to transmit the desires of the people that they 
represent.  These could involve, among others, the technology for new power stations, new 
services, new tariff structures, and grid extensions.  The second challenge is to create an 
adequate way of transmitting community aims and desires to pension fund managers.  
 
As Chapter One highlighted, the direct involvement of institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, in the decision-making of firms is a widely known phenomenon.23  Branston et al. 
(2001b) highlight the example of Chile where the participation of domestic pension funds in 
privatised firms during the 1980s, helped them to create the infrastructure and knowledge to 
participate in share ownership.  Indeed, fund managers are said to now be able to vote for 
independent directors (Vittas, 1996).  The challenge in Mexico, therefore, is to improve the 
role of fund managers in corporate decision-making along similar lines.  This will involve 
cultural changes and a learning process, which might be stimulated by the chance to become 
involved in the electricity privatisation, and nurtured by the pension fund regulatory authority.  
 
However, what is not clear from existing work or experience is how the challenge of 
transmitting the different, and often conflicting, interests of pension fund contributors might 
be met.  In order to give a flavour of such an idea, we suggest a number of ways in which this 
might take place.  Ballots and elections of fund managers could be instituted, allowing 
contributors to express their opinions on how funds should be managed, a concept not 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Rubach (1999) or Faccio and Lasfer (2000). 
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dissimilar from the way in which the electorate determine the path of a country (or how senior 
management might be accountable to the members of a corporation).  In exceptional 
circumstances referenda might be called, perhaps if a certain number of contributors can be 
gathered to support a particular proposition.  More generally the pension funds might be 
invested with a duty to actively consult and seek the opinions of its members.  This might take 
the form of local meetings with participants, or greater opportunities for feedback regarding 
key decisions.  Indeed, the role of fund managers could evolve; to mediate across different 
interest groups, to elicit compromise, and to negotiate agreements on the way forward.  It may 
also be possible for each pension fund to evolve a particular niche in terms of policy.  
Individuals would then be able to self-select the fund that best represents their interests.  
Given their pioneering nature, all of these mechanisms would need to be considered and 
reformed overtime, learning from experience, and refined in light of success or failure. 
 
There will undoubtedly be limits to the practical feasibility of such schemes to increase 
involvement in the decision-making of the pension funds, especially in developing countries 
such as Mexico.  Particular concern may be expressed, for example, at the cost of the 
monitoring and consultation that is required.  This is something that must clearly be 
considered, but what is important is that there exist some ways in which contributors can have 
their opinions heard and considered.  Indeed multiple avenues are important so that if one 
method is unavailable to a certain groups then others are.  In this way, pension fund 
contributors have the opportunity to become involved in decisions where they feel that they 
have an interest, but the choice to remain passive at other times.  As we have previously 
suggested, following Hirschman (1970), a mixture of active and inactive members might 
actually serve the system more effectively than total activism. 
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A similar opportunity should not be denied, however, to the large proportion of the population 
that do not contribute to pension funds.  This was indeed the principle behind our earlier 
proposition of a third tier of governance, in addition to pension funds and other private 
investors.  With this in mind, we now turn to consider a balanced governance structure for the 
whole industry, incorporating a general citizen’s right to participation. 
 
IV.iv A Balanced Governance Structure 
The idea of a balanced governance structure is to ensure that decision-making becomes more 
democratic with the implementation of privatisation; that all actors have a voice.  To this end, 
it is important that all Mexican citizens have access to channels of participation in decisions 
where they have interests, although it is unrealistic to envisage that this be in terms of a 
financial stake.24  The fundamental principle is that one group (i.e. pension funds, other 
investors or Mexican citizens) does not hold all the power; democracy implies the balancing 
of interests.  In practical terms, the balance of different governance powers will require 
continual adjustment, learning from experience of what works and what does not.   
 
A number of different avenues are required to facilitate this process of incorporation of wider 
interests, many of which will share a fundamental symmetry with the measures we have 
already outlined when discussing the governance of pension funds.  There will, however, need 
to be differences, and expansions upon the ideas already outlined, reflecting the different 
situations.  An example of one such method would be the creation of a body that could help 
                                                 
24 If shares in the electricity companies were floated on the stock market, any individual could buy shares, thus 
giving them some form of representation in the conventional sense of corporate control.  The point here, 
however, is to give representation to all, and not simply those in a position to obtain some measure of control 
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form groups of like-minded individuals; to facilitate the formation of interest groups.  These 
could be more conventional consumer pressure groups lobbying over specific issues, or, more 
fundamentally, locally based groups that have the interests of that locality as their prime 
concern.  Such local groups could act as fora for thinking, analysing and discussing issues of 
importance to that locality, one of which may involve electricity.  These local groups might 
then feed into a larger process whereby many different local groups get together to express 
and debate their concerns, and then make representations to the electricity companies when 
and where issues of importance arise.    
  
We therefore see that a balanced governance structure for the privatised electricity sector 
would look something along the lines of that outlined in Figure Two (overleaf).  The top half 
of the diagram shows the electricity sector, split into its three core elements, while the bottom 
half represents localities within Mexico.  For purposes of illustration, we have depicted two 
such localities, one urban and one rural, with different characteristics in terms of access to 
electricity and pension fund contributions.  Represented in solid arrows are electricity flows; 
from the generators to the local distribution companies, via the transmission company, and 
finally to the localities themselves.  Around this we have illustrated our proposed flows of 
decision-making input and control (dashed lines), incorporating the three distinct groups 
outlined above. 
                                                                                                                                                        
through share ownership.  Moreover, there is strong debate around the ability of small shareholders to effectively 
exercise their control rights – see Chapter One. 
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Figure Two 
Potential Control Structure  
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The first, and most traditional, control group are the private investors, who have direct input 
into the three different types of company through their share ownership.  The second group 
are the pension funds, who also have direct control through their ownership.  The control 
exerted by this group, however, is linked explicitly back to the localities through the 
subsection of each locality that are contributors to these funds.  Finally, the third tier of 
control is that implied by the right for all Mexican citizens to participate in the governance of 
the key electricity sector.  This control differs from the other groups in that there is no 
element of financial ownership, and input is thus shown on the opposite side of the diagram. 
 
We have represented the input of this third group in relation to local fora (which may be 
informal or formal), where issues of concern can be aired among local actors.  Where these 
concerns are influenced by the activities of electricity companies, it is envisaged that 
representations can be made to these companies, either directly or through a broader layer 
where distinct localities can co-ordinate their representations.  The precise form of these 
channels for representation to the companies is an important consideration.  In particular, 
there is a danger that the non-financial status of this group implies, in practice, a comparative 
lack of voice.  It may be necessary, for example, to formalise this participation on the board of 
the company, perhaps through allowing these local channels to elect representatives to the 
board.  In this way, the channel becomes effective, but will only be utilised where there is a 
divergence of interests.  This solution will be particularly appropriate for local distribution 
companies, which play more of a role in specific localities, especially in terms of widening 
access and expanding the system.  This is not to deny, however, that there may (or should) be 
other channels through which localities can exert their voice in the decision-making process.  
Indeed, one of these could be through the regulatory/co-ordination body, which we have also 
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included on the left side of the diagram.  Individuals or localities could input into this body, 
either directly or through the multi-regional fora, and thus influence the way in which this 
body interacts with, and guides, the electricity sector as a whole.   
 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
As a practical real-world application of the principles and types of broad policies we have 
indicated as being required to correct strategic failure in governance, we argued that the 
impending reform of the Mexican electricity sector is a step that should be afforded great 
care.  In particular, our emphasis has been on the possibility of privatisation and the 
opportunity that this process would present for enhancing participation, and hence democracy, 
in a key sector of the economy that has major implications for the development of the 
localities that comprise Mexico.   
 
Given the constraints that exist for Mexico and the nature of the electricity sector, our 
preferred solution, as outlined in Chapter Two, of simply putting in place a variety of 
mechanisms to allow different interest groups to participate in the current decision-making 
processes is not a viable option.  We have therefore had to consider alternative solutions.  
Specifically, we have suggested an ownership and control structure that aims to balance the 
interests of the required private investors against those of other interest groups.  A primary 
mechanism for this is to allow Mexican pension funds to play a leading role in the reform, 
thus linking investment in the sector back to individuals and groups with interests wider than 
those traditionally associated with external investors.  While this moves towards the guiding 
principles we established in the earlier parts of this thesis, it falls short of being the fully 
inclusive economic democracy we advocate.  We have therefore also proposed a more direct 
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incorporation of Mexican citizens in decision-making, through a formal right to participation.  
Finally, we have debated various governance mechanisms that would allow this participation 
to be realised, although we acknowledge that these require further debate, refinement and 
learning from what works, and what does not. 
 
The use of Mexican electricity reform as a specific application of how economic democracy 
can be made a reality, should not be interpreted to mean that this is a special case and thus 
that (many of) the conclusions are not applicable more widely.  The case of Mexico was 
adopted because of it allowed discussion of the governance implications of privatisation, its 
topical nature, the fit with the previous wider utility focus, and the fact that the forces acting 
within and upon Mexico meant that the policy space available was severely limited.   To that 
end, other industry examples might also have been chosen.  This is pursued in Chapter Four, 
which further extends the analysis of elite decision-making by focussing attention on the 
considerably different example of the corporate university.  It is therefore to this that we now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE WIDER APPLICATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST DECISION-
MAKING: THE CASE OF CORPORATE UNIVERSITIES 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus placed upon utility companies in the preceding Chapters gives rise to a possible 
danger in that that some readers might take this to imply the requirement for public interest 
decision-making is only applicable to these specific sectors.  This was not our intention, nor 
our view; other industry or sector examples to illustrate the application of the theory might 
easily have been chosen.  To demonstrate this, a further application of our approach is 
therefore now considered; we examine the case of corporate universities.  This example is a 
considerable departure from our previous utility company focus but this is a deliberate choice 
in order to give the broadest possible illustration of the generality of the theory.  Furthermore, 
at another level, corporate universities are significant in their own right and therefore 
discussion of the sector provides further insight. 
 
Education and the acquisition of new skills have always played a significant role in economic 
development and thus the expansion of the productive capacity of an economy.   In the age of 
the so called ‘knowledge’ economy, a highly skilled workforce and consequently the means 
by which these skills are nurtured – education/training - are seen to have a central role in 
creating economic prosperity (Sugden and Wilson, 2003; Dunning, 2000; World Bank, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 1998).   As an aspect of this, corporations see an appropriately educated workforce as 
one of the key determinants of their ability to thrive and expand.  In line with this, recent 
years have seen many become involved with the phenomena of the so-called ‘corporate 
university’.   
 118 
 
Dealtry (2000, p.171) reports that there are more than 1,600 such institutions now listed, and 
Meister (1998a, p.38) comments that in the USA, at their current rate of growth, their number 
could surpass that of traditional universities by the year 2010. A survey of the FTSE 100 
index companies conducted in the Spring of 2002 for this PhD, revealed that 23 out of the 100 
companies identified themselves as having created, or having been in the process of creating, 
a corporate university for their organisation.    
 
The decision to create such institutions is of particular interest in the current business climate, 
where many corporations are downsizing and focusing their activities on  ‘core areas’.  Such 
behaviour gives rise to an apparent paradox: it is hard to reconcile retrenching and the 
narrowing of focus, with the corporate move to provide education via the creation of 
corporate universities.
1
 In this Chapter we therefore seek to analyse why so many 
corporations are embracing the idea of the corporate university, by investigating the aims of 
the companies that have created them, and then by exploring the implications of these 
institutions.  Specifically we are concerned with some of the affects of these bodies on the 
governance and control of education, and on the provision of education in the economies in 
which they operate. 
 
The basis for our analysis is our previous understanding of, and therefore a comparison with, 
governance of the modern corporation. This is of relevance to corporate universities since 
these are institutions specifically created and controlled by a corporation, dedicated to serving 
                                                 
1
 It could be argued that if the education and training corresponds to these ‘core areas’ then it might be a natural 
deepening of the corporate focus.  However, even in this situation, a conflict could be still seen to arise because 
the provision of such training/education is most likely not a core area in itself but rather one of many services 
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its needs.  The implication is that decision-making within the parent organisation will likely 
impact upon the way it operates.  More specifically, with a corporation being controlled by a 
subset of those with an interest, we are left with the potential result that the corporate 
university may in turn be governed by this minority group, thus granting them the potential to 
exert a significant degree of control over education in the economies with which their 
corporations are associated.  Such a situation may be incompatible with a truly democratic 
society, where institutions such as companies and universities might be argued to exist to 
serve the communities with which they are associated, not the significantly different result, 
which the creation of corporate universities might imply. 
 
In order to pursue these arguments, this Chapter is organised as follows.  Our starting point in 
Section II is the issue of what exactly a corporate university is, and thus how it might be 
defined.  We then position this discussion in terms of the possibilities of strategic decision-
making within such organisations. Section III then introduces the British corporate university 
sector, drawing upon a survey of their number in the corporations of the FTSE 100 index, and 
a series of interviews conducted for this thesis.  The key findings on the rationale and 
governance mechanisms of these corporate universities are examined, and then this evidence 
is used to draw conclusions in terms of the control of corporate universities and the possibility 
of strategic failure. Section IV highlights the implications and significance of our findings for 
governance.  Finally our conclusions are presented in Section V. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that helps facilitate the operation of the corporation.  It is therefore unclear why it wouldn’t be outsourced like 
other support services such as housekeeping. 
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II. THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY  
II.i The Corporate University Defined 
Encountering the term ‘corporate university’ for the first time, it immediately raises    
connotations of an organisation that is an academic institution run on corporate lines.  That is 
to say, a university that operates as a business by providing a service (research, education and 
the granting of degrees) from which its raises revenue, and thus makes a profit; i.e. a for-profit 
private university run like a corporation.  In fact this is not the case.  Defining what 
constitutes a corporate university, however, and thus what is and is not such an organisation, 
is something upon which there is no definitive answer within the literature.  Several authors 
proffer consistent, if somewhat vague, definitions for this relatively abstract concept, but the 
difficulty remains in defining a corporate university in a definitive, meaningful way.   
 
A good starting point for a broad but robust definition is that proffered by Blass (2001, p.153), 
who sees corporate universities as “wholly owned training/education/learning/knowledge 
management facilities providing education and services for members of their organisations”.   
However, whilst this definition does not contradict the other contributions in this area, it does 
seem lacking when compared with the views of other commentators.  Greenberg (1998, p.37), 
for example, gives a good summary of the general feeling within the literature when he 
defines a corporate university as “a centralised, proactive organisation that is responsible for 
all training and education at a given company – and sometimes beyond.”   It is the structural 
and behavioural element that is the key difference from Blass, the notion of “centralised” and 
“proactive” suggesting the relevance of strategy to the operation of a corporate university.  
This Greenberg definition is more consistent with the views of Meister, one of the most 
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prominent and prolific writers in this subject area.  She defines a corporate university as a 
“strategic umbrella for developing and educating employees, customers, and suppliers in 
order to meet an organisation’s business strategies” (Meister, 1998b, p.29).   Therefore, 
according to Meister, such an institution must be strategic as well as being aligned closely 
with the needs of the parent corporation.  However, what is still unclear is exactly what 
‘corporate university’ actually means in practice, and how it differs from a more traditional 
training department or function. 
 
According to Meister, there are some very real and tangible differences between a training 
department and a corporate university, some of which are illustrated in Appendix A.  It 
reports Meister’s comparison of some of the differing features, and the ten clear-cut goals and 
principles around which she suggests that corporate universities tend to organise themselves.   
Whilst this is again instructive in giving a broad insight into a corporate university, it is still 
not a definitive or really meaningful definition. 
 
One of the key factors that make it so difficult to robustly define a corporate university in a 
meaningful way is that there is not a fixed model for such an organisation.    The corporate 
universities that exist today vary considerably in their operation and scope, making a ‘one-
size-fit-all’ definition problematic.  Some are entirely virtual, relying solely on the Internet 
and other new technologies, whilst others are in a more traditional university mould, having 
bricks and mortar campuses.   Moreover, some corporate universities observed in the real 
world neither fulfil all of the criteria for being different from a training department, or 
subscribe to all of the guiding principles identified by Meister, but they are nevertheless 
widely regarded as being corporate universities.  It would therefore seem that the term 
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‘corporate university’ should be regarded as an overarching nomenclature to describe the 
activities of branded, centralised and strategic training organisations of corporations, rather 
than as a rigidly definable particular type of entity that is readily, clearly and easily 
identifiable.  It is this view that is adopted for the purposes of this thesis. It is a view in line 
with the observations of Prince and Beaver (2001, p.18) who see the term corporate university 
as being “little more than that a convenient label or language construct”. 
 
We have not, however, addressed whether these institutions can be appropriately described as 
universities in the traditional and conventional use of that word.  This has been covered fairly 
extensively in the existing literature and is not our central concern.  Our focus is the 
governance of such entities.  The broad view of existing research is that the traditional (or 
academic) university and the corporate university are quite different and distinct things.  
Moreover, a common thread running through many, if not all, of the interviews conducted for 
this work was the ready acceptance that the corporate universities in question were not 
actually universities in the broadly accepted sense of the word.  For further information on 
this issue see Beaver and Prince (2001), Blass (2001), Craig et al. (1999) or Walton (1999).  
 
II.ii Decision-Making Within The Corporate University 
Irrespective of the debate as to how to define a corporate university or whether they are or are 
not a university in the traditional sense of the word, one thing is clear:  a corporate university 
is some form of corporate organisation and, as such, governance is required.  Chapters One 
and Two earlier established the existence and significance of strategic decision-making within 
corporate governance.  However, strategic decision-making is not confined to traditional 
production activities.  Many different types of corporate institutions and organisations give 
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rise to strategic decisions as a habitual part of their activities and/or operations.   Without such 
decisions to (amongst other things) establish the broad plans to guide them, such institutions 
and organisations would lack focus and direction, given that they could not have any clear 
aims or goals for the activities with which they are associated.   Strategic decisions are 
therefore readily observable in many different fields of economic activity, and corporate 
universities are no exception.  Strategic choices are made concerning the courses the 
corporate university is to offer (including any accreditation), what bodies (if any) are to 
accredit the courses, how to deliver those courses (using a physical facility or via virtual 
technologies), who are to be the instructors (internal or external), who is the target audience, 
and how to position the corporate university in relation to other educational providers, such as 
traditional universities.   
 
By their very nature, such strategic decisions are fundamental in determining the nature and 
shape of corporate universities, and are therefore the key determinants of their impact and 
affects.  There will inevitably exist different preferences over the potential strategic decisions 
amongst all of those groups or individuals that have an interest in the activities of that 
corporate university. This variation in interest can easily be illustrated.  
 
Differences of opinion may exist, for example, on the corporate university offering 
(externally) accredited courses.  Corporate employees completing courses taught by the 
corporate university may prefer that widely recognised bodies externally accredit these 
courses so that their qualification is ‘portable’, providing cachet in the eyes of potential 
employers.  Conversely, those controlling the corporation may prefer that courses are more 
basic, only covering material relevant to the firm (and not the wider generic material that 
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would most likely be required for a formal qualification).  This would mean the corporate 
university does not devote resources to something for which the parent corporation would 
receive little benefit.
2
 
 
However, that does not mean that all the employees of a corporation with its own corporate 
university will have exactly the same views on all of the possible strategic decisions.  It could 
be the case, for example, that middle ranking managers prefer that their junior colleagues do 
not take accredited course because these may take longer to finish, thus requiring more time 
away from the business needs of their job, and which may then make the jobs of middle 
ranking managers more difficult.  Conversely, the junior colleagues may prefer to take 
accredited courses because they may help to secure promotion (perhaps at a rival firm) in the 
future.   There are also likely to be differences of opinion over the availability of courses.  
Some may prefer that courses are freely available to all, whereas others might prefer 
restrictions in order to protect the exclusivity of the courses and qualifications. 
 
Interests may also differ between those involved with a corporate university and those 
involved in the wider educational sector, such as a traditional university, or more broadly, 
government.  More traditional universities may question the ability of a corporate university 
to act independently given the nature of the relationship with its parent, and may see such an 
organisation as a threat to the traditional educational and research role of universities.   
Indeed, traditional universities may well prefer that corporations train their staff via the use of 
closer partnerships with existing educational institutions, rather than by creating their own 
corporate universities.  On the other hand, many of those controlling the corporations clearly 
                                                 
2
 The interviews conducted for this Section of the thesis highlighted cases where corporate universities identified 
the requirement to expand the generic material taught on their courses (which was not of relevance to their 
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prefer to create their own corporate university (given the number that have been created thus 
far). 
 
Given this variation in interests and the usual economic assumption that individuals take 
decisions in their own best interests, the question then becomes: who is able to exert control 
over the decision-making process, and thus determine the impact and affects of the corporate 
university?   
 
Our previous discussions on control of the modern corporation are again instructive in this 
regard.  Corporations controlled by a subset of those with an interest in their activities raises 
the possibility that a corporate university, controlled by a particular corporation, may also be 
controlled by a subset of those with an interest in its activities.   If this is the case, a corporate 
university may not be governed in a way that is acceptable to all of those with an interest in its 
activities.  In other words, the corporate university may also suffer from strategic failure.  
This is a particularly alarming result given the importance of education, and thus an 
investigation upon the nature of the corporate university is required if their impact and 
consequences are to be properly assessed.  We therefore now turn to investigate the corporate 
universities of the largest British based publicly floated companies in order to do this. 
 
III. THE BRITISH CORPORATE UNIVERSITY 
A survey conducted between January and March 2002 of the FTSE 100 companies revealed 
that 23 out of the 100 companies contacted (via telephone and email) identified themselves as 
                                                                                                                                                        
parent organisation)  if they were to gain accreditation from external bodies. 
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having created, or having been in the process of creating, some form of corporate university.
3
   
In reality the true number of corporate universities in Britain is likely to be significantly 
higher than this figure would suggest; several companies identified themselves as not having 
such an institution but an alternative view is that they have a de facto corporate university, it 
is just not branded as such.
4
  Moreover, several companies outside the FTSE 100 have created 
their own corporate universities, or have access to their parent organisation’s corporate 
university.   Arkin (2000, p.43), for example, reports that there are around 200 corporate 
universities in the UK, and that this number is likely to increase over the next few years.  The 
suggestion is therefore that the influence of the corporate university in the UK is reasonably 
strong, and is getting stronger.   
 
The evidence presented in the following Section is based around a series of semi-structured 
telephonic interviews that were conducted in February and March 2002 with relatively senior 
representatives of a number of FTSE 100 companies.  Building upon the foundations of the 
survey mentioned above, these representatives were identified as working in the areas of those 
companies that are associated with corporate universities.  This included those involved with 
corporations that already operate a corporate university, those in the process of creating one, 
and those to whom the idea is still some distance away.  Whilst the parent corporations and 
the corporate universities in question vary considerably, a number of key themes and findings 
were common to most interviews.  Unless highlighted otherwise, the quotes in the remainder 
of this Section have been taken directly from these interviews.  The companies’ names have 
                                                 
3
 The FTSE 100 was taken to be that as outlined in The Sunday Times on December 16
th
 2001.   Where the term 
‘corporate university’ was not known, the simple definition of  Blass (2001) was adopted. 
4
 Similarly some of those companies which identified themselves as having a corporate university may not in 
fact have such an organisation in the eyes of those involved with the corporate university sector elsewhere, 
although the effect of this over representation is likely to be relatively small due to the multi-contact approach 
adopted by this survey. 
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been omitted to ensure anonymity (of both the companies and the individuals who took part).  
See Appendix B for the list of core questions utilised in these interviews, and a sample 
transcript of one of the interviews. 
 
III.i The Rationale 
In order to understand the role, impact and implications of the corporate university, it is first 
necessary to understand the rationale behind the corporate decision that they be created.   The 
most commonly cited explanation in the interviews for why corporations are becoming 
increasingly involved with the corporate university was that they sought “to align learning 
with group and business strategies”.  A corporate university was seen as the best means to 
train and educate a workforce in a way that “responds to the corporate strategy of [the 
particular corporation]” and thus ensure “a closer link between learning available and the 
needs of the business”.  In other words, as one interviewee put it, to ensure that “the learning 
agenda of [the particular corporation] is entirely driven by the business agenda of [the 
particular corporation].”  The parent corporations seem to believe that a corporate university 
is the best way to educate and train their workforces in a way that facilitates the successful 
operation of those corporations.  This appears to encourage the view that a corporate 
university is just a means to an end; a tool to aid and assist a corporation in its activities.   
 
Viewing corporate universities as such a tool is consistent with the fact that virtually none of 
the companies interviewed used their corporate universities as revenue generators.  Broadly 
speaking, they were internally focussed, seeing their customers as solely the employees of the 
parent organisation.  They typically did not offer any of their courses to external agents.   
However, the major exceptions to this were when a limited number of courses were offered to 
 128 
some of the business partners of the parent corporation.  Generally speaking these were only a 
small number of specialist courses that would enable their relationship to function better (for 
example, by providing specialist information on the understanding of the nature of the 
business), or that would be difficult for the partner to run by itself but were nevertheless 
required for their business operation (e.g. safety courses).
5
  It did not appear to be the case 
that these courses were offered outside the parent corporation in order to make a profit. It 
seemed to be in the parent’s interest to aid its business partners in this way because it 
facilitated successful business relationships. This is consistent with viewing the corporate 
university as something that has been created to aid and assist the parent corporation.
6
 
 
The interviews also indicated that one of the major reasons for the move into the corporate 
university field was to get the best value from the money being put into the education/training 
area.  In other words, to gain “the greatest possible benefit for the greatest number of people”, 
or to get the biggest “bang for your buck”, as one interviewee said.  Companies indicated that 
by centralising training in such an organisation they were able to cut out wasteful duplication 
of effort amongst their different business units, gain economies of scale and scope, and offer 
consistent courses across the whole business group.  Indeed one interviewee working within a 
corporate university said that they “have a business model according to which the 
considerable investment that [the parent corporation] is making into [the particular 
corporation] is matched by savings that [accrue] by just centralising training.”  A corporate 
university is therefore partially about the cost of training and education to corporations. 
                                                 
5
 The courses may be difficult to run for a whole host of reasons, for example, because the partner in question 
was relatively small. 
6
 There were a very small number of other exceptions to this where companies did provide training to external 
agents, which for the most part seemed to be done for historical reasons.  For example, they were the worlds 
largest company with expertise in a particular area and so had always made their training available to external 
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A significant number of the interviews also highlighted the idea that a corporate university 
was created in order to make learning and education more accessible, and to give employees 
“access to top quality learning”.   By centralising all training, corporations are “opening up 
the best [of the] existing courses to people right across” the parent corporation, increasing the 
scope and raising the standard of training within the corporation.   
 
Improving the access, quality and ‘value for money’ of training is especially important for a 
number of corporations as they are under dual forms of pressure to educate their workforce.  
Firstly, from a compliance point of view, both service and more traditional manufacturing or 
related sector corporations are now obliged to have employees in certain positions with 
specific external qualifications.  They are thus having to train more of their staff to such 
levels; they are under pressure to create “fit for purpose people in the organisation”.   
Secondly, corporations were also said to be under increasing pressure from their shareholders 
to manage and invest in their “intangible assets, [their] intellectual capital”, which is the 
company employees.  Such a view parallels and compliments the findings of a small number 
of the interviews suggesting that a significant reason for the move into a corporate university 
was to change the business culture; “to turn [the particular corporation] into the kind of 
organisation where learning is part of the culture…to get all [of the parent corporation’s] 
employees interested in learning”.   The move into a corporate university was seen as being a 
“cultural change project” to help the organisation adopt a more learning/training friendly 
approach. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
agents, even prior to the creation of a corporate university. The provision of this training is therefore 
unconnected with the decision to create a corporate university. 
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Changing the business culture regarding training and education would also have a positive 
impact upon another one of the reasons highlighted, that of the beneficial affect on the 
attraction and retention of staff.  A corporate university to provide access to training and 
qualifications was seen as a positive factor when recruiting new staff or striving to keep  
existing staff; “a lot of people would rather work for an organisation that is going to give them 
development than for an organisation that isn’t.”  Moreover, “people would prefer to work in 
an organisation where morale and motivation is high, and [they] are highest in organisations 
that put a lot of time, effort and money into developing people”.
7
 
 
III.ii Governance Mechanisms 
As outlined, one of the major reasons that corporations moved into the area of corporate 
universities was “to align learning with group and business strategies”.  If a corporation is to 
successfully achieve this goal, it needs to be able to exert control over the corporate university 
so that it can govern what is going on within that organisation; it needs to be in a position to 
influence strategic decision-making within the corporate university.  This was very evident in 
the interviews.  Many interviewees outlined governance mechanisms in corporate universities 
that were apparently envisaged to ensure that “learning is very much guided by the direction 
in which the business is going”.   Broadly speaking this seems to be operationalised by 
integrating high-ranking leaders of the parent corporations into positions of responsibility and 
decision-making power within the corporate universities.    In many cases the corporate 
universities have a council, board or senate which sits at the top of the organisation to control 
                                                 
7
 It is interesting to note that these later reasons for why corporations have created corporate universities might 
be seen to be general arguments as to why corporations invest in education rather than why they created 
corporate universities per se.  It would, however, be dangerous to take one argument in isolation since it is likely 
that all of the reasons mentioned above would interact with each other when the decision to create a corporate 
university is taken.  It could, for example, be the case that whilst a corporation was required to have certain 
employees with specific qualifications, it wanted to ensure that any learning done within the guise of that 
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its operation, and these are dominated by senior representatives of the parent corporation. For 
example, “the person who chairs the executive committee [of the particular corporate 
university] is the group chief executive, and he is also the chair of the university council”.  
Similarly  “the strategy board … consists of half a dozen directors who are either on the main 
[company] board or one stop removed from the main board and they are there as a business 
representative to make sure that we have an overall university and learning strategy and 
agenda that meets what the business wants”.   
 
In addition to having supervisory type-boards at the top of the corporate universities, many 
were also divided into several faculties for different types of learning/education. These were 
also generally headed by a senior member of the parent corporation, and such managers were 
often on the supervisory boards as well.  As one of the interviewees highlighted, “the four 
faculties of [the particular corporate university] are all chaired by a dean who is a member of 
the executive committee of [the particular corporation], in other words the top top business 
leaders, and those four deans are accountable for the learning agenda of [the particular 
corporate university] so they drive it absolutely at the centre”.  Whilst discussing the issue of 
how they maintain governance, one interviewee highlighted that this was done by 
“subdividing … all the key learning areas into what we call faculties and then appointing 
again a senior director as a head of each of those faculties.”  In other words, “the learning 
agenda is right up there with the business agenda because it is exactly the same people driving 
both”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
qualification was as relevant to its specific business needs as possible, a situation facilitated if the corporation 
was responsible for the teaching associated with that qualification via its own corporate university. 
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As well as controlling the corporate university by formal governance mechanisms, a number 
of the interviewees outlined several other ways in which the parent corporations exert their 
influence.  Whilst much of the corporate university’s teaching/instruction is done by external 
providers or professional trainers within the organisation, a significant amount is said to be 
done by “those people who actually work in the line, in functions out in the [operations of the 
business]”.  Indeed one corporation was said to run a course through its corporate university 
“…for [its] high potential senior leaders and the chairman of the company always contributes 
to it in terms of the final session”.   
 
Such involvement by those so closely associated with the parent organisation cannot help but 
transfer the strategic direction of the parent corporation onto the operations of the corporate 
university.  The transfer of influence is further re-enforced by other factors that help close 
integration with the parent corporation.  One such example might be the decision on where to 
locate any physical infrastructure associated with the corporate university.  One interviewee 
revealed that “the reason why we have decided to build our leadership development centre in 
[a particular city] is that we will actually build it into the core of our head office in [the same 
city] … we want senior leaders who are based in head office to easily be able to contribute to 
its programmes …we are taking the learning centre right into the heart of head office”. 
 
III.iii Corporate University Governance and Strategic Failure 
It is clear that the evidence presented significantly validates the hypothesis that corporate 
universities, like their parent corporations, suffer from strategic failure in that they are 
controlled by a subset of those with an interest in their activities.   Not all of those with an 
interest in the activities of the corporate university are able to contribute in a meaningful way 
 133 
to strategic decision-making.  The evidence collected overwhelmingly suggests that 
everything about the British corporate university is controlled by the parent corporation.  We 
have seen they control its physical location, its scope, the nature of its teaching, its syllabus 
and even provide much of its personnel.  Furthermore, the identification of this subset 
controlling the corporate universities is unmistakable.  It is senior individuals within the 
parent company who seem to be taking such strategic decisions, and as Chapter One 
suggested, it is these individuals who are going to be closely involved with the strategic 
decision-making of the parent company.  Decision-making within the corporation and 
corporate university are therefore extremely closely integrated, something that was explicitly 
admitted during many of the interviews.  
 
Given this control structure, it is no surprise that as one interviewee put it, corporate 
universities “are driven by an overriding business agenda rather than by a general academic 
agenda”.   Likewise, another admitted that   “courses that happen in [the particular corporate 
university] are usually very business focused” and “any value we [the corporate university] 
have within [the particular parent corporation] is about delivering things for and as part of [the 
particular parent corporation]”.   We would expect such findings given that theory suggests 
decision makers take those decisions in their own best interests, and the previous conclusion 
that control of the corporate university strategic decision-making process is the preserve of 
those controlling the parent corporation.   
 
In one sense this result is unsurprising and in no way unexpected given previous contributions 
as to the nature of a corporate universities, their function and the fact they were created by 
their parent corporations.  At another level, however, the extent to which those in charge of 
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the strategic decision-making process of the parent corporation seem to utterly dominate the 
activities and decision-making of the corporate university is extremely revealing.  This close 
association means that those controlling the modern corporation are not only able to control 
production, but are also able to exert significant influence upon the provision of education.  
The significance and implications of this are addressed in the next Section.
8
   
 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC FAILURE 
IV.i A Cause for Concern 
A practical illustration of one of the problems caused by strategic failure within the corporate 
university, and one of the much highlighted dangers in the existing literature, is the existence 
of a potential for conflicts between a corporate centred agenda and scholarly independence 
and impartiality – as one of the interviewees puts it, “we are driven by an overriding business 
agenda rather than by a general academic agenda”.  As Craig et al. (1999, p.513) comment,  
“in the corporate university one might well imagine conflict between what 
scholars consider ought to be enquired into, and what the corporate strategy 
dictates to be the current action plan.  Consider, for example, the obvious conflicts 
between corporate strategies in the tobacco industry and the conduct of research 
into the health effects of smoking.”    
A similar argument can also be made for the academic content of educational courses offered 
                                                 
8
 Our findings on the control of the corporate university have implications for the issue as to whether or not a 
corporate university can be treated as anything other than a subsidiary of the parent corporation.  The close 
relationship we have documented between the corporate university and the parent corporation, both in terms of 
the decision makers and supporting role of the corporate university, certainly adds weight to the argument that 
the corporate university cannot be treated as anything other than a subsidiary.  Indeed, this view is further re-
enforced by adopting the Cowling and Sugden (1987a, 1994, 1998) view of a corporation as a centre of strategic 
decision-making.  This broad perspective as to the nature of the corporation would therefore suggest that a 
corporate university could be treated as being part of the parent given that the strategic decision-making is 
closely integrated. Whilst the veracity of this argument is appealing in many regards, the matter is still open to 
debate because of the differences that exist between the two organisations.  For example, the purpose of the 
parent corporation is making profit via the provision of good and services, whilst the corporate university is 
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by the corporate university. 
 
Whilst the possibility for conflict in teaching is significant, the extent to which a research 
conflict exists within the corporate university is in all probability reasonably limited, given 
that the corporate universities examined in this study were essentially training centred 
organisations and as such did little or no research.
9
  Where research was conducted, it seemed 
to be focused on operational aspects, aimed at improving the operation of the corporate 
university itself rather than developing new knowledge of the form required from research 
conducted in a more traditional university.  Much of the corporate university research process 
was done by benchmarking and interacting with other corporate universities, either directly or 
by one of the many organisations that seem to have been created to facilitate such activity.  
One surprising feature the interviews did raise, however, was that those involved with 
corporate universities were generally not prohibited from researching or writing articles for 
publication, although that they were said to be “accountable” for their time and employed in a 
certain function.  If this responsibility were neglected to pursue other interests then action 
would be taken, but so long as this was not the case, individuals were free to pursue any 
matters that arose.  In practice it seemed to be the case that the vast majority of those who this 
might apply to would not have the time to take advantage of this potential freedom.  They 
were de facto constrained. 
 
The aforementioned constraint of the academic freedoms of those involved with corporate 
universities highlights the significance of strategic failure within the governance of the 
corporate university.  A corporate university controlled by, and therefore run in the interests 
                                                                                                                                                        
about providing education and training.  
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of, those in control of the parent corporation implies that the education/training is given 
because it is the interests of the corporation to do so.  It is not given for altruistic reasons or 
because it is beneficial to society.  It will likewise be given in a manner, and containing the 
content that is most suitable for the needs of the corporation in question.  Whilst this sounds 
like the basic economic principle of self-interest leading to mutually beneficial outcomes, this 
is in fact not the case.  Such a view is based on the notion of ubiquitous perfectly competitive 
markets, but it is universally acknowledged that markets are imperfect.  Such market 
imperfection therefore suggests that corporations are free to pursue their own self-interest but 
that it may no longer lead to mutually beneficial outcomes.
10
  Hence, it points to the 
significance of strategic failure. 
 
Consequently we view the provision of education via the corporate university as a serious 
cause for concern because, as the previous potential research conflict illustration has 
demonstrated, the interests of the corporation may not conform to the broad academic 
principles, standards, ideals or impartiality that society may regard as desirable.  Furthermore, 
by providing a (potentially) biased or sub-standard education with limited content, the 
corporate university may also stifle future possibilities and knowledge creation.  Such a 
situation is not optimal for society as a whole, and therefore the education and other services 
provided by the corporate university might be done in a sub-optimal way. 
 
Moreover, as well as controlling the education given to their employees via their own 
corporate university, corporations are also extending their influence into other parts of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
9
 This clearly has implications as to whether these institutions can be accurately be known as universities 
although as already stated, this question is beyond the confines of this study. 
10
 Chapter Three used its focus on utilities to give some examples of how the absence of perfect competition 
results in the breakdown of the self-interest principle. 
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educational sector.   Our interviews revealed that corporate universities tend to form a number 
of partnerships with existing traditional universities and other educational institutions, in 
order to take advantage of existing expertise and award particular degrees or qualifications.  
As several authors have already highlighted (Craig et al., 1999; Jarvis, 2000; Sugden, 2000), 
by engaging in such processes they raise the possibility of their having an immediate and 
direct influence over the activities of these partners.   This might therefore give their parent 
corporations even more control over education than might first be apparent, thus exacerbating 
the costs to society of the corporate university.  It might even extend the strategic failure of 
the corporate university into education more generally.    
 
IV.ii How To React? 
In response to the strategic failure surrounding the corporate university (and perhaps therefore 
education more broadly), some schools of thought are sure to argue that appropriate 
regulation could be used solve any problems.  This regulation could, for example, take the 
form of nationally set curricula for corporate universities, or stipulations as to outside (i.e. 
none corporate) or academic members of any corporate university governance board, or the 
sheer number/strength of their positive features.  We would, however, contest the view that 
regulation could be fully effective since, as we have previously argued, regulation is a 
mechanistic, arms length response to address a specific set of observed ‘symptoms’.  Not only 
does it fail to address the underlying governance concern of the dominance of the parent 
corporation, it will inevitably be found wanting given that it seeks to use (an admittedly 
developing but) fixed set of rules to limit a fundamentally dynamic and often 
unseen/unobserved process.   
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 We therefore suggest that active measures need to be taken to restrain the activities of 
corporations within the educational sector.  The exact nature of these measures is beyond the 
confines of this thesis and requires input from those with specific pedagogical expertise, 
drawing lessons from what works and what does not.  One possibility would be dilution or 
control of the corporate influence within a corporate university, but that might still give the 
parent a (significant) degree of control, thereby not removing the possibility of strategic 
failure within the corporate university.    In practice it may, however, prove extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate a corporate university from its parent corporation.  It 
may therefore be necessary to take the extreme step of banning the existence of corporate 
universities and instead require corporations to reassign education/training resources to 
support their employees in other education/training possibilities that do not suffer from 
strategic failure (or at least not to such an extent). 
 
Opponents of the view that restraint of corporate universities (or at least restraint of direct 
corporate involvement with them) is a necessity might argue that corporate universities have a 
number of positive features that justify their continued existence in their present form. Such 
positive features might be seen to include the fact that they are organisations that promote 
education/training, encourage a corporate learning ethos or are quite innovative in their 
teaching methods when compared to the traditional university.
11
   If these arguments are 
adhered to, then it is logical to encourage corporate universities instead of seeking to restrain 
(or indeed ban) them as we are advocating.  
 
                                                 
11
 These ‘positive features’ were all goals or features of the corporate university identified during the interviews 
conducted. 
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However, to make such an argument would fundamentally miss the governance focus of the 
arguments we have been making.   The issue as to whether or not a corporate university has 
specific (educational or other) benefits is beyond the confines of this thesis.  However, for the 
sake of argument, let us assume that the corporate university does have some benefits, at least 
some of which are unique and thus cannot be replicated by another form of educational 
establishment.   
 
In this situation, the extent to which these potential benefits of the corporate university accrue 
to society depends upon the way in which it is governed.    Any benefits from a corporate 
university that accrue to society will originate from those issues where the interests of the elite 
running the corporate university overlap, coincide or approximate the broader interests of 
society.  Therefore, the benefits actually derived from a corporate university controlled by an 
elite are certain to be equal or less than would be the case if there were the application of 
public interest decision-making (if such a thing is possible in this context).    This is evident 
from the following extreme situations that serve to bound the possibilities of the outcomes of 
elite decision-making, and thus the potential benefits of the corporate university.   
 
A best-case scenario under strategic failure would have the interests of the decision-making 
elite coinciding with those of society on every issue, and on every occasion.  In this situation, 
elite decision-making would result in the same outcomes as public interest decision-making, 
and thus all the possible benefits of the corporate university would be gained by society.  At 
the other extreme, a worst-case scenario would have polar opinions on strategic decision-
making between the controlling elite and society in general, and thus there would be no 
overlap or even similarity in preferences.  In these circumstances, elite decision-making 
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would result in outcomes diametrically opposed to those that would have been achieved under 
public interest decision-making.   Therefore, none of the potential benefits of the corporate 
university would accrue to society. 
  
The above scenarios show that only in an extreme situation did elite control of the corporate 
university result in the same outcomes that would have occurred had there been public interest 
decision-making.  This extreme scenario is exceedingly unlikely to occur in reality given the 
variation of interests that we have already illustrated exist surrounding the corporate 
university.  Therefore, it is more realistic to assume that preferences over decisions will differ 
(for at least some of the time) and thus that elite control of the corporate university results in a 
less than optimum outcome for society.  Only some (if any) of the possible benefits of the 
corporate university will accrue to society.  Furthermore, this loss to society may be further 
increased by the influence of the corporations, either via their corporate universities or others 
means, upon more traditional forms of educations/training such as universities.   
  
In short, we suggest that society needs to think carefully about the consequences of corporate 
universities before we rush to embrace and encourage them, which seems to be the current 
trend, at least in the UK.  Education is far too important to allow it be provided in a manner 
which does not take account of the public interest, and consequently we suggest that measures 
need to be taken that address the strategic failure of corporate universities. 
 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Building upon the utility corporation centred foundations of the preceding work, this Chapter 
examined the considerably different example of examining the emerging corporate 
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universities phenomena. Defining these bodies as the branded, centralised and strategic 
training organisations of corporations, we hypothesised that because corporations suffer from 
strategic failure, a corporate university may likewise be controlled by a subset of those with 
an interest in its activities.   In order to test this view, we illustrated the presence of strategic 
decision-making and then presented an investigation of the corporate universities of the 
corporations in the FTSE 100 stock market, examining why such corporations decided to 
create these institutions and how they were governed. The findings indicated that these 
institutions have been created, are controlled and are run so as to serve the interests of their 
parent corporations, and therefore perhaps not in the interests of society more widely.  We 
therefore suggested that measures need to be taken to address this strategic failure, and that 
perhaps even banning such institutions is required given the importance of education.    
Criticisms of this interventionist approach were also addressed. 
 
In short, this Chapter sought to extend the application of the strategic decision-making 
approach to governance, and thus illustrate its broadly applicable nature.  In order to do this 
we considered an in-depth analysis of the corporate university.  Other illustrations might also 
have been chosen.  To mention a few out of any number of possibilities: given the dominance 
of Microsoft in computer operating systems and elsewhere, there are questions to be 
addressed, for example, into the governance of Microsoft, its and other companies influence 
upon the Internet or simply computing in general; given the risk inherent in the consumption 
of tobacco products, there are questions to be addressed into the governance of this sector; or 
given the particular nature of the entertainment they provide, there are questions regarding the 
governance of sports teams such as football clubs.   
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These possibilities we leave for future investigations.  We will instead conclude our 
governance investigation by returning to the topic of privatisation.  As Chapter Three 
outlined, privatisation has important implications for corporate control whilst also presenting 
a opportunity in which to make the fundamental changes that our earlier work on public 
interest decision-making suggested may be required.  In utilising privatisation in such a 
manner, lessons need to be drawn from existing experience so that (organisational) mistakes 
are not repeated.  In Part Two we therefore continue our previous focus on the electricity 
sector by examining several features of British electricity privatisation in order to highlight 
such lessons to be learned. 
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PART TWO 
 
BRITISH ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to evaluate the policy of encouraging new entry into the market for 
electricity generation in England and Wales.  This issue has been largely ignored in the 
existing literature inasmuch as encouraging new ‘independent power producers’ (IPPs) is 
often (implicitly) assumed to be a logical progression of a newly liberalised and privatised 
market.  Where the existing literature does look at these ‘independents’, it is as an aside to 
what are perceived to be larger issues, and/or from the point of view of a different subject.  
Green (1999), for example, mentions IPPs in the context of the reform of electricity trading 
arrangements, whilst Watson (1997) and Winskel (1998) do so from the perspective of 
technological change within the industry.  Furthermore, Thomas (1999) comments upon IPPs 
when conducting a broad analysis of whether privatisation has reduced electricity prices.  
 
Our view is that the policy of encouraging independents should not simply be regarded as an 
aside to other events, but is instead an important and deliberate attempt to correct a mistake 
that was created by an embroiled privatisation process.  As such it should be evaluated on its 
effectiveness in this respect.  That is our goal, and by doing so, it is hoped that lessons can be 
learned for the design of future privatisations and for the policies that are implemented once 
privatisation has occurred.   This issue is especially relevant for our previous decisions on 
electricity privatisation in Mexico, given that IPPs are already operating in the publicly owned 
system in Mexico (see Section III.i, Chapter Three).  Moreover, entry by new firms is about 
competition, and as Sugden (1990) has suggested, competition is an aspect of democratic 
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governance in that it can prevent the exercise of monopoly or monopsony power which may 
constrain the freedom of a publicly controlled corporation. 
 
In order to pursue these arguments, the Chapter is organised as follows.  After initially 
positioning itself within the context of privatisation of the British electricity sector, Section II 
highlights why such a policy on entry was required and how this policy was implemented in 
practice.  Section III provides some insight into which companies responded to the incentives 
on offer, why these companies got involved, what factors influenced their decisions to enter 
and how they became involved with generation. The issues of what these companies are 
independent of and whether they can in fact be called independent are also addressed.  To do 
this, the Chapter draws heavily upon original information gained from telephone interviews 
conducted with many of those involved with the so called ‘independent power producers.’  
These interviews provide fresh insight on many issues, with some of the information being 
completely unexpected in the context of the existing electricity literature.  The interviews also 
provide evidence to support theories that have already been mentioned in the existing 
literature concerning IPPs. 
 
In the light of, and drawing from, the information provided in the interviews and existing 
literature, Section IV then analyses the effects of this entry.  We suggest that the policy 
objectives have not been met, since the independents have not done the job that they were 
originally intended for. The unforeseen consequences of this policy are also examined, with 
newly calculated figures for the plant margin (the amount by which installed capacity exceeds 
peak demand) leading the Chapter to highlight serious concerns about the future viability of 
the electricity system.   We then conclude by using the experiences of the policy of 
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encouraging entry to draw some overall lessons on the design of privatisation in England and 
Wales, and hence more widely. 
 
II. THE BACKGROUND 
II.i Electricity Sector Privatisation 
Consider first a brief overview of the restructuring and privatisation process of the electricity 
sector in Great Britain.  The British system consists of one market for England and Wales, 
and a separate, significantly smaller, Scottish market.  Prior to reorganisation and privatisation 
(henceforth privatisation for simplicity) the market in England and Wales consisted of twelve 
regional Area Boards who were responsible for the local distribution and supply of electricity 
to consumers.  These Area Boards purchased electricity directly from the CEGB (Central 
Electricity Generating Board), which was responsible for the generation and transmission of 
electricity via a countrywide electricity grid (Chesshire, 1996). 
 
In 1990 the British Government restructured and then subsequently privatised the electricity 
sector of England and Wales.  The transmission grid of the CEGB was transferred to a new 
company (National Grid Company - NGC) and the 12 Area Boards were essentially 
unchanged and became known as Regional Electricity Companies (RECs).  The NGC and the 
RECs were seen as natural monopolies and were therefore governed by a new industry 
regulator, the Office for Electricity Regulation (OFFER), which employed RPI-X style 
regulation.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 On 16
th
 June 1999, OFFER merged with the gas regulator to form OFGEM, the Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets. 
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The government’s initial plans (as outlined in the February 1998 white paper) were to include 
all generating plant in the privatisation, including the nuclear plant.  To achieve this whilst 
also including competition in generation, it was planned that the CEGB’s generation assets 
would be split into two companies; the nuclear facilities being combined with 60% of the 
conventional stations to form National Power (NP), while the remaining conventional stations 
were to be placed in a smaller company (PowerGen). This asymmetric duopoly structure was 
chosen as it was felt that a large company was required to ‘shelter’ the nuclear plant; to bear 
the sizeable risks associated with their construction and pay the extensive back end costs of 
the contaminated power stations (Newbery and Green, 1996). 
 
As the privatisation process progressed, it became increasingly obvious that nuclear generated 
power was far more costly than had been previously thought and that the market was 
unwilling to shoulder the massive liabilities associated with this plant.  The government had 
no real alternative but to withdraw the nuclear stations from the sale midway through the 
process in 1989.  By this stage the privatisation process was already very seriously delayed 
and so there was no time to change the structure of conventional generation.  Thus the only 
alteration was that the nuclear assets were removed from NP and placed in a company, 
Nuclear Electric, which was to remain in the public sector (Thomas, 1996a).
2
 
 
As well as restructuring the industry, the government also changed the way in which the 
market worked.  The main result of this was the creation of the Power Pool, a spot market 
designed to secure a merit order of plant operation. Generating companies made bids into the 
Pool with the price of electricity from their individual power stations. A combination of plant 
                                                 
2
 The nuclear plant remained in the public sector until 1996, when the newer plant was privatised as British 
Energy.  At the time of writing this company was facing significant financial difficulties. 
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was then chosen, such that expected demand was satisfied at minimum cost. All the power 
stations chosen received the bid price of the marginal plant selected to run; the System 
Marginal Price (SMP).  In addition to this payment, all plant that bid into the Pool received a 
variable capacity payment for each unit of capacity bid, regardless of whether this capacity 
was actually used to generate electricity at that time. This payment was inversely related to 
the amount of surplus capacity (i.e. the greater the surplus capacity, the lower the payment).  
The objective was to ensure that the system had sufficient capacity (Newbery and Green, 
1996). 
 
Since privatisation, the industry has witnessed the so called ‘dash for gas’ - the building of 
large amounts of new generation capacity using the relatively new Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) technology.  Much of this new capacity has been built by the independent 
power producers that are the focus of this Chapter. 
 
The electricity system in Scotland is separate to that which exists in England and Wales, 
although both systems are physically linked and industry reorganisation in both systems took 
place on the same day (31
st
 March 1990).  Prior to privatisation two vertically integrated 
companies (The South of Scotland Electricity Board and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric 
Board) provided all electricity services in the regions of Scotland in which they operated.  
Reorganisation and privatisation of the industry in Scotland was less radical than that in 
England and Wales.   The two vertically integrated companies were essentially transferred 
into the private sector with the only major change being that the nuclear assets were 
transferred into a new publicly owned company, Scottish Nuclear.  Like their counterparts in 
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England and Wales, the new Scottish electricity companies were regulated by OFFER on 
transmission, distribution and supply (Thomas, 1996a). 
 
II.ii Dominance in Generation 
It quickly became apparent that the structure of the industry in England and Wales that 
eventually emerged from the embroiled privatisation process had some significant defects. 
Most important amongst these was the severe lack of competition in the generation sector, a 
situation that was particularly acute since the government did not believe generation to be a 
natural monopoly if entry was possible, and had therefore made no provision for detailed 
regulation of this sector.
3
  National Power (NP) and PowerGen (PG) had inherited all the 
existing fossil fuel capacity, including the ‘mid-merit’ and ‘peaking’ plant that set SMP 
virtually all the time, giving these companies effective control of the Pool.   Even in 1994, 
after NP and PG had come under pressure from the regulator for controlling the Pool and 
significant amounts of entry had occurred, NP and PG still set SMP 85% of the time (Thomas, 
1996b, p.73). 
 
If the Pool had been competitive, a profit maximising generator owning a single plant would 
bid into the Pool at the marginal cost of its plant; if it bid above marginal cost, the generator 
would risk being asked to produce less often.  Since there would be a large number of 
different generators bidding into the Pool, each generator would have no real opportunity to 
act strategically and increase profits (Green, 1996). In this situation the Pool might be an 
admirable system, providing electricity at the marginal cost of production. 
 
                                                 
3
 The government believed that competition from the existing generators and the threat of potential competition 
from new entrants would suffice (Newbery and Green, 1996). 
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However, in reality the market was dominated by two large companies who owned numerous 
generating plants.  In this situation the large companies have an incentive to act strategically 
by raising the bid price of some of their stations.  Although these stations would be used less, 
the higher bids would raise the overall system marginal price (SMP) which all operating 
plants receive.  The firm’s remaining stations would then receive this higher SMP, making it 
possible for the firm to raise its overall profits (Green, 1996). 
 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that both PG and NP have engaged in such activities to 
manipulate the Pool to their own advantage. The OFFER (1991, p.1) report on the Pool price 
inquiry cites that average Pool prices for the first half of 1991/92 were 29% higher than the 
corresponding period of 1990/91, which it attributes to rises in SMP.  The report goes on to 
say that “PowerGen followed a policy of declaring some plant unavailable which was 
subsequently redeclared available.  This policy increased Pool prices …… it represented an 
abuse of the company’s dominant market position” (OFFER, 1991, p.3). This gaming within 
the Pool allowed the company to increase the capacity payments that generators receive.  
Indeed the report also notes that “there is no doubt that the two major generators (PG and NP) 
have recently been able to increase Pool prices significantly” (OFFER, 1991, p.2). 
 
It is interesting to note that the Power Pool provides a practical illustration of the theories of 
Baran and Sweezy (1966), and  Scherer and Ross (1990), in which firms recognise that they 
are mutually dependent. Cowling (1982) and Cowling and Sugden (1987b) take this idea 
further, with the notion of the coexistence of rivalry and collusion. A firm will follow the 
course of action from which it derives the most benefit; retaliatory power on the part of rivals 
leads to a collusive outcome since it is the avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour.  In the 
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Power Pool, neither of the two dominant conventional generators had any incentive to act 
competitively by cutting price, since any price reductions on the part of one company would 
have necessitated an immediate and similar response by the other so that it would maintain its 
market share.  Consequently the threat of mutual aggression forced the companies to compete 
in other ways, since aggressive action would ultimately hurt both companies.  Indeed the 
firms could increase the benefits from strategic action if they worked together.  If both firms 
acted strategically, for example, by increasing the bid price of several stations each, they 
would have increased the benefits of this course of action.  The stations with the more 
expensive bids would have set the SMP on a greater number of occasions, benefiting all the 
plant selected to run. 
 
Assessing the situation, Parker (1996a, p.127) sees that there was little choice on what could 
be done to increase competition in generation: 
“It was politically unthinkable for the government to contemplate breaking up National 
Power and PowerGen so soon after setting them up, or even at that stage requiring 
them to divest themselves of plant.  The only way the market share of National Power 
and PowerGen could be reduced was through the construction of new generating plant 
not owned by either of these companies.”
 
 
The crucial issue is therefore to understand how new companies could be persuaded to enter 
the market for electricity generation, in order to ‘correct’ for this domination. 
 
II.iii How New Entrants Were Encouraged 
One of the responsibilities of the regulator, as set out in the 1989 Electricity Act, was to 
promote competition wherever possible (MacKerron and Boira-Segarra, 1996). It was 
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therefore the regulator’s responsibility to pursue a policy that encouraged new entrants into 
electricity generation. 
 
The RECs had generally only been involved in the public distribution and supply of electricity 
prior to privatisation.
4
  However, one of the conditions of their supply licences was that each 
REC was now given a limit on the amount of generation capacity that they could own; either 
wholly owned generation sets, or plants in which they had an accountable interest.  These 
were fixed limits in terms of the number of megawatts (MW) allowed by each company, 
which translated to approximately 15% of the electricity each individual company supplied 
(House of Commons, 1992/93, p.25). 
 
As OFFER (1992, p.4) describes, the Pool had been organised to “facilitate the freedom (of) 
generators and suppliers to enter into contractual arrangements around the Pool.”  This 
allowed new entrants to sign fixed price electricity contracts with customers (Contracts for 
Differences - CfDs), circumventing the risks of relying on the variable price associated with 
the Pool.  Removing this uncertainty would allow new entrants to predict their revenue 
streams, reducing the risks associated with entry.  The regulator also encouraged entry into 
power generation by allowing the RECs who signed power purchase agreements with IPPs to 
‘pass through’ any additional costs of these contracts into their prices (Parker, 1996a). This 
cost ‘pass through’ was seen as being important since the new entrants were looking for the 
security of long-term power purchase contracts.  The long duration of these contracts would 
be a risk to the RECs as they might be left with an expensive contract if the price of electricity 
were to fall. The ability of the RECs to ‘pass through’ the cost of these contracts was 
                                                 
4
 A small minority of the RECs (Area Boards) had some involvement with small power projects prior to 
privatisation.  
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contingent upon their ability to show that they had met the economic purchasing obligation of 
their licence when they signed these agreements (Parker, 1996a).  The REC’s licences 
contained an obligation on economic purchasing, but the wording of this left considerable 
scope for interpretation, since it stipulated that electricity should be purchased at the  “best 
effective price” (OFGEM, 1999b, p.146). This licence clause  “specifies factors which may be 
relevant – such as diversity, reliability and security of supply.  Each company may have 
regard to the future effect on price, and on those other factors of its purchasing decisions” 
(OFFER, 1992, p.2). The RECs were therefore presented with a number of grounds on which 
they could justify signing such contracts. 
 
III. THE ‘INDEPENDENTS’; WHO, HOW AND WHY? 
The incentives for getting involved with the market for generation and the general nature of 
the privatisation had the effect of encouraging a large amount of entry.  At the end of May 
2001, total capacity of generating plant commissioned since privatisation and owned by new 
entrants stood at 17,045 MW, out of a total capacity of 74,220MW in the United Kingdom
5
 
(approximately 23% of total capacity).
6
  With the encouragements on offer, virtually all the 
RECs became involved with generation to varying degrees.  This usually took the form of a 
joint venture between one or more of the RECs (or one of the Scottish companies) and a 
company already involved in electricity generation elsewhere, often a transnational power 
                                                 
5
 This section focuses on the electricity sector in England and Wales, since the other parts of the United 
Kingdom have different structures.  Statistics often refer to the UK as a whole, but should reflect events of 
England and Wales since this is by far the biggest element of the UK – see Section IV, Chapter Six for statistical 
evidence of this. 
6
 Figures calculated using the list of power stations in the UK, presented as Table 5.13 in DTI (2001, pp.156-
159). This list includes all power stations of more than 1MW capacity that were operational in the UK at the end 
of May 2001, with the exception of several renewable stations.  In calculating this figure, the time of 
privatisation is assumed to be the time of reorganisation and privatisation of the industry in England and Wales, 
i.e. 1990.  New entrants refers to all the companies that entered new markets by constructing new generation 
capacity, and to this end includes the capacity constructed in England and Wales by the two incumbent Scottish 
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group. The 1,875MW Teeside power station, for example, was built and part owned by Enron. 
This venture was also a partnership between four of the RECs: MEB; Northern Electric; 
Southern Electric; and SWALEC.
7
   
 
The evidence presented in this section is based around telephone interviews conducted in 
January/February 1999 with those involved with the new entrants into electricity generation.  
This included senior figures within several of the transnational power groups who became 
involved with generation in England and Wales, high level managers within the RECs, and 
those involved with the IPPs directly.  Unless otherwise highlighted, the quotes in this and the 
following sections have been taken directly from these interviews.  The company and 
individual names have been removed from any quotes to ensure anonymity to those taking 
part in the interviews.   See Appendix C for the list of core questions utilised in these 
interviews, and a sample transcript of one of the interviews. 
 
The form that entry took was particularly interesting since there has been little difference 
between the various independent projects.   The most obvious pattern is in the type of plant 
used; virtually all of the new plants constructed since privatisation have used the new 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) technology.   The interviews highlighted a number of 
technical reasons as to why this particular type plant had been chosen.  This was a relatively 
new technology that had been proven in other countries to be a reliable generator of 
electricity.  CCGT plants are a lot quicker to build, the interviews providing the illustration of 
a CCGT plant taking around 3 years to construct, compared with 4.5 to 5 years for a coal fired 
plant (Thomas, 1996b, p.75, cites these as typically being 2-3 and 6-8 years respectively).
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
electricity companies.  Total generating capacity owned by new entrants (i.e. capacity newly constructed and 
existing capacity purchased) was 36,982 MW, representing  approximately 50% of total generating capacity. 
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The capital costs per unit installed are approaching half of those for a coal fired plant; the 
interviews revealed that capital costs of one of the early CCGT plants was around £500 per 
kW installed, compared with an average coal station without FGD (flue gas desulphurisation - 
an emissions cleaning technology) of £800 to £1,000 per kW.  The CCGT plants also operate 
at much higher thermal efficiency levels (CCGT plant in the UK averaged 49.8% in 2000, 
compared with 36.2% for coal fired plant - DTI, 2001, Table 5.9, p.151), which means less 
fuel is required per unit of electricity generated.  This helps to make gas a relatively ‘clean’ 
fossil fuel.  Not only is less fossil fuel required per unit of electricity generated, but each unit 
of gas produces significantly less of the emissions that cause acid rain and global warming.   
The environmental risks of using gas as a fuel were therefore seen as being considerably less 
than the more polluting coal, which was likely to suffer from tighter future environmental 
legislation. 
 
The plants were mainly built on an ‘off balance sheet basis’ using project finance; the 
companies involved borrowed the money to build the power station.  To finance the project 
the banks required the parties concerned to remove as much of the uncertainty as possible so 
that there was little risk of the bank not receiving its money back.  To this end, the IPPs 
hedged as much of the risk as they possibly could; they “let other companies who were better 
placed bear the risk.”  This involved ‘back-to-back’ fixed price contracts, usually of at least 
15 years duration, which made the projects very secure.  For example, the IPPs bought gas on 
a fixed real price basis and then signed contracts for virtually all their output that allowed 
them to pass through these gas costs.  These output contracts have become known as 
‘sweetheart’ contracts since the majority of output was usually taken by the RECs who had an 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 Source: Teeside Power Ltd 
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equity interest in the project, casting doubts on the independence of the entrants.
8
  The set of 
contracts surrounding the investment was such that the only risk the IPP was actually left with 
was the operation of the plant; the availability and reliability risk.  These risks were minimal 
since gas is a uniform fuel with few impurities and therefore does not require a large amount 
of expertise for plant operation.  This means there was little scope for operator errors leading 
to breakdowns and the factory produced technology had been proven to be reliable in other 
countries. 
 
CCGT plants were particularly attractive in respect to finance.  The lower capital costs meant 
that borrowing was low, and the smaller build time allowed the plant to start generating 
electricity and obtain revenue at the earliest opportunity.  The overwhelming conclusion 
drawn from the interviews was that everything about these ‘independent’ projects concerned 
the stripping out of all risks.  Without this cover against all the uncertainties, the vast majority 
of these projects would not have gone ahead.
9
   
 
This pattern of entry has been followed for the majority of the independent plants that have 
been constructed since privatisation.  However, more recent years witnessed a change in this 
pattern.  The Pool had by then been in operation for several years and so the banks had 
become more comfortable with its operation and how it actually worked; those involved had a 
view on what the price was going to be, and why prices were what they were. That meant that 
the risk removing ‘cradle to grave’ contractual structures of earlier projects were no longer 
required.  More recent entry into generation has been carried out on a more ‘merchant plant’ 
                                                 
8
 There were also a limited number of contracts signed with large industrial users of electricity.   
9
 The findings of the interviews presented in the previous part of the section have some degree of overlap with 
the findings of some of the interviews that contribute to Winskel (1998). Where overlaps exists, the results of the 
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basis.  Essentially this is buying the gas required for generation short term on the open market 
and selling electricity via the banks who act as brokers.  However, a virtual moratorium was 
put in place on the construction of new gas fired capacity in 1998 because the government 
was worried about the rapid increase in gas capacity (predicted to exceed 60% by 2003 if 
nothing was done) and the distortion that this ‘dash for gas’ was having on the market (DTI, 
1998b).
10
  Whilst the moratorium was lifted in November 2000 (DTI, 2000), it had stifled the 
development of new merchant type plants since its imposition coincided with the beginnings 
of this type of development.
11
  Nevertheless, this is a very significant development that will be 
discussed in section IV. 
 
Although the CCGT technology offered several distinct advantages over other types of plant, 
technological reasons were not the sole guide for the RECs. The interviews with one of the 
transnational power groups revealed some unexpected information on this subject: “We 
started developing a coal project with one of the RECs but they pulled out ….. we offered 
them a long term contract and pricing on coal plant that were competitive but they preferred 
the gas…….The RECs behaved like sheep – once one had gone for CCGT they all wanted to 
go (for) it ……. they don’t want to be out on their own on a whim.”   The choice of plant 
would therefore seem in part to be a logical continuation of the new entrants policy of 
stripping away risk. The fixed contract would mean the REC had no risk in terms of the 
technology.  However, by a particular REC using a different type of plant  from the others, 
they would stand alone.  They would therefore lose their strength in numbers which they 
                                                                                                                                                        
two different sets of interviews are consistent even though they were undertaken completely independently and 
without prior knowledge of the other interview series. 
10
 The moratorium took the form of a stricter consents policy which only gave permission to environmentally 
friendly projects such as combined heat and power (CHP), or renewable schemes - see DTI (1998b). 
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would have enjoyed had they followed all the other RECs.  This strength might be for a 
regulatory reason; for example, if such fixed price contracts were to incur problems in the 
future.  Problems with fuel supply might also arise (e.g. due to strikes or technological 
problems), but by being the same as the other RECs, the company would not be singled out or 
loose an advantage. Knickerbocker (1973) raised the possibility of firms following an 
investment matching strategy as a means of cutting risks and preventing one company from 
gaining an advantage, and it would seem that the REC’s behaviour is in line with this 
approach. 
 
 The convention in the existing literature is to call the new entrants into power generation 
‘independent power producers’ (IPPs). In reality, many of these companies are not truly 
independent.  The RECs have equity stakes in the majority of these power generation projects 
from whom they purchase electricity.  This is too close a relationship to be termed 
independent.  Tenenbaum et al. (1992, p.1134) suggest a more accurate way of describing 
these generators: 
“…..many of the new generators are affiliated with their buyers, the RECs.  
Therefore, it is probably more accurate to describe them as affiliated power 
producers (APPs).”  
The distinction between independent and affiliate is crucial.  By recognising that the RECs 
have a vested interest in these new generating companies, we start to accept that there are few 
truly independent generators.  Indeed, one could argue that these “affiliates” have just created 
a new power bloc opposing the big established generators, and have really done little to shape 
the market to be of a truly competitive nature.  This, and the wider implications of being an 
                                                                                                                                                        
11
 It could be argued that the moratorium effectively ended the construction of new plant on a merchant basis due 
to the very strong contractual nature of the New Electricity trading arrangements - NETA (which are discussed 
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affiliate, will be dealt with in section IV.  (For the sake of clarity we will continue to follow 
the existing convention, however, and refer to all the new entrants as IPPs.) 
 
But why did the RECs and the other companies deem it to be in their interest to enter the 
market for electricity generation? Again the interviews revealed a great deal of information on 
this subject.  One of the most commonly cited reasons for the RECs involvement in 
generation was the dominance of National Power (NP) and PowerGen (PG).  The RECs 
resented this dominance and were “very worried …. that they were going to be squeezed 
between PG and NP.”  Direct involvement in generation allowed them some shelter from this 
dominance and to some extent to compete.  This finding is in line with that of Watson (1997) 
and Winskel (1998). Indeed OFFER (1992, p.16) cites the RECs as seeing  “long-term 
contracts to support IPPs as providing an important countervailing power to the market power 
of the (big two) generators and hence in their longer interest.” 
 
The interviews also revealed that another major reason why the RECs entered the market for 
electricity generation was to get to know that market; they very much wanted to understand 
electricity generation.  When it came to negotiating with the big generators for supply 
contracts, they wanted to be in the position of understanding generation costs and the various 
mechanisms; they wanted to know what they should pay and why.  As one of the interviewees 
highlighted,  “this immediately gave value to a REC entering into the market for electricity 
generation.”  Even if the IPP were to make no direct profits, the REC would benefit by 
gaining knowledge of generation and thus hopefully the ability to save money on its fixed 
contracts with the existing generators.  This knowledge of the market for power generation 
                                                                                                                                                        
later in more detail).  
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will be of great use in the current market for electricity generation, because in March 2001, 
the Pool was replaced with a new way of trading electricity, NETA, a topic addressed in the 
next section. 
 
Another insight revealed by the interviews was that following privatisation, the RECs 
“became very interested in assuring that there was sufficient capacity in the system.”
12
 The 
RECs could not easily compel the existing generators to invest in new capacity or keep a 
sufficient stock of existing plant to meet an acceptable safety margin.  Whilst it was true that 
the Pool had been created with a capacity element to encourage entry, this mechanism was 
still untested and so an element of doubt existed.  Direct investment in generation on the part 
of RECs allowed new capacity to be built, giving those RECs who signed contracts a greater 
degree of security of supply.  
 
National Power, in the House of Commons report into the market for coal, claimed that IPPs 
“provide a mechanism whereby (REC) profits can be transferred from regulated to 
unregulated businesses” (House of Commons, 1992/93, p.48). Several of the interviews were 
broadly supportive of this view, in that they indicated that the RECs wanted to diversify from 
their traditional roles of electricity distribution and supply.  The RECs had lots of money 
which they were “terrified that the regulator would make them return to their customers.” 
Entering into generation was one such opportunity of diversification, which was particularly 
attractive since it was “an opportunity to earn unregulated profits.”
13
 This view on 
                                                 
12
 It is in the RECs interest to ensure that there is sufficient generating capacity, because their businesses can not 
function efficiently if they are unable to sell electricity to fulfil demand, i.e. demand unfulfilled is a lost profit 
opportunity. 
13
 That does not mean that profits earned on generation were seen as being unregulated.  The interviewee 
suggested that profits on generation were relatively unregulated, a stark contrast to the very tight, RPI-X 
regulation in electricity supply/distribution. 
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diversification is in line with the findings of Winskel (1998), who also makes use of 
interviews with those involved in the sector. 
 
In addition to diversifying, a REC also took out a form of profit hedge on the electricity price 
when they signed a ‘sweetheart’ contract with an IPP affiliated to them.  If the electricity price 
rises, the fixed contract will allow the REC to purchase cheaper electricity and hence make 
high profits on the sale of this to the final consumer.  If the electricity price were to fall, then 
the REC would be buying electricity at premium rates from the affiliate which would be 
making high profits from these and other contracted sales.  Since the affiliate would be part 
owned by the REC, some of these unregulated profits would accrue to the REC.  The 
electricity regulator has also allowed the REC to pass through the costs of these contracts to 
the final consumers.   The REC is therefore still able to make reasonable profits on these sales 
in its own right.   In this respect the REC could not loose by entering into a deal with an IPP.  
 
The partners of the RECs in these new power generators became involved with power 
generation for a far more fundamental reason.  These companies were established 
transnational power groups and so it was a logical progression for them to expand by getting 
involved in the newly privatised market in England and Wales.  In terms of the specific 
factors that influenced them to choose the UK, the interviews again provided information.  
When considering entering a “new market, (a transnational power group) look for a legal 
basis to do it, a political will, a way of financing the project and a requirement for power.”  
While it is true that there was no real requirement for power in the UK, the political will for 
encouraging competition was such that this did not really matter.  Although electricity is 
somewhat different from most foreign investments in that it cannot be readily exported around 
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the world, this information would seem to be in tune with the views of Caves (1996) and 
Dunning (1993) on foreign investment.  Caves (1996, p.60) says companies “picked foreign 
markets …. so as to minimise the information and transaction costs associated with foreign 
investment.” The newly privatised market in the UK was particularly attractive since it was 
now reasonably similar to the US market where most of these companies were based.  It 
therefore presented an opportunity, as Caves (1996, p.60) puts it, of  “acquiring knowledge 
that reduces the cost (or risk) of future expansion into more alien territory.” With other 
European countries starting to privatise, the entry into the UK market would give it 
experience of working in Europe. 
 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENTRY 
IV.i Competition  
Such a large amount of entry into the market for power generation was clearly going to have a 
significant impact.  However, it was not certain that it would necessarily solve the problem of 
lack of competition in generation, the reason that the policy was created. 
 
The nature of IPP entry was such that the majority of their output had already been sold via 
long-term power purchase agreements - CfDs.  These contracts meant the IPPs were operating 
on ‘baseload’ (i.e. that part of demand that does not change with time).  To make sure these 
IPPs were selected to be run by the Pool, they placed bids at very low prices (Green, 1999).  
The IPPs could do this because the price they would receive was set in advance by their 
power contracts and was not the price set by the Pool.
14
  In this respect, entry by IPPs had 
                                                 
14
 As Green (1999) highlights, the actual problem was that these IPP contracts were ‘non-firm’ CfDs which 
means that that the power station in question only receives payments when it generates, receiving nothing if it 
does not run.  It was therefore always in the interest of the station to bid a low price into the Pool so that it would 
be chosen to run, and would thus get the payments set under its CfD.  An alternative contract would have been a 
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very little effect on the way the overall Pool price was set, other than to change which group 
of plant would set the Pool price.
15
 
 
The entrants had contracts for virtually all their output. However, the interviews revealed that 
some of the IPPs had a very limited amount of uncontracted capacity at the ‘top end’ of their 
plants i.e. that part of capacity that requires 100% plant operation.  When the SMP was high 
enough, it was worth the IPP bidding this part of its capacity into the Pool.   On these 
occasions IPPs did have some effect on the Pool and could have set SMP on occasion. 
However, this would have been only when SMP was reasonably high and therefore did little 
to make the Pool a source of cheap electricity.  For example, in 1998/99 CCGT plant set the 
Pool price on only 3% of occasions (OFGEM, 1999a, p.13), although this figure will include 
the CCGT plant of the CEGB successor companies as well as the IPPs.  Indeed the ability of 
the IPP to bid this way into the Pool was curtailed by the nature of the gas contracts the 
majority of the IPPs agreed. The contracts signed were such that British Gas can ‘interrupt’ 
gas supplies at times when the gas capacity is required to ensure that the demands of the 
domestic market are met (Thomas, 1996b).  Pool prices were likely to be high when demand 
for all forms of energy was high, but it was (and still is) at these times that gas supplies for 
electricity generation were most likely to be unavailable, thus restricting the ability of the 
IPPs to bid their uncontracted capacity into the Pool. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘two-way’ CfD which specifies a purchase price and payments are made irrespective of whether the particular 
station runs.  If the Pool price is below the price of the contract, the buyer pays the seller the difference. On the 
other hand, if the Pool price is above the price of the CfD, the generator refunds the buyer the difference.  A 
‘two-way’ CfD would not have caused the IPPs to bid at very low prices because it would be more efficient for 
the station not to bid into the Pool at price below its marginal cost - at these price levels, the station would be 
better off not running, and simply collecting the contract payments. 
15
 It could be argued that SMP would therefore be set by a cheaper station and thus the price of electricity would 
fall. Whilst there is an element of truth in this, it does not take into account the cost of the IPP plant which 
received a set price which was separate from the Pool. 
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In more recent years, new plant was starting to be built on a more ‘merchant’ basis.  This type 
of plant would have significantly increased competition since it was not tied down by a set of 
‘back-to-back’ contracts and could compete directly.  However, before many of this type of 
plant could be developed, the moratorium on new gas plant was put in place. This moratorium 
meant the policy of encouraging entry as a way of increasing competition was cut off just 
when it had the belated potential to work and the number of companies bidding into the Pool 
was increasing. At the time of privatisation only 8 generators bid into the Pool but this had 
increased to 38 in 1999 (OFGEM, 1999a, p.13). 
 
Despite this, in respect of increasing competition in electricity generation, one must look at 
the policy to encourage new entrants as an overall failure. Although competition in generation 
has increased in the period since privatisation, in part due to the increased number of 
companies bidding into the Pool, the changes have not been enough.  Even as late as 1998/99, 
SMP was set on 86% of occasions by just three operators of conventional plant (OFGEM, 
1999a, p.14) 
 
The fundamental problem was that the policy of encouraging entrants did little to widen 
ownership of the ‘mid-merit’ and ‘peaking’ plants that set SMP the majority of the time.  
Indeed, it could be argued that more progress was made in this area via others means, such as 
applying pressure to NP and PG to dispose of significant amounts of plant; the capacity of NP 
and PG accounted for approximately 78% of total capacity in England and Wales on 1
st
 April 
1990, and this had fallen to approximately 42% on 1
st
 October 1999.
16
  Changes to the rules of 
                                                 
16
 Information provided by OFFER. 
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the Pool also changed to make it harder for companies to manipulate Pool prices (OFGEM, 
1999a). 
 
However, despite these changes, in 1999 OFGEM (1999a, p.7) reported that “the history of 
the Pool in the ten years or so since vesting (i.e. reorganisation) has demonstrated the 
continuing market power of a number of generators and their willingness to exercise that 
market power at the expense of customers, which is facilitated by” the Pool.  The 
government/regulator therefore concluded that changes needed to be made to the way 
electricity was traded if competition in generation was to increase.  To that end, the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) became live on the 27
th
 March 2001.  If the new 
entrants had done the job they were intended for, competition in the Pool would have been 
greater and thus these wholesale changes would not have been required.  What is, however, 
interesting to note is that NETA is based around bilateral power purchase agreements such 
that it is estimated that around 90% of trading will take place on forward contract markets 
(OFGEM, 2001, p.1).  This is effectively extending the contract based system employed by 
the IPPs, to the rest of the market. 
 
But what of the unforeseen effects of this policy to encourage entry into generation?  
Tenenbaum et al. (1992, p.1154) raise the issue of a REC favouring its own affiliate: 
“When  a regulated buyer has captive customers, it has the incentive to purchase 
from its unregulated affiliate at a price that is higher than the market price.  Unless 
the regulator is able to detect and eliminate these ……. the captive customers will 
be harmed.” 
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To the consumers it matters little if the high price of electricity is caused by the dominance of 
the big generators or ‘sweetheart’ contracts between RECs and their affiliates.  The 
emergence of IPPs therefore created a trade off between curtailing the power of the big 
generators and the RECs incentive to buy expensive electricity (Tenenbaum et al., 1992). The 
interviews revealed that many of the RECs have struck deals that, although reasonably 
attractive in terms of price at the time of signing the contacts, now look less impressive. One 
REC, for example, signed a contract with an affiliate based around the gas contract price of 
20p a therm.  At the time of the interview, gas was said to be available on the spot market at 
10p a therm and so as the interviewee put it, “from (the RECs) point of view it isn’t such a 
good deal at the moment….but as a shareholder of (the affiliate) we are doing very well thank 
you (since) companies who buy from (the affiliate) are buying at premium rates.”  This REC 
is not alone in this position.  Therefore the entrant has locked the REC into buying expensive 
electricity due to the contracts it required to get involved in generation.  In this respect, entry 
just replaced one cause of high electricity prices with another. 
 
The effects of this change are not equal in terms of which consumer group bears the burden.  
The market for supplying large users was open to competition straight from privatisation.  The 
size of the market open to competition was gradually increased until 1998 when the RECs lost 
their monopoly position in the small, domestic market.  Up to this point, the RECs could 
exploit their captive customers and so it was these who paid the high price for the electricity 
they received from their affiliates.  The large users were free to choose their suppliers and so 
the REC had to offer them competitive prices.  This supports the material presented in the 
next Chapter which suggests that in terms of price, privatisation was hardest on domestic 
consumers, while the larger industrial users bore a relatively light burden.  Indeed, Thomas 
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(1999, Generation Section) highlights this issue by including some statistics from the 
regulator, which show that in 1996/97 captive customers were charged about 22% more for 
generation than non-captive customers. 
 
Whilst it is true that the supply companies of the RECs have now lost their legal monopoly in 
supply, they still retain a great deal of their former monopoly power.  Inertia on the part of 
consumers means that very few consumers actually change supplier. As of September 15
th
 
2001, only approximately 30% of customers in Great Britain had switched electricity 
supplier.
17
 As Thomas (1999, Conclusion) puts it, “consumers do not want to sit down 
regularly with a confusing selection of advertising material trying to work out what is the best 
deal for them.  They have better things to do with their time.”  The incumbent supply 
companies of the RECs know that many consumers will not switch supplier and use this to 
exploit their position as the former monopolist - a fact that is obvious when tariffs are 
compared.  In the area where the RECs used to enjoy a monopoly, they are amongst the 
companies offering the highest charges. Although the supply company of the REC will loose 
some customers, they will still retain the majority. However, in other regions the same 
company offers cheaper tariffs in an attempt to win new consumers.    
 
For example, in October 2001, in the Midlands region, Npower (the successor supply 
company of the former REC - MEB)
18
 offered a standard rate tariff such that the typical bill 
for the use of 3,300kWh of electricity (classed as medium electricity use by Energywatch) 
would be £236 paying by Direct Debit.  All of the competing supply companies in this region 
offered tariffs which would result in savings ranging from £8 to £33 on the same bill using the 
                                                 
17
 See http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/prices/switching.htm#elec - accessed on 15
th
 November 2001. 
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same payment method (Energywatch, 2001a). Similarly, in the East Midlands region, 
PowerGen (the successor supply company of the former monopoly REC - East Midlands 
Electricity) charged customers paying by Direct Debit £226 for the same amount of electricity 
on the standard rate tariff scheme.  All of the competing supply companies in this region 
offered tariffs which would result in savings ranging from £6 to £28.  Npower, one of the rival 
supply companies in the East Midland region, offered a tariff structure such that the charges 
for the same service and payment method would result in a saving of £22 (Energywatch, 
2001b).  This means that Npower charged customers in its own historic region £32 more for 
the same amount of electricity on a standard rate tariff using the same method of payment. 
There is no reason why significant cost differences should exist between these adjoining 
regions, suggesting a strategic reason for the price differential. 
 
It is therefore clear that the RECs still have a large amount of de facto captive customers who 
they can exploit by passing on the high costs of the fixed price IPP contracts they signed some 
years ago.   The ability of the REC to pass on these costs will slowly decline over time as 
more customers decide to switch electricity supplier.  Nevertheless, there will still be a great 
deal of people who remain with the historic supplier of that region for the foreseeable future 
and who will thus continue to pay for these expensive contracts.  OFGEM (2000) studies 
show that ‘disadvantaged customers’, such as low income groups, are less likely to have 
knowledge of competition in supply, or change supplier.  It is these groups that are therefore 
most likely to suffer from the RECs’ expensive IPP contracts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
18
 Many RECs have separated the supply and distribution parts of their business, often selling either or both of 
these businesses. 
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IV.ii Damage to Coal 
The actual effects of the new gas fired stations with respect to coal are two fold.  First, the 
large building programme has caused the premature closing of the older coal fired stations.  
The second effect is that the remaining coal stations have been utilised less intensively. 
During the Hinckley Point enquiry, the CEGB presented its central forecast of its future 
power requirements.  It estimated that by the end of the century, 5.5GW of ageing coal plant 
would need replacing (Barnes, 1990; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). However, by 1995 more 
than 5.5GW of coal plant had already been retired.  These stations had not yet reached the end 
of the technical working period and so this new wave of investment was precipitate.  They 
were essentially forced out of the market because the new gas stations operated on ‘baseload’ 
due to the contracts the entrants signed.  Parker (1996b, p.220) sees that the attempt to 
introduce competition in this way created a market distortion since “the avoidable costs (of 
the coal stations) were lower than the total costs, including capital charges, of many of the 
new CCGTs”, a finding that is supported by the work of Winskel (1998) and by the 
government in its white paper on Energy sources for Power Generation (DTI, 1998c).  From a 
theoretical viewpoint, the effect of this entry has been to raise the price at which electricity 
might be charged.  These new stations have now to be paid for, whereas the older coal stations 
could have provided the same power at a lower total cost, a view shared by Green (1999).  
Not only has the policy of entry failed to increase competition in electricity generation, but it 
has also raised the industry’s cost base.  This means that if any future policy is successful at 
lowering electricity prices, they will not be reduced by as much as they might have been had 
this policy not been pursued.
19
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Following privatisation, the utilisation of coal plant has fallen dramatically as independent gas 
fired stations started to operate on long-term ‘baseload’ contracts, which resulted in high 
utilisation levels.  These contracts distorted the marginal cost based merit order of the Pool 
which should have determined the combination of plant to be used, since gas plant was 
contracted to operate, even when it was not the cheapest plant to fulfil demand.  For example, 
data on the UK shows that the utilisation of coal plant fell from 54.1% in 1993/93 to 44.8% in 
1997, while the utilisation of CCGT plants rose from 60.5% in 1993/94 to 81% in 1997 (DTI, 
1998a,  p.164).
20
 
 
IV.iii System Viability 
The telephone interviews conducted highlighted the fact that one of the factors that influenced 
the RECs’ decision to enter the market for electricity generation was the desire to ensure that 
there was sufficient capacity in the system. This does, however, seem to be at odds with the 
way this entry took place.  The ability of the system to keep the lights on is most likely to be 
in jeopardy when demand for energy is at its highest. This is when the IPP plants are least 
likely to be available, due to the interruptible nature of their gas contracts.  
 
This problem of system viability has been exacerbated because as mention above, the entrants 
have resulted in a large amount of the older coal plant being closed prematurely, which has 
put severe strain on the ability on the system to cope with demand.  Indeed, in several of the 
years since privatisation, entry by IPPs was more than off set by the closure of existing coal 
fired generating capacity.  For example, data for the UK shows that between March 1992 and 
                                                                                                                                                        
19
 Since virtually all new entrants have been gas fired, there will have been significant effects on this industry 
and on the coal industry which it has displaced. These effects have been covered elsewhere and as such do not 
need to be explored here. 
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March 1993, the capacity of coal stations declined by 2,163MW, whilst new CCGT capacity 
was rated at only 900MW (DTI, 1995, Table 50, p105).
21
 
 
Plant margin statistics measure the amount by which installed generating plant exceeds peak 
demand, and this is presented as a percentage of that peak demand (appendix D shows the 
formula how plant margin is calculated).  The building of large amounts of new CCGT plant 
associated with the entry by IPPs might lead one to expect an increase in plant margin.  
However, the actual situation as seen in Table 1, reveals that in fact plant margin declined 
following privatisation, stabilising at approximately 20%.   
Table 1 
Plant Margin of the UK Electricity system 
(see Appendix B for formula used) 
 
Year Plant Margin (%)
a,b 
1989/90 31.66 
1990/91 28.21 
1991/92 21.78 
1992/93 22.67 
1993/94 17.65 
1994/95 23.46 
1995/96 19.05 
1996/97 21.61 
1997/98 19.88 
1998/99 21.45 
1999/2000 21.10 
2000/01 23.23 
 
a 
Calculated using data presented in DTI, Digest of United Kingdom Energy statistics, various issues, 
London: Government Statistical Service. 
 
b 
From 1996/97, data for generation capacity (required to calculate plant margin) is published as it stood 
at the end of the  December of the period of interest. Prior to this time, generation capacity had been 
measured as it stood at the end of  the March of the period of interest. According to Mike Janes, head of 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 1997 data has been used because after this date, coal stations are no longer explicitly listed, but rather included 
in the broad category of  “conventional steam stations” which will include other fossil fuels. 
21
 Presumably the signing of contracts with IPPs reduced the size of the market available to other generators, 
reducing the incentive to maintain/build plant on a merchant basis 
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coal, gas and electricity statistics at the DTI,  this change was made so that the generation statistics can 
more accurately reflect the capacity which was available at the time of peak demand.  It was estimated 
that had capacity been measured in March 1997, instead of December 1996, capacity would have been 
80MW higher, which is a 0.12% increase in total generating capacity. The effect of this change is 
therefore likely to be small.  Maximum load  (the other statistic required to calculate plant margin) is 
measured for years ending in March throughout, so that the winter maximum load might be accurately 
reflected, regardless of which calendar year it falls in. 
 
An initial look at the plant margin figures might indicate that the electricity system still has a 
high degree of excess capacity, with the rapid reduction in the plant margin following 
privatisation representing the increased efficiency and cost reduction measures of the private 
sector.   However, what is not apparent from the figures is that generating units are not 
available 100% of the time; CEGB experience suggests that only 85% of generating stock 
could be predicted to be available at times of winter peak demand several years ahead, which 
means it is necessary to plan to meet demand with only 85% of generation capacity.  In this 
case it means that installed capacity must be equivalent to 118% of peak demand (i.e. a plant 
margin of 18%), although this does not take into account other factors, such as the risk of 
adverse weather conditions which might be worse than the average weather assumed under 
the forecast (National Grid Company, 2000, Chapter 4, Plant margin terminology section, 
point 4.5).  Plant margin is therefore not surplus or excess capacity but necessary for the 
security of electricity supply (National Grid Company, 2000, Chapter 4, Plant margin 
terminology section).  The ability of the system to keep the lights on was therefore more in 
doubt than might first be apparent from the figures present in Table 1. 
 
A minimum plant margin of 18% (as suggested by the paragraph above) is very close to the 
actual plant margins observed in the UK following privatisation, which indicates that the 
system has had very little spare capacity, should unforeseen events have occurred.  Indeed, the 
CEGB aimed to have a plant margin of 24% several years ahead and large world-wide utilities 
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plan on a similar basis to have plant margins of up to 30% (National Grid Company, 2000, 
Chapter 4, Plant margin terminology section, point 4.6), presumably so that the electricity 
systems are able to cope in times of unexpected events, such as severe weather.  
 
Whilst the rules of the Power Pool can be said to be most at fault for failing to secure an 
adequate plant margin, the IPPs do make a significant contribution to such concerns. The 
plant margins observed in Table 1 are somewhat misleading, in that at times of peak demand, 
available capacity is likely to be less than that indicated by the figures. As previously 
mentioned, gas supplies to the IPPs might be interrupted and so some of the installed capacity 
would be unavailable.  Recent estimates suggest that if Britain experiences a ‘1 in 50 winter’ 
(the coldest winter expected in a 50 year period), gas stocks would run out in six days, which 
would require the implementation of emergency measures to reduce consumption, with power 
stations being the first to be cut off.
22
 Any removal of (some) of the IPP capacity could be 
expected to be in addition to the 15% of capacity that the CEGB experience suggested would 
be unavailable, since the CEGB had no CCGT stations that could have been made unavailable 
due to gas interruptions.   The IPPs are therefore potentially exacerbating the situation. 
 
Indeed Thomas (1996b) cites several incidents since the industry was privatised, where the 
viability of the system has been placed in severe risk.   In December 1994, two nuclear power 
plants broke down which is said to have diminished the margin of spare plant down to 
minimum levels.  As Thomas (1996b, p.84) puts it, “had demand been as high as the previous 
year, the lights might well have dimmed or gone out.”  Thomas goes on to report that in 
December 1995, the coincidence of cold weather, breakdowns at a number of nuclear stations 
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 “UK faces threats of winter power cuts”, The Times, Monday April 23
rd
 April 2001. 
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and strikes in France resulting in the loss of imports, were said to have again caused 
problems.   Most interestingly, Thomas (1996b, p.84) explicitly comments that in January 
1996 there was “serious concern” that there would not be sufficient capacity in the system due 
to the availability of IPP being curtailed by the unavailability of gas supplies.  It would 
therefore seem that there are significant doubts about the ability of the system to keep the 
lights on, an issue which, although not wholly attributable, is still very much related to the 
large amounts of IPP entry, the nature of this entry and the effect this entry had on the existing 
generating capacity.  
 
It remains to be seen what will happen to the plant margin and hence system viability in the 
future.  When the moratorium on the construction of new gas fired plant was revoked in 
November 2000, 6 new IPP projects were given approval (DTI, 2000) representing over 
4,800MW of new capacity
23
, and further projects have been approved since then.  However, 
this new capacity is gas fired and so it may well be liable to the same constraints on fuel 
supply as the current gas fired stations, adding to concerns over the viability of the system, 
especially if this new capacity results in the closure of existing, none gas fired, capacity. 
 
Such significant entry by IPPs using CCGT technology also raises the question of security of 
fuel supply.  In recent years there has been steep increases in the amounts of natural gas 
consumed in the UK, both for electricity generation and more widely.  For example, total 
natural gas and colliery methane available for consumption in the UK (i.e. consumption) has 
increased from 597,046GWh in 1990 to 1,103,508 GWh in 2000, with gas used by the 
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electricity generators rising from 6,513 GWh in 1990 to 312,695 GWh in 1999 (DTI, 2001, 
Table 4.4, pp.126-127).   
 
Demand for natural gas is now such that Britain is no longer self-sufficient, having to import 
gas during the winter months, and the situation is expected to worsen in the near future.   John 
Wybrew, a director of Lattice Group (the company that owns Britains gas pipeline network), 
was quoted during March 2001, as saying that “we already expect the UK to be dependent in 
winter on (gas) imports and we will be importing more than we export within three years”.
24
  
In the recent government white paper on Energy Sources for Power Generation, figures were 
presented which predict that gas imports would constitute between 55% and 90% of 
consumption by 2020 (DTI, 1998c, p.6).  Although Norway might provide a solution to these 
import requirements in the short term, Russia is likely to be the biggest gas supplier in the 
long term due to its massive reserves. Gas in Russia is dominated by the company Gazprom, a 
monster company which accounts for 8% of Russia’s GDP, controls 25% of the world’s gas 
production and is said to have almost unlimited gas reserves of 35 billion cubic metres.
25
  
Jacek Palasinski, of Wpost magazine  (which has been tracking the company) was quoted as 
saying that “Gazprom has become the most important instrument of Russian foreign policy.”
26
  
If these predictions prove to be correct, Britain, like much of Western Europe, will be heavily 
reliant for much of its energy requirements on a relatively unstable country, which has a 
proven record of exploiting its dominant position as a major energy supplier.  To have such a 
reliance on one country would give Russia and the companies that control these energy 
supplies, enormous power over Britain.  In this way the IPPs have contributed to the 
possibility of energy problems in the future, since they have helped reduce the use of coal, a 
                                                 
24
 “UK may be net importer of gas ‘within three years’”, The Times, Friday March 23
rd
 2001. 
25
 “Even big Ted Turner will avoid igniting Gazprom”, The Independent on Sunday, 15
th
 April 2001.  
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fuel that is plentiful in Britain.  Whilst this does not preclude a return to power stations 
designed to burn coal in the future, it has set back the development of the associated 
technologies which will be of disadvantage in the future should this line of power generation 
be required.  Indeed, Watson (1997) highlights the rise of CCGT technology, and its 
widespread uptake, as one of the key reasons for the failure of the fluidised bed technology 
that uses coal as its fuel. 
 
It might therefore be said that entry by IPPs  has made a potentially significant contribution to 
the concerns surrounding the viability of the electricity system, both now, and potentially in 
the future, which was perversely one of the reasons why they were said to have entered the 
market! 
 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The policy of encouraging entrants into electricity generation can be traced back to the 
deficiencies in the market that were created when the industry was reorganised and privatised 
in 1990.  The government’s desire to include its nuclear assets in the privatisation lead to an 
embroiled process, which eventually resulted in a system that was dominated by two 
conventionally fired generators.  
 
Post-privatisation policy towards electricity generation has been very much dominated by the 
need to correct this early mistake.  This Chapter has illustrated how the policy of encouraging 
entry has had little effect on increasing competition but has created further distortions in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
26
 “Russia’s New Power Game”, The Times, Monday  March 26
th
 2001. 
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market which may have serious affects in the future, confirming the view of Tenenbaum et al. 
(1992, pp.1155-1156): 
“We think the best approach…… is to put the industry and regulatory structures in 
place prior to privatisation.   In other words – restructure first and privatise later. 
If this is politically infeasible, the alternative is to do as the British did – 
restructure and privatise at the same time.  However, the problem with this 
approach is that major mistakes are often made in the rush to privatise and once 
the structure is in place, it is difficult to correct these mistakes. The reality is that 
it is infinitely easier to make changes before privatisation then to do so 
afterwards”. 
 
The policy of encouraging entry is an excellent example of how it is difficult to correct 
mistakes made during a rushed privatisation.  Had the government taken the time before 
privatisation to ensure that its restructuring was optimal, the subsequent problems might well 
have been avoided.  If any flaws did exist in the reorganised system, the government would 
have been able to address these problems without any issues of hurting private firm’s property 
rights.  In the case of England and Wales, the government would have had no need to 
implement the policy of encouraging entry; instead they would have been able to split 
conventionally fired generation into more companies, reducing the ability of any one firm to 
control the market.  Not only might there have existed a cheaper, more efficient electrical 
system, but the government could have received a greater income. By allowing the new 
industry structure to establish itself for a reasonable period of time in the public sector, the 
markets could observe it operating in practice.  This would have reduced the doubt as to how 
the market system operated and so allowed the government to increase its proceeds from 
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privatisation.  Since this was not the case, successive governments have been unsuccessfully 
playing catch-up, attempting to correct the earlier mistakes built into the market.  Future 
privatisations in England and Wales, or elsewhere, take note. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
PRIVATISATION AND ELECTRICITY PRICES 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There seems to be a general acceptance that electricity privatisation in England, Wales and 
Scotland (henceforth, Great Britain) has been a success, simply because real electricity prices 
have subsequently fallen, and thus that it is a model for elsewhere.  However, it is the 
contention of this Chapter that British electricity privatisation should not be viewed as a 
success for this reason, as other industry structures might have resulted in more significant 
price cuts.  
 
Consequently we investigate the privatisation process in an attempt to see if it did indeed 
result in lower real electricity prices, or if these price cuts would have happened anyway.  
This is accomplished by comparing the observed electricity prices with those that might have 
been charged had the industry remained publicly owned.  In this Chapter we therefore develop 
a counterfactual scenario for the likely decisions that the publicly owned industry would have 
taken, drawing heavily on the existing counterfactual work of Yarrow (1992) and Newbery 
and Pollitt (1997).  The counterfactual is developed within the context of an identity, which 
splits the price of electricity into fossil fuel costs, profits and other costs.  Each of these 
elements is then modelled in terms of the likely effects of a publicly owned industry.   
 
In the course of developing the counterfactual model, the Chapter apportions aggregate 
industry profits between industrial and domestic sales with some startling results.  The 
calculations presented indicate that domestic sales account for the majority of aggregate 
 180 
industry profits, even though they make-up only 35% of total sales.
1
   This bias against the 
domestic consumer is also born out in the analysis of final electricity price, which indicates 
that both domestic and industrial prices would have been lower had privatisation not occurred.  
Moreover, the results presented imply that domestic prices with privatisation are higher by 
relatively more than industrial prices, intimating that the domestic consumer has suffered the 
most from privatisation. 
 
In order to pursue these arguments, the Chapter is organised as follows.  Section II considers 
existing literature contributions in this area, enabling Section III to build upon these 
foundations by developing a theoretical model of electricity prices.  Section IV uses this 
model to construct a counterfactual analysis of the industry had it not been privatised.  Our 
results are then presented in Section V, followed by our concluding comments in Section VI. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF SOME EXISTING LITERATURE 
Much has been written about the privatisation of electricity in Britain, with the vast majority 
of the literature (implicitly) assuming that the resulting structure was beneficial. A large 
amount of this literature has focused on specific elements of privatisation, such as modelling 
the operations of the pool or the extent of competition in generation.  These articles often 
conclude that specific elements of privatisation could have been carried out more effectively; 
for example, competition in the pool would have increased had the CEGB’s generating 
capacity been split into at least five companies (Green and Newbery, 1992).
2
  However, the 
focus of this literature seems to be that these flaws in privatisation have been a gain lost, 
                                                 
1
 The breakdown of electricity sales by sector was provided by Andrew Walker, Director of price control at the 
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER). 
2
 See also Green (1996) and Armstrong et al. (1994). 
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rather than an outright cost.   Thereby privatisation is still seen as a good thing, just that it 
could have been done better. 
 
Nevertheless, there has been a limited amount of work seeking to evaluate whether or not 
privatisation was beneficial, primarily the contributions of Yarrow (1992), and Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997).  Yarrow uses the basic benchmark of privatisation, that of electricity price, to 
evaluate whether the process was advantageous.  This is carried out by comparing the actual 
electricity prices observed with those that might have been charged had privatisation not 
occurred. To accomplish this, Yarrow developed a counterfactual scenario which assumes that 
the CEGB had not been privatised but that instead the government continued with the policies 
it established in the 1980’s.
3
 
 
The counterfactual was constructed within the context of the price identity shown below: 
 
 
 
ttt YXP +=       Equation 1 
 
    
 
Where  Pt is the relevant price (per kWh) of electricity in year t 
  Yt is the unit (per kWh) cost of coal inputs in year t 
Xt comprises unit ‘non-coal costs’ in year t 
 
Yarrow (p.11) accounts for the use of this identity because he believed that for the period of 
interest (i.e. 1988 to 1991)
4
 “bulk prices of electricity have been driven by the unit costs of 
generation of conventional steam turbine technologies.”  Since coal costs accounted for in 
excess of 80% of the CEGB total fuel costs up to early 1992, it would seem reasonable to 
                                                 
3
 In the late 1970’s/1980’s, the government progressively introduced the use of financial/performance targets and 
reduced entry barriers to encourage the development of private power stations and hence competitive pressures. 
4
 Yarrow assumes privatisation would first have had an effect when the specific details were first announced in 
1988. 
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separate out the cost of coal as a major determinant of price (Yarrow, 1992, p.12).  In order to 
calculate the ‘unit cost of coal’, Yarrow uses the following formula: 
 
t
tt
t
QE
QCPC
Y
×
=      Equation 2 
 
 
Where Yt is the unit (per kWh) cost of coal inputs in year t 
PCt is the unit price of coal to the generators in year t 
  QCt is the quantity of coal used in year t 
QEt is the quantity of electricity supplied in year t 
 
 
The counterfactual position developed by Yarrow is carefully explained by detailing the 
specific assumptions made regarding each variable, since privatisation would have affected 
many of the factors included.  
 
Yarrow defines the ‘non-coal costs’ component of price in very broad terms, which means it 
would include all the remaining determinants such as capital costs, taxation, profits or labour 
costs.  This is calculated as a residual, i.e. price minus coal costs, and so the counterfactual 
makes predictions using the observed long-term trend.  This is perhaps the main weakness of 
the paper because this ‘non-coal costs’ element is so broad that it includes many unknown 
factors. It contains not only the residual costs of generation, but also the various factors that 
affect distribution, transmission and supply. 
 
The counterfactual ‘story’ for the likely CEGB actions in the absence of privatisation allows 
Yarrow to separately calculate the two elements of price.  These are then combined to find 
that in 1991, domestic prices are 25% higher than they would have been without privatisation 
(Yarrow, 1992, p.23).  The counterfactual assumptions used are well justified, but the author 
also develops a more ‘pessimistic’ case for ‘non-coal costs’ (due to the large amount of 
 183 
unknown factors this includes) which still shows a 15.6% difference in price (Yarrow, 1992, 
p.31).  Both of these results are used by Yarrow to undermine the supposed success of 
privatisation. 
  
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) take a more complex view by attempting a comparative social 
cost-benefit analysis of the CEGB restructuring/privatisation process, between the years 1988 
to 2010.
5
 The main aim of the article is to investigate the size of the efficiency gains from 
privatisation, although there is limited discussion about the resulting effects on price.
6
   
 
To carry out such an analysis,  Newbery and Pollitt need to compare the actual efficiency of 
the industry with that which would have existed had privatisation not taken place. They 
therefore develop a counterfactual position for the likely actions of the CEGB if it continued 
in its pre-privatisation form.  This takes the form of two ‘extreme’ scenarios: the ‘pro-
privatisation’ case, which is pessimistic in terms of the CEGB performance and consequently 
favourable to privatisation; and the ‘pro-CEGB’ case, which takes a more optimistic view of 
the CEGB, thereby more supportive towards continued public ownership. These 
counterfactual positions were derived by forecasting the CEGB’s actions if it had faced the 
same conditions as the privatised industry. For example, the changing sulphur limits imposed 
by Brussels, or the 1991 lifting of the EC prohibition on the burning of gas in electricity 
generation.  Since these factors were not experienced by the CEGB when it was publicly 
owned, Newbery and Pollitt rely on evidence of the CEGB’s view of the future and its plans 
                                                 
5
 2010 was chosen since the majority of the current plant will have been replaced by then.  This time frame has 
not been adopted here due to the great uncertainties about predicting future events. 
6
 In carrying out the analysis they focus on the impact of competition in generation and so they therefore exclude 
electricity distribution and supply from their study, reasoning that it has been regulated and essentially 
unchanged in structure. 
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for the 1990’s.  The majority of this information was presented to a commission of inquiry in 
1990, when the CEGB proposed to construct a new nuclear station at Hinkley Point. 
 
Newbery and Pollitt then use this counterfactual, together with predictions for the future 
performance of the industry, to look at the various effects of restructuring and privatisation.  
Efficiency savings (e.g. due to lower labour use) together with changing plant mix and input 
costs are all modelled.  They find that benefits accrue from four areas: efficiency gains in the 
use of inputs (offset partly by restructuring costs); the switch in fuel use and investment; and 
the consequential environmental benefits.  The main costs arise from higher prices for 
imported French electricity, the cost of restructuring, and premature investment in new gas-
fired generating plant.  Combining all their calculations, Newbery and Pollitt obtain a central 
estimate that privatisation has resulted in a permanent cost reduction of 5% per annum over 
continued public ownership.  However, they find these cost savings have not been passed on 
to the consumer in the form of lower prices, but have instead been taken as higher profits by 
the electricity companies.  Indeed they find that it is only these companies who have benefited 
from privatisation, since profits have risen by more than the cost reductions made.  They 
therefore conclude that electricity prices in the privatised industry are higher than those 
predicted for the CEGB, indicating that it is the consumer who has borne the burden of the 
privatisation process. 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Earlier assessments of the potential costs of privatisation (in terms of electricity prices) 
indicate that there may exist substantial costs to the consumer from the restructuring and 
privatisation of the British electricity system.  It would therefore be useful to verify this view 
 185 
with a more up to date analysis, especially since Newbery and Pollitt reach their conclusions 
on price movements as an aside to their main work.  Moreover, Yarrow’s work was written in 
1992 and as such it only includes the performance of the private companies for one year.  The 
effect on price may therefore be substantially altered since this time. Consequently we use a 
modified version of the model presented by Yarrow, together with elements of the Newbery 
and Pollitt article, to judge the success of privatisation with respect to the price of electricity.  
 
Since Yarrow, electricity generation in Britain has witnessed significant changes, which 
implies that Yarrow’s approach cannot simply be duplicated with updated data.  The model 
must be revised to take account of changing technologies and alteration in the effects that the 
privatised companies have had on the nature of electricity generation. On this basis, a similar 
approach to Yarrow has been used, where the cost of electricity has now been split into the 
three components shown in equation 3: 
 
   tttt NFP Π++=     Equation 3 
Where Pt is the relevant price (per kWh) of electricity in year t. 
Ft is the ‘fossil fuel costs’ per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t.  
Nt comprises  ‘non fossil fuel costs’ (per kWh) in year t. 
Πt are the ‘profits’ (per kWh) in year t. 
 
 
The price identity now includes the more general term ‘fossil fuel costs’, which replaces 
Yarrow’s  ‘unit cost of coal’.  This has been done to incorporate the ‘dash for gas’ (and the 
associated changes in the mix of fossil fuels required for generation), as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  It also provides a better estimate of overall fuel costs, since it now 
incorporates the use of oil in generation.  ‘Profits’ have also been separated from Yarrow’s 
‘non-coal costs’ so that the massive increases in profit levels after privatisation can be 
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explicitly modelled.  This leaves the remaining factors bundled in the residual term, ‘non 
fossil fuel costs.’   
 
Yarrow does not model the different potential mix of fuels used to generate electricity but 
rather assumes that 75% of  “bulk electricity produced by the generating companies was from 
coal-fired stations” (Yarrow, 1992, p.17). This assumption, while reasonably valid for the 
time period examined, can no longer be supported due to the changes that have occurred in 
the fuel mix used for generation.  Consequently equation 4 utilises the weighted unit costs of 
coal, gas and oil generated electricity to calculate an estimate of the cost of fossil fuels per 
unit of fossil fuel generated electricity.   
  
  ( ) ( ) ( )ttttttt OZGYCXFF ++×+×=   Equation 4 
 
Where  FFt is the fossil fuel costs per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t which was  
generated using fossil fuels 
  Xt is the proportion of electricity sold in year t, generated using coal. 
Ct is the unit (per kWh) fuel cost of coal generated electricity in year t. 
Yt is the proportion of electricity sold in year t, generated using gas. 
Gt is the unit (per kWh) fuel cost of gas generated electricity in year t. 
Zt is the proportion of electricity sold in year t, generated using oil. 
Ot is the unit (per kWh) fuel cost of oil generated electricity in year t. 
 
 
To calculate the unit fuel cost of electricity generated from the different fossil fuels, the 
formula Yarrow used (as outlined in equation 5) can be applied to each of the fuels: 
 
  
it
itit
it
QE
QP
I
×
=        Equation 5 
 
 
Where Iit is the unit fuel cost of electricity generated using fossil fuel i in year t. 
Pit is the unit price of fuel i in year t.    
Qit is the quantity of the fuel i used in year t. 
QEit is the quantity of electricity generated using fuel i in year t. 
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However, equation 4 does not take into account electricity generated from other, non fossil 
fuel sources such as nuclear or hydro, and thus just works out the costs of the fossils fuels per 
unit of electricity generated using fossil fuels.  Therefore, an additional equation is required to 
spread the costs of the fossil fuels over the total amount of electricity sold, in order to 
calculate the cost of fossil fuels per unit of all electricity sold.  This is done in equation 6. 
 
t
tt
t
QET
QEFFF
F
×
=      Equation 6 
 
 Where Ft is the fossil fuel costs per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t 
FFt is the fossil fuel costs per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t which was  
 generated using fossil fuels  
  QEFt is the number of units of electricity (kWh) sold in year t which was  
generated using fossil fuels  
 QETt is the number of units of electricity (kWh) sold in year t 
 
 
When combined, equations 4, 5 and 6 should provide a good estimate of ‘fossil fuel costs’ per 
unit of electricity sold, since they incorporate virtually all of the fossil fuel used.  The 
structure of the equations also allows the changing importance of each fossil fuel to be 
modelled on a yearly basis. 
 
Although the price identity is an updated version of Yarrow, the general methodology 
employed in this Chapter draws heavily upon that of both Yarrow, and Newbery and Pollitt.  
Following Yarrow, we look at the price of both domestic and industrial electricity and make 
similar assumptions regarding the CEGBs structure without privatisation (i.e. further 
reductions in entry barriers to encourage competition, together with slightly more aggressive 
financial/performance targets).  We also follow Yarrow’s assumption that the first effects of 
privatisation would be felt in the financial year 1988/89, since the governments specific 
proposals had already been published by then.  Newbery and Pollitt's influence on this 
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Chapter is mainly discernible in terms of the counterfactual developed (see next section), but 
a similar approach is adopted to the way in which they deal with the different domains within 
the electricity sector.
7
  The focus is predominantly on generation since  this contains the most 
important cost drivers, while the structure of the remaining parts of the industry is generally 
unchanged and has been subject to government regulation.
8
 This essentially means we 
concentrate on the activities of the CEGB (and its successor companies) as this accounted for 
the vast majority of British generation cost drivers, especially given that the Scottish market 
was more heavily based on nuclear and hydro generated electricity (Thomas, 1996a, p.59). 
 
IV. COUNTERFACTUAL DATA USED 
In order to compare prices, a counterfactual alternative must be developed for the individual 
elements that form the price identity.  Newbery and Pollitt present an assiduously developed 
counterfactual ‘story’ for likely CEGB actions in the absence of privatisation.  Although this 
Chapter incorporates differing assumptions and structure, Newbery and Pollitt has been 
utilised as a foundation for the counterfactual developed here, due to the vast amount of 
information it contains. (N.B. a brief summary of the counterfactual used can be seen in 
appendix E).   
 
In line with Yarrow, and Newbery and Pollitt, the counterfactual analysis starts in the 
financial year 1998/89, as this is the first year after which the specific privatisation proposals 
were announced and thus changes might have reasonably started to occur within the 
electricity industry.   It has, however, been decided to limit the extent of our study such that it 
finishes with the 1997/98 financial year.  With any counterfactual type analysis the 
                                                 
7
 i.e. Generation, transmission, distribution and supply. 
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probability of accurately predicting what might have been, slowly diminishes as the number 
of years increases, and thus the number of decisions that have to be estimated multiply, and 
assumptions built upon assumptions start to grow.  To this end, we felt that a ten-year study 
would give a strong indication of the real effects of privatisation upon price, whilst after this 
time the electricity market had grown sufficiently different to make robust counterfactual 
predictions problematic.  For example, in 1998 the market for electricity supply was fully 
liberalised, which resulted in all electricity consumers being able to choose their electricity 
supplier.  This therefore meant that amongst other things, it would no longer be appropriate to 
concentrate entirely on generation as the main driver of electricity price.  Moreover, given the 
changes in the industry (e.g. fuel used for generation) consistently defined data series were 
also becoming more difficult to obtain or calculate as the length of the counterfactual 
increased. 
 
The data used to construct this counterfactual (and the actual data it contrasts) has been 
collected from several specialised publications,
9
 and from telephone interviews we conducted 
with senior people within the industry.  However, some of the published information refers to 
the United Kingdom (UK) as a whole and thus is not specific to the markets of England and 
Wales, and Scotland (i.e. the markets that make up Great Britain). This is not a serious 
problem since the electricity system for Northern Ireland (the UK consists of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland) is tiny in comparison to the markets of Great Britain, and so data for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 This line is supported by the fact that, for example, in 1993/94, 77% of industrial electricity cost was 
attributable to generation, which shows it to be by far the most important domain (CRI, 1994/95 edition, p.xi). 
9
 These include: the Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics, and Energy trends, both published by the 
Department of Energy and then the DTI; Handbook of Electricity Supply Statistics, and Annual Report and 
Accounts, both published by the Electricity Council; Energy Prices and Taxes from the International Energy 
Agency; The UK Electricity Industry: Charges for Electricity Services, The UK Electricity Industry: Electricity 
Services and Costs, and The UK Electricity Industry: Financial and Operating Review, all published by the CRI; 
the Statistical Yearbook from the CEGB and the Annual Report and Accounts of the privatised companies. 
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UK should still provide a reasonable estimate for Great Britain.
10
 For example,
 
in 1998 
7,174GWh of electricity were distributed by public electricity suppliers in Northern Ireland, 
which is just 2.4% of the 299,387GWh distributed in the UK as a whole (DTI, 1999, p.151). 
 
IV.i Fossil Fuel Costs 
When looking at ‘fossil fuel costs’ it is first necessary to examine the fuels used in the 
generation process, as this is said to be a direct consequence of the industry structure.  As the 
previous Chapter indicated, there has been a significant shift in fuel use since privatisation, 
with the new independent CCGT plant replacing the coal fired plant of the CEGB successor 
companies.
11
 During the Hinckley Point Enquiry the CEGB presented its central forecast of 
its future power requirements.  It estimated that by the end of the century 5.5GW of ageing 
coal plant would need replacing (Barnes, 1990, Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).  However, by 
1995 more than 5.5GW of coal plant had already been replaced by the IPPs new gas fired 
plant, which had caused the premature closure of the older coal stations.   
 
Telephone interviews that we carried out with senior people within these independent 
companies during January/February 1999 suggested that limited entry by IPPs might still have 
been possible in the absence of privatisation, if the environment were right (see report in 
Chapter Five, and appendix C for the list of core questions utilised in these interviews, and a 
sample transcript of one of the interview). For this entry to take place, our interviewees 
indicated that the independent companies would have been looking for specific conditions, 
such as long-term purchase contracts, which are likely to have been less favourable or 
                                                 
10
 The electricity system of Northern Ireland has not been included in this analysis because much of the 
information required was unavailable for the period of interest.   
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forthcoming under public ownership. Therefore, the counterfactual developed in this Chapter 
takes the view that independent entry would have been approximately 50% of that actually 
witnessed under privatisation, reflecting the reduced willingness of the independents to 
enter.
12
  Thus in the counterfactual scenario there is a lower amount of gas capacity (3.5GW 
less by 1998). Consequently the retirement of ageing coal plant would have been more 
gradually phased in and would not have been completed until the end of the century, as was 
originally forecast.
 
 
 
The analysis of capacity does not show how the assumed plant mix would be used to generate 
electricity, and so plant utilisation must also be modelled. One of the features of privatisation 
was that the utilisation of coal plant fell dramatically as independent gas fired stations started 
to operate on long-term ‘baseload’ contracts, which resulted in high utilisation.  These 
contracts distorted the marginal cost based merit order which should determine the 
combination of plants to be used, since these gas plants were contracted to operate, even if 
they were not the cheapest plant to fulfil demand.  For example, the utilisation of coal plant 
fell from 54.1% in 1993/93 to 44.8% in 1997, while the utilisation of CCGT plants rose from 
60.5% in 1993/94 to 81% in 1997. (DTI, 1998a, Table 6.7, p.164). Since the counterfactual 
assumes lower entry by IPPs, there would have been less use of gas for ‘baseload’ operations 
and so gas fired plants would have been used less intensively.  In order to model plant 
utilisation this Chapter uses the established trends (both pre- and post-privatisation) to 
                                                                                                                                                        
11
 In dealing with this issue it has been assumed that the electricity production/capacity for nuclear, hydro, oil 
and imported electricity remain unchanged, due to the time taken to build new plant and to the nature of the 
demand these sources satisfy. 
12
 50% has been used due to the information gained from the interviews conducted. 
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estimate the rates for the counterfactual.  This results in higher utilisation of coal plants and 
reduced utilisation for gas plants.
13
 
 
To calculate ‘fossil fuel costs’ it is also necessary to make assumptions regarding the 
technical efficiency (i.e. the amount of fuel required to generate one unit of electricity) of the 
power stations, which will then allow fuel requirements to be calculated.
14
  The observed 
trend shows that there were steady improvements in the efficiency of coal fired plant from 
1980 to the end of the study, with privatisation making no difference to the trend.  For 
example, in 1987 approximately 0.000435 tonnes of coal were required to generate one unit 
of electricity (kWh), which had declined to 0.000419 tonnes by 1992 and 0.000396 by 1997.  
Such a trend suggests that the CEGB was as efficient as the privatised industry in terms of the 
technical operation of coal fired plant.  This is a contention that is supported by Armstrong et 
al. (1994, p.320), who report in their conclusion: “In terms of short-run operating efficiency, 
the CEGB's performance appears to have been reasonably good, except (as is now apparent) 
for over-staffing”.  However, since the CEGB had no CCGT stations, there is no pre-
privatisation record to study, and so there are fewer facts to guide the counterfactual 
estimation of the efficiency of the gas fired stations. What is known is that the technical 
efficiency of CCGT fired plants is virtually unchanged during their limited period of use.  
This is unsurprising since CCGT is a new technology and there has been little time for 
improvement.  It might therefore be reasonably assumed that the CEGB would have run its 
CCGT stations with the same ability as it did its coal stations. Consequently the 
                                                 
13
 When modelling utilisation it has been assumed that the total amount of electricity sold would remain the same 
i.e. own price elasticity of electricity is zero,  since simultaneous modelling of price and quantity would be 
prohibitively complicated due to the many effects it would have.  Research conducted on the own price elasticity 
of demand shows that in the short  run it is actually likely to be in the region of -0.7 for small changes (Brenton, 
1997). 
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counterfactual assumes that technical efficiency for both coal and gas would have been the 
same as that observed under privatisation. (i.e. the amount of fuel required to generate one 
unit of electricity is the same for the counterfactual as that actually observed).
15
 
 
Privatisation is also likely to have had an effect on the prices of coal and gas used in 
electricity generation,
16
 especially since the quantities required would differ (due to the 
assumptions made on available capacity).  Prior to electricity privatisation the Government 
owned both the coal and electricity industries.  To protect domestic coal production, it forced 
the CEGB to purchase expensive British coal.  However, in the 1980’s government policy 
changed towards a more market orientated approach, which included a policy of cost 
reductions in order to move British coal prices more in line with world prices.  
 
Government influence in the price of coal continued to be felt in the years immediately after 
privatisation. In 1990, prior to privatisation, the new generating companies signed three-year 
contracts with British coal, which were effectively government imposed.  These contracts 
specified large quantities of coal (only slightly lower than the quantity in 1989/90) whilst 
continuing previous government policy of gradually moving British coal to world prices.
17
  
The counterfactual used in this assumes that the coal prices up to 1993 were the same as those 
                                                                                                                                                        
14
 This is different from thermal efficiency, which measures the efficiency with which heat energy contained in 
the fuel is converted into electrical energy - see the DTI (1998a,1999). 
15
 It has been assumed that the efficiency costs to coal stations of being fitted with the additional FGD equipment 
required to clean emissions is offset by the efficiency increases derived from higher load factors (i.e. increased 
use). 
16
 It has been assumed that the oil price would not change in the counterfactual since the market for oil is a 
global one.  
17
 Since the government had such strong links with the coal price Yarrow made the assumption that coal prices 
would have been the same had privatisation not occurred. 
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actually observed, with small adjustments to take account of quantity differences.
18
 This 
approach has been chosen as it seems to represent the most likely conditions the CEGB would 
have faced, inasmuch as the actual price was effectively set by the government.
19
  
 
Once these contracts expired, the privatised electricity companies were able to negotiate their 
own contracts for coal.  They could now exert considerable pressure on British Coal, since 
their newly constructed port capacity meant they had the viable alternative of cheaper 
imported coal.  This resulted in a considerable gulf between what British Coal was willing to 
accept as reasonable and what the generators were willing to offer.  The government acted as 
a negotiator and applied considerable pressure to reach an agreement.  The contract stipulated 
significantly lower quantities (reflecting the reduced demand caused by the CCGT stations) 
while continuing the previous downward trend in the real price, which had started in the mid-
1980s when the CEGB was still publicly owned. Given this government involvement, it is 
likely that a publicly owned CEGB would also have followed a similar path. Therefore, the 
counterfactual in this uses the observed price from 1994 to 1998 as a base, with the 
appropriate adjustments for quantity differences.
20
 
 
The effect of privatisation on gas price is more difficult to estimate since there were no CCGT 
stations operating before privatisation. Newbery and Pollitt, in their ‘pro-CEGB’ case use the 
same price actually observed under privatisation.  In their 'pro-privatisation' case they argue 
that gas prices might actually have risen by 10% without privatisation, due to the monopsony 
                                                 
18
 Newbery and Pollitt use the marginal cost curve presented in the House of Commons Inquiry into the Market 
for Coal as a means of adjusting the price of coal for quantity changes. A similar approach has been adopted in 
this , using the cost curve presented in House of Commons (1992/93, p.24) . 
19
 Newbery and Pollitt  in their ‘pro-CEGB’ case assume coal costs were the same as with privatisation. 
20
 See Parker (1996a) and House of Commons report (1992/93) for a more comprehensive account of the 
relationship between the coal industry and electricity generation. 
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power of the CEGB deterring the rapid expansion in North Sea gas production, which is said 
to have resulted in the decline of gas prices.  However, this does not allow for any entry by 
IPPs or other avenues for gas production (e.g. exports into Europe), and hence it is unlikely 
that the North Sea boom would be as severely affected as Newbery and Pollitt suggest. 
 
Newbery and Pollitt's contention is opposed by the House of Commons 1992/93 report 
‘British Energy Policy and the Market for Coal’, which partially attributes the ‘dash for gas’ 
in electricity generation to the “realisation that more gas was available at competitive prices 
than had previously been thought” (House of Commons, 1992/93, point 77, pp.46-47).  This 
would seem to reverse the causality between the ‘dash for gas’ in the North Sea and that in the 
electricity generation sector, from that proposed by Newbery and Pollitt.  
 
This argument is supported by developments in the gas market, where regulatory bodies had 
effectively removed British Gas’s monopoly control of the market.  For example, between 
1989 and 1993, 36 new gas fields were made available but only 9 of these went to British Gas 
(BG), the remainder going to 18 different organisations. Previously, new gas fields had only 
been brought on line when BG required them, either to replace existing fields or to meet the 
extra demand within its existing markets. This had allowed BG to restrict gas supply to 
forecast demand, but competition has resulted in a great deal more gas seeking buyers and 
hence lower prices (Parker, 1996a, p.128). Consequently it might be that the falling gas price, 
and its plentiful availability helped to encourage the use of gas fired plant. In that case, the 
ownership of the power station is an inconsequential fact.   
 
In this situation, lower entry into gas fired generation (as is assumed under the counterfactual) 
might lead to over supply and thus to even lower gas prices. This lower price contention 
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might be supported by the view that monopsony buying power of the CEGB could also lead 
to lower prices.  Therefore, in the face of such great uncertainty, the CEGB counterfactual 
assumes a gas price which is the same as the one actually observed with privatisation.
21
 
 
IV.ii Profits 
Electricity prices are generally presented in two forms: the price to domestic consumers and 
the price to industrial users.  Following Yarrow's example, we use the same separation of 
price.  However, this presents a problem due to the explicit incorporation of profits into the 
identity employed.  The statistical data does not include the profits made from each category 
of sale, but instead gives total industry profits.
22
  The profit figures cannot be simply divided 
by the number of units sold each year, because this makes the implicit assumption that 
industrial and domestic sales generate the same profit per unit.  It is rather unrealistic to 
assume that domestic and industrial sales would produce the same profit per unit, given the 
higher levels of competition for industrial sales during the period of interest and the cost 
differences.  It is therefore better to estimate explicitly the profit distribution, using the limited 
amount of data that is available.
23
 (A full transcript of the calculations can be seen in 
Appendix F). 
 
The calculations indicate that in 1993/94, 61.65% of profits in the electricity sector were 
earned on domestic electricity sales, with only 38.35% coming from the larger industrial 
                                                 
21
 This is the same line that Newbery and Pollitt take in their ‘pro-CEGB’ counterfactual. 
22
 We contacted several companies to get this information but they proved unwilling to share this confidential 
data. 
23
 The calculation is based on the idea that to generate one unit of electricity costs the same irrespective of final 
destination.  Therefore, information on the breakdown of typical industrial and domestic bills between the 
different domains in 1993/94 allows the calculation of the profit differential earned in generation between the 
two types of sale (i.e. industrial/domestic). This profit rate was then applied to the other domains and hence the 
per unit profits for the two sale types can be calculated. 
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sector.
24
  This result is very significant since it shows that domestic electricity sales provide a 
disproportionately large percentage of aggregate profits (only 35% of sales are to domestic 
customers).  It may also indicate that industry specific regulation has failed to protect the 
domestic consumer from the interests of big business, if the profits on domestic electricity 
sales represent more than a reasonable return on capital employed.  
 
The key piece of information used to calculate this profit distribution (the breakdown of 
typical electricity bills) was only available for the financial year 1993/94, when the industry 
was privately owned.  It is most likely that this profit distribution would have been different 
had the industry still been publicly owned, and indeed changed over time for both the public 
or private industry. However, given the lack of regular information, there is no way that 
reasonable  predictions can be made for this changing profit distribution.  It has therefore been 
assumed that the division of profits remains at the 1993/94 level, for all the years examined 
and for both the public and private industry.  
 
Throughout the 1980’s, the electricity industry in the Great Britain faced a series of financial 
targets that determined the individual company’s return on capital (i.e. profit).  It is the 
position of this  that the government would have continued with this targeting policy, setting 
financial targets for the CEGB, the various Area Boards, and the Scottish companies.
25
 In the 
last few years of public ownership, these financial targets were increased significantly (e.g. in 
                                                 
24
 Initially these calculations were carried out using earlier information from OFFER that indicated the market 
for electricity was split evenly between domestic and industrial sales.  The use of this information gives the 
conclusion that 79.29% of profits  originate in the domestic sector, with only  20.71% earned from  industrial 
sector sales.  However, these have not been used because when sent details of the provisional results, OFFER 
replied with scepticism, citing as evidence  ‘new’ information on the proportion of electricity sold to 
domestic/industrial consumers (i.e. 65% industrial, 35% domestic). This ‘new’ evidence, being the most up to 
date, has therefore been used  in the remainder of this ,  although in either case the results are startling.   
 198 
England and Wales, the target increased from a 2.7% return on assets in 1987/88 to a 4.75% 
return in 1989/90 - see Electricity Council, 1988/89).  Since this was a time when the industry 
was being prepared for privatisation, the counterfactual assumes that a target under continued 
public ownership would have been set slightly above those set for the period in the mid 
1980’s.  Moreover, in the later years of the counterfactual, the profit target has been increased 
slightly to reflect a more aggressive approach to targeting and the entry by IPPs, who would 
have the higher profit margins associated with private businesses. (It has been assumed that 
financial targets would be met - see Appendix E for the actual profit targets).
26
  
 
The counterfactual profits estimation has resulted in the observed profits trend of the 1980's 
continuing into the 1990's.  However, in reality profits exploded since privatisation. Therefore 
the profits predicted by the counterfactual are significantly below those actually observed.
27
 
 
IV.iii Non Fossil Fuel Costs 
The biggest element of price is what we term ‘non fossil fuel costs’, which are determined by 
the multitude of factors not covered by the ‘profit’ or ‘fossil fuel costs’ terms. When 
analysing the actual data on privatisation, ‘non fossil fuel costs’ are calculated as the residual 
of price; i.e. by subtracting ‘profits’ and ‘fossil fuel costs’ from the price.  However, the 
counterfactual requires it to be modelled explicitly so that the estimate of the counterfactual 
price can be achieved.  To accomplish this Yarrow simply assumes the series would have 
followed the same downward trend as was observed from the middle of the 1980's.  While 
                                                                                                                                                        
25
 The industry in England and Wales faced a joint financial target. From this, each Area Board faced its own 
target, reflecting the different circumstance of each, while the CEGB aimed to achieve the industry target.  The 
two Scottish companies had a separate target. 
26
 Newbery and Pollitt do not make any explicit predictions regarding yearly profits, but give a discounted figure 
for total profits in the time frame they use.  They account for this by the continued use of the CEGB's 1989 
financial target.   
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this might appear reasonable up to 1991, it is unlikely that this trend would have continued 
unchanged, due to the large amount of variables included.  We therefore examine the main 
constituents of this broad category, examining how each might have been altered.  The nature 
of the elements included in this term mean there are often severe data limitations and so the 
established trends (both pre- and post-privatisation) are important indicators for the 
counterfactual.   
  
One of the main elements expected to be included in the ‘non fossil fuel costs’ division since 
privatisation, is the fossil fuel levy (FFL).
28
  This was a flat rate tax of around 10% on all 
retail sales of electricity in England and Wales, which was introduced during industry 
restructuring in 1990 (it was phased out in 1996/97 when the newer nuclear stations were 
privatised as British Energy).  The exact purpose of the FFL has been the source of much 
confusion, with many authors and even government ministers often reporting its purpose 
inaccurately.  The primary aim of the levy was to finance the excessive costs of nuclear 
generated electricity over conventionally generated electricity.
29
 Money generated by the FFL 
was paid to Nuclear Electric (NE) who treated these payments as a large component of its 
turnover. The levy payments were not reserved to pay for inherited liabilities as is widely 
reported (MacKerron, 1996, pp.151-154).   The Chairman of NE told the House of Commons 
Trade and Industry Committee that “basically the Levy is taken in to add cash flow.”  The 
finance director added that the FFL “.. was specifically described as to ensure that Nuclear 
Electric remained cash-positive” (House of Commons, 1992-93, p.62). 
                                                                                                                                                        
27
 For example, actual industry profits were £2013.3M in 1990/1, rising to £4,737.6M by 1996/7 (CRI, 1996/97), 
where as the counterfactual estimates profits in 1996/7 at £2,360M.  
28
 This does not mean that the fossil fuel levy is a cost - just something that one might expect to be included in 
this section due to the way it is calculated as a residual. 
29
 A very small amount of the levy was used to support energy generated from renewable sources. 
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The majority of NE’s expenditure since privatisation would have occurred regardless of 
whether NE received any money from the FFL; investment in plant under construction would 
have continued, whilst nuclear plants and waste materials would still have needed to be made 
safe. In this respect the only effect of the levy has been to boost Nuclear Electric’s revenue, 
and hence profits.   The levy will therefore already be included in the ‘profits’ section (since 
NE’s profits include the levy payments) and consequentially will not constituent part of the 
‘non fossil fuel costs’ division of the privatisation scenario. 
 
The manner in which nuclear liabilities were handled did not change following industry 
restructuring.  As a liability became due, it was paid out of current revenue.   The CEGB’s 
policy on the backend costs of nuclear power was that the assets were reduced in value to take 
account of these future costs, which were to be met from future revenues.  Privatisation 
separated the nuclear assets from the conventional plants that were to provide much of this 
future revenue, creating the need for the FFL.  If privatisation had not occurred, there would 
have been no need for the levy since the backend costs of nuclear power would have been met 
in the planned way.  Since ‘profits’ are calculated using an appropriate return on assets 
employed, and total costs are accounted for using the ‘fossil fuel costs’ and ‘non fossil fuel 
costs’ series, the counterfactual for continued public ownership does not need to include a 
fossil fuel levy.  
 
The capital costs of building the power stations (in the form of depreciation) are another 
important factor, since approximately 25% of the non-fuel costs of the CEGB in the 1980’s 
were depreciation costs (See Electricity Council, handbook of electricity supply statistics).  
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After privatisation, the ‘dash for gas’ resulted in the building of many new power stations 
which would have boosted this depreciation charge.  In the counterfactual scenario it is 
assumed that there would be less new CCGT capacity (nearly 3.5GW less by 1998), which 
would reduce the depreciation charge, since old plant would already have been written 
down.
30
  
 
Although the CEGB had been reducing its workforce throughout the 1980's, labour still 
accounted for approximately 27% of the CEGB’s non-fuel costs in the 1980’s ( see Electricity 
Council, handbook of electricity supply statistics).  Since privatisation, the rate of job losses 
within the industry has increased significantly, and it is unlikely that the CEGB would have 
matched the privatised companies in this respect.
31
  We therefore take the view that the 
observed CEGB trend of labour reduction in the 1980's would have continued in the absence 
of privatisation, with a slight increase in the mid 1990's reflecting the number of IPPs and 
associated competition. 
 
There were significant costs associated with the whole reorganisation and privatisation 
process - Newbery and Pollitt estimate the cost of restructuring the CEGB at approximately 
£3 billion (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, p.291).  If the industry had not been privatised these 
costs would not have been incurred.  However, the counterfactual does assume that some 
reforms would have occurred within the public sector (e.g. more performance targets, the 
                                                 
30
 Some of the savings in depreciation charges from fewer new stations would be offset by the need to install 
FGD emission cleaning equipment in some of the coal plants to meet emission targets. 
31
 Interviews with industry insiders show that the CEGB did not know how much ‘fat’ it contained, and so they 
report that it really needed the aggressive approach of the private sector to fully trim this excess labour fully. 
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introduction of independently owned generating capacity) and therefore takes account of a £2 
billion cost saving from not privatising.
32
 
 
Clearly many other factors would be included in such a broad category, the majority of which 
are not known. Thus it is rather difficult to predict the effect that privatisation had upon these 
costs.  However, some were classed by the government as being ‘non-controllable’ before 
privatisation, so it seems reasonable to assume that the remaining ‘non fossil fuel costs’ would 
not have been significantly changed for the counterfactual (Yarrow, 1992, p.11).
33
  This view 
is supported by the fact that ‘non fossil fuel costs’ also include the costs of electricity 
generated from other sources (e.g. nuclear, imports or hydro), which have already assumed to 
be constant in terms of volume and price. For example the improved performance of the 
nuclear power industry would be included in this part of the analysis.  The counterfactual 
assumes that this improvement would have happened even if privatisation had not occurred, 
since much of the improvement can be attributed to the solving of technical problems and the 
nuclear part of the industry was in public ownership for much of this improvement.
34
 
 
V. RESULTS 
Combining the various elements of the counterfactual with equations 3, 4, 5 and 6, allows us 
to estimate the predicted electricity prices for continued public ownership. 
                                                 
32
 This is a very conservative estimate of the cost savings that would have been achieved, but detailed 
information on the costs of privatisation was not available and hence a conservative figure was taken. 
33
 Some costs would have risen but these might be offset by the cost elements that had fallen. 
34
 In 1988, salaries, depreciation and local rates accounted for over 60% of non fuel costs, and this figure would 
rise when the other factors already mentioned are included (Electricity Council, handbook of electricity supply).  
Therefore, it would seem that the assumption on ‘non fossil fuel costs’ is a reasonable first approximation. 
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V.i Domestic Prices 
 
Table 2  
Domestic Electricity Prices, pence per kWh
† 
 
Year Actual* Predicted % Difference 
1988/89 6.17 6.06 1.73 
1989/90 6.67 6.49 2.64 
1990/91 7.34 6.75 7.97 
1991/92 7.72 7.16 7.27 
1992/93 7.70 7.09 7.92 
1993/94 7.50 6.73 10.29 
1994/95 7.46 6.31 15.47 
1995/96 7.44 6.27 15.70 
1996/97 7.14 5.68 20.51 
1997/98 6.94 6.13 11.64 
† In  April 1994 VAT (Value Added Tax) was imposed on domestic electricity sales.  This tax has been excluded for 
consistency. 
* Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues  
Table 2 shows that privatisation has led to significant increases in the price of domestic 
electricity compared with those predicted for continued public ownership.  Consumers have 
been paying significantly higher prices since 1988/89, which indicates that the privatisation 
process has had a large cumulative cost (in terms of price) to domestic consumers. 
 
The size of the difference is particularly interesting because it suggests that the results 
presented in Yarrow over-estimated the price-increasing effect of privatisation. For example, 
Yarrow projected that without privatisation, domestic electricity prices would have been 25% 
lower in 1991 (Yarrow, 1992, p.23). The results in this estimate the cost for 1990/91 at only 
7.97%.  Moreover, Yarrow’s less optimistic counterfactual estimates the cost at only 15.6%, 
which are still significantly higher than this has found (Yarrow, 1992, p.31).  Another 
interesting observation is that the price differential peaks in 1996/97 and starts to fall after this 
time. This is because the actual price of domestic electricity continued its downward trend, 
while the predicted price of electricity actually broke its downward trend and started to rise. 
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Nevertheless with a difference still in the region of 11.64% in 1997/98, the results show that 
privatisation has had a substantial negative impact on consumer prices. 
 
The results presented above (and in the rest of this section) are nominal prices.  A second set 
of results were calculated using real prices, but these are not presented in this section because 
the nature of the results was not altered.  The aim of this is to give an indication of the relative 
changes in prices caused by privatisation.  To present results using real prices might imply a 
level of accuracy in terms of the absolute level of real prices, which would be unwise given 
the nature of the methodology employed. 
 
V.ii Industrial Prices 
Industrial electricity prices show a similar story to domestic prices although the price 
differential is lower. 
Table 3 
Industrial Electricity Prices, pence per kWh 
 
 Actual*
 
Predicted % Difference 
1988/89 3.73 3.62 2.86 
1989/90 3.98 3.81 4.33 
1990/91 4.11 3.68 10.41 
1991/92 4.32 3.93 9.14 
1992/93 4.55 4.12 9.36 
1993/94 4.38 3.95 9.85 
1994/95 4.34 3.80 12.52 
1995/96 4.19 3.65 12.88 
1996/97 3.95 3.39 14.26 
1997/98 3.91 3.66 6.48 
* Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues 
 
It is interesting to note that the difference between the actual and predicted price in the 
industrial sector has a flatter distribution than domestic prices, peaking at only 14.26% 
compared with 20.51% for domestic prices.  This might reflect the fact that the market to 
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supply large users was open to competition from the beginning, reducing the market power of 
individual firms. The results for industrial prices are closer to those of Yarrow’s preferred 
counterfactual.  For example, Yarrow’s main prediction is that industrial prices would be 
18.9% lower in 1991 (Yarrow, 1992, p.23), while his alternative set of results indicated they 
would be 7.9% lower (Yarrow, 1992, p.31).  Table 3 shows that our model predicts that 
industrial prices would have been 10.41% lower in the 1990/91.  It is also interesting to 
observe that the price differential peaks in 1996/97, the same year as the peak in the domestic 
price differential. The price differential has also fallen substantially in 1997/98, to 6.48%, 
which is nevertheless a significant amount.  The predicted figure for 1990/91 seems to dip in 
comparison to the surrounding years, which leads to an unexpectedly large differential.  The 
reason behind this is a dip in the ‘non fossil fuel costs’ and the cause appears to be a quirk of 
the methodology and its interpretation of events. 
 
V.iii Price Ratio 
It is also interesting to compare the ratio of industrial to domestic prices, as this shows how 
privatisation has affected the relative price of electricity, and thus which group bore the most 
burden.  
 
From Table 4 (overleaf) it can be seen that the predicted results follow roughly the same 
pattern as was actually observed under privatisation; i.e. industrial price falls as a proportion 
of domestic price.  It is interesting to note that the predicted ratio is slightly below the actual 
ratio for the first half of the period of interest, although it closely follows the general pattern 
actually observed. This indicates that the predicted series has lower industrial prices relative 
to domestic prices than were actually observed.  After the first few years following 
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privatisation, the pattern is reversed so the actual ratio shows industrial prices falling relative 
to domestic prices, whilst the predicted series suggests that relative prices would remain 
roughly constant.  These results indicate that domestic consumers suffered the most from 
privatisation, since the price they faced increased by relatively more than industrial prices.  
This is consistent with the structure of privatisation, as it created a competitive market to 
supply larger (industrial) consumers but retained the Area Boards’ local monopoly over 
supply to small (domestic) consumers during the period of interest. 
Table 4 
 Ratio of Industrial to Domestic Prices (i.e. Industrial/Domestic Price)
† 
 
 Actual Predicted % Difference 
1988/89 0.6045 0.5976 -1.15 
1989/90 0.5967 0.5864 -1.73 
1990/91 0.5599 0.5451 -2.65 
1991/92 0.5596 0.5483 -2.01 
1992/93 0.5909 0.5817 -1.56 
1993/94 0.5840 0.5869 0.49 
1994/95 0.5818 0.6021 3.50 
1995/96 0.5632 0.5820 3.35 
1996/97 0.5532 0.5967 7.86 
1997/98 0.5634 0.5963 5.85 
† Domestic prices exclude the effect of VAT which was imposed in April 1994 on domestic electricity sales. 
 
V.iv Sensitivity Analysis 
When dealing with methodology such as that used in this Chapter, the exact results calculated 
will, to some extent, depend upon the author’s individual interpretation of the specific events 
investigated.  It is therefore desirable to proffer the preferred results within the context of a 
potential range, in order to show how sensitive these results are to differing assumptions.  In 
order to accomplish this, the preferred results for domestic electricity (as presented in Tables 
2 and 3 above) have been calculated together with two, more extreme scenarios.  The 
‘pessimistic’ series assumes a counterfactual that takes a more negative view of CEGB 
performance and events.  This includes factors such as slower reductions in employee 
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numbers, higher fossil fuel prices and a higher profit target.  The ‘optimistic’ series takes a 
more positive view of CEGB performance and events, so includes factors like lower fossil 
fuel prices, more aggressive reductions in the labour force and lower profit targets.  (N.B. a 
brief summary of the key differences of the ‘pessimistic’ and ‘optimistic’ counterfactuals can 
be seen in Appendices G and H respectively). 
 
Table 5  
Domestic Electricity Price Counterfactual Comparisons  (in pence per kWh - % difference to 
actual in parentheses)
† 
 
 Actual*
 
Preferred Pessimistic Optimistic 
1988/89 6.17   6.06 (1.73)   6.13 (0.61)   6.01 (2.61) 
1989/90 6.67   6.49 (2.64)   6.61 (0.87)   6.43 (3.58) 
1990/91 7.34   6.75 (7.97)   7.04 (4.13)   6.59 (10.22) 
1991/92 7.72   7.16 (7.27)   7.48 (3.10)   7.02 (9.13) 
1992/93 7.70   7.09 (7.92)   7.49 (2.73)   6.95 (9.69) 
1993/94 7.50   6.73 (10.29)   7.12 (5.04)   6.49 (13.45) 
1994/95 7.46   6.31 (15.47)   6.70 (10.19)   6.06 (18.73) 
1995/96 7.44   6.27 (15.70)   6.75 (9.30)   6.03 (19.01) 
1996/97 7.14   5.68 (20.51)   6.14 (14.0)   5.42 (24.14) 
1997/98 6.94   6.13 (11.64)   6.60 (4.86)   5.85 (15.66) 
† Prices exclude the effect of VAT which was imposed in April 1994 on domestic electricity sales. 
* Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes, various editions. 
 
Table 5 shows that differing assumptions within the counterfactual can produce substantial 
differences in the results.    The contrasting extreme counterfactuals show a similar trend and 
distribution to the author’s preferred counterfactual, without changing the indication of the 
results.  The main difference between the series is the size of the differential achieved during 
the period of interest. 
 
However, by calculating this analysis of the domestic price, we have illustrated that even 
when using an extremely pessimistic view of possible CEGB performance, prices in the 
privatised industry would seem significantly higher than those that might have been charged 
by a publicly owned industry.  Indeed, the extremely optimistic series shows the differences 
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to peak at a massive 24.14% in 1996/97, although the results of the preferred series (e.g. 
20.51% for 1996/97) are favoured by the author.  A similar sensitivity analysis was also 
conducted on industrial electricity prices, but this showed similar results to the analysis on 
domestic prices and so was felt to be of little value.   
 
V.v Beyond the Study 
The results presented above indicate that the differential between actual prices and those 
predicated for the counterfactual narrowed in the last year of the study.  We believe that it is 
likely that this process would continue after the sample period for a number of reasons.  The 
price controls for the years after the study are significantly stronger than those imposed in the 
early part of the 1990’s, which should ensure that the actual price of electricity continues to 
fall. In addition, in September 1998 the market for electricity supply was fully opened to 
competition (OFFER, 1998, p.17), which should provide additional downward pressure on 
actual electricity prices in future years. The counterfactual price of electricity might be 
expected to fare less well since some of the older coal fired stations would have to be replaced 
with new gas fired plant.  It would therefore be expected that the actual price of electricity 
will decline relative to the price that might be charged by a publicly owned industry.  Indeed, 
it is not impossible that the situation will be reversed, and that the privatised industry would 
provide the cheaper electricity. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Building a counterfactual for likely actions of a publicly owned electricity sector, we have 
shown that privatisation has resulted in prices significantly above those that might have been 
charged had the industry remained in public ownership.  By concentrating on price alone, this 
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Chapter restricts its analysis to consumer surplus, while welfare as a whole is constituted by 
consumer and producer surplus.  Since it has been assumed that the amount of electricity sold 
remains the same (i.e. own price elasticity of electricity is zero), the effect of privatisation has 
been to reduce consumer surplus while the effect on producer surplus, and hence total surplus, 
is indeterminate.    However, it is observed that profits have increased dramatically since 
privatisation, while at the same time a significant part of the industry has been sold to foreign 
utility companies, transferring a notable amount of these profits out of the country.  When the 
producers were domestically owned, some of the profits and hence producer surplus would be 
transferred back to the consumer in the form of dividends, but now any dividends would 
accrue to the foreign owners.  
 
The result might have been different had we not assumed that the own price elasticity of 
electricity was zero, but instead allowed both price and quantity to vary.  For example 
Brenton's (1997) estimate of an elasticity of –0.7 for rich countries, together with decreased 
domestic prices of 20.51% (1996/97) would have resulted in demand increasing by 14.36%.
35
  
This changing price and demand would clearly have affected the size of total surplus and thus 
would have given a better indication of the desirability of privatisation. 
 
This Chapter also concentrates entirely on the electricity sector when evaluating privatisation 
and thus does not take into account any spillover effects on other markets. For example, 
electricity privatisation has had a considerable impact on the British coal mining industry, 
since it has caused a precipitous decline that might otherwise have been avoided.  Therefore 
                                                 
35
 Although elasticity estimates, and hence quantity changes, are not likely to be stable for such large changes 
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electricity prices should only be one element of a wider picture when analysing the success or 
failure of privatisation. 
 
However, despite their limited scope, the results presented clearly indicate that privatisation 
may well have resulted in prices that are significantly in excess of the prices that might have 
been charged with continued public ownership.  This would imply that privatisation has failed 
to live-up to the promises of successive governments, who have stated that consumers have 
benefited from this process.  Indeed the results also intimate that it is the domestic consumers 
who have born the heaviest burden, since they have endured the higher relative price rises.  
This bias is also borne out in the analysis of industry profits, which reveals that sales to 
domestic consumers account for 61.65% of total profits but only 35% of sales. 
 
Since electricity prices appear to have been ‘excessive’ since the late 1980’s, the cumulative 
cost to both consumer groups of this privatisation inadequacy is significant. Calculations 
using the results presented indicate that by 1997/98 consumers have paid an additional 
£16,134 million in electricity charges.
36
  It would seem that the cause of these high prices can 
be broadly attributed to the specific structure of privatisation and the subsequent operation of 
the market it created. Future privatisations in Great Britain, or elsewhere, take note. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 This figure is calculated by using the yearly price differential indicated by the preferred counterfactual series 
multiplied by the amount of electricity sold in each year. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
 
I. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 
In light of recent corporate scandals surrounding the likes of Enron, Worldcom and Tyco, we 
sought to add to the debate first started by Berle and Means (1932) as to how corporations are 
governed and by whom.   Our core premise was that only when all interested groups have the 
ability to assert influence on governance, might outcomes be framed as truly representing the 
public interest. The central concern of Part One was therefore the current governance 
mechanisms of corporations, whether these lead to public interest outcomes, and thus 
appropriate public policy responses.   
 
Part Two pursued a related line of research on privatisation.  Whilst there was some tension 
between these two avenues, privatisation is fundamentally about governance since it is the 
transfer of activities from the public sector into the private sector, and therefore from public to 
private control.  Moreover, privatisation is a process during which many changes often occur.  
As we have demonstrated by reference to electricity reform in Mexico, it therefore presents an 
opportunity to make the fundamental governance changes as suggested by the first line of our 
research.  In making such fundamental changes, lessons need to be learned from existing or 
recent privatisations, and it is this that was the second focus of our research. 
 
I.i Part One: Public Interest Decision-Making 
After introducing the concept of strategic decisions, we suggested that because these decisions 
determine the broad direction of a corporation, to control them is in essence to control the 
firm.  This result was then positioned within the context of existing literature on the nature of 
corporate control as conceptualised in the world’s major economies.  We concluded that even 
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though significant differences exist between the corporate governance systems examined, the 
central result is the same.  Shareholder power rests with a small group of inordinately 
powerful shareholders, who together with higher management and the board of directors, 
form a select few who control the strategic decision-making process, and by extension, the 
corporation. 
 
Using utility companies as a practical illustration, we then explored the significance of the 
modern corporation being controlled by an elite.  We suggested that preferences over strategic 
decisions vary between those who have an interest in the activities of a particular company, 
and given self-interested decision-making, this implies that the elite will take decisions in 
their own best interests and thus not those of the wider public; that strategic failure exists.     
 
To address this concern, we examined a number of policy measures that might be taken to 
ensure companies serve the public interest.  Our main suggestion was to increase participation 
in the decision-making process; to democratise decision-making.  One possibility raised was 
that companies be controlled by their members, where members consist of all of those 
different groups who have a specific interest in the activities of a particular company. More 
immediate ways forward were also considered. 
 
As a practical illustration of these ideas on economic democracy, we then considered the 
topical case of electricity reform in Mexico. One avenue for privatisation was presented 
which sought to marry economic efficiency with principles of democratic decision-making.  
Our specific idea was that Mexican pension funds have the potential to play a key role in such 
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a process, although direct input from ordinary citizens via a variety of channels and 
mechanisms, is also vital. 
 
In order to provide a contrasting illustration of our conclusions on governance and the public 
interest, we then switched focus from the example of utility companies, to consider corporate 
universities.  After investigating the nature of these organisations, we drew upon an original 
survey and telephone interviews concerning the corporate universities of the FTSE 100 
companies in order to investigate the possibility of their elite control.  Our findings suggested 
British corporate universities are controlled by a subset of those with an interest in their 
activities and that this subset is closely associated with the elite controlling their parent 
company. 
 
In short, Part One utilised the strategic decision-making approach to the theory of the firm to 
re-visit the topic of corporate control so as to gain new insight into the nature of appropriate 
public policy. 
 
II.ii Part Two: British Electricity Privatisation 
In Part Two, we turned our attention to the reorganisation and privatisation of the electricity 
sector in Britain, in order to explore some practical lessons to be learned from past 
privatisations.  After introducing the British electricity sector, we considered a number of 
aspects surrounding the emergence of the so-called independent power producers (IPPs) in the 
market of England and Wales.  Original telephone interviews with those closely involved with 
the IPPs were heavily utilised within this investigation.  The evidence presented suggested 
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that these IPPs have not done the job that they were originally intended for, but have instead 
had a number of unforeseen consequences. 
 
In order to investigate the issue of privatisation and electricity pricing, we then developed a 
counterfactual scenario for the likely decisions of a publicly owned industry.  This 
counterfactual allowed comparisons between the prices actually observed and those that might 
have been charged had the industry not been privatised.  Our conclusion was that observed 
electricity prices are significantly higher than those that would have been charged had the 
industry remained in public ownership.  Furthermore, we found that domestic consumers were 
especially unfortunate in that the cost differentials in this category were significantly greater 
than for industrial users. 
  
In short, Part Two examined aspects of electricity reorganisation and privatisation in Britain, 
in order to gain lessons for future reforms in this sector.  The issue of independent power 
producers in England and Wales was investigated, as was the effect of privatisation upon the 
electricity prices charged to final users. 
 
II. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
II.i Immediate Concerns 
The application of the strategic decision-making theory of the firm has given new insights 
into the control of modern corporations, and thus their impact upon society.   The possibilities 
for future research in this area are therefore numerous.  Most obviously, further sector specific 
investigations are required in order to develop our understanding of the exact nature of elite 
control in different contexts, countries or industries, or to explore how principles of 
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democratic decision-making might be practically implemented in different contexts.  
Consequently, additional policies might be devised which will more effectively engender 
democratic decision-making (either in those specific contexts, or for application more 
widely). 
 
Furthermore, investigations into the success (or failure) of implemented measures to broaden 
the governance of corporations are also warranted so that lessons can be learned as to what 
policies work and what do not.  In this regard the future of the British not-for-profit railway 
infrastructure company, Network Rail, is especially interesting given that it includes public 
interest members (although it remains to be seen what their function will be in practice).   
Investigations of similar examples in other countries is also an attractive possibility. 
  
These two extensions to the work contained herein are our immediate concern, but one 
attractive possibility is to explore the boundaries and extent of strategic decisions, the process 
by which such decisions are made in these contexts, and thus their wider impact upon society. 
 
II.ii Strategic Decision-Making Beyond the Modern Corporation 
The focus of this dissertation has been on strategic decision-making within the modern 
corporation. However, we believe that strategic decision-making is neither confined to the 
modern corporation nor merely to the traditional concern of production, since all forms of 
organisation require governance.  We therefore suggest that many non-corporate institutions 
and organisations will take strategic decisions as a habitual part of their activities.  Without 
such decisions to (amongst other things) establish the broad plans to guide them, such 
institutions and organisations would lack focus and direction, given that they could not have 
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any clear aims or goals for activities with which they are associated.  For example, charities 
have to decide upon which causes to support and how to generate the associated funds, 
publicly funded schools and universities have to decide how to best use their limited 
resources, and foundations have to decide upon how to invest their endowments. 
 
The significance of strategic decisions within the non-corporate sector would seem to be very 
similar to their connotation within the corporate sector.  Different interested groups will be 
differently affected by all the possible strategic decisions, and will therefore have their own 
preferences over which should be taken.  Given the standard economic assumption of self-
interested behaviour, to control the strategic decision-making process of a non-corporate 
entity is to control the impact of that organisation upon society.   Strategic failure may 
therefore not be confined to the corporate sector but could instead extend to any organisation 
or institution that habitually takes strategic decisions. 
 
The investigation of the decision-making structures of non-corporate entities is therefore a 
natural extension of the work contained herein.  Furthermore, situations where corporate and 
non-corporate organisations or institutions interact may have additional significance.  In line 
with these ideas, one potentially interesting avenue for further study that we aim to pursue is 
the specific case of the Health Industry.   
 
II.iii The Health Industry 
Personal health, or indeed the health of a society more generally, might be seen as being 
fundamental to life, given that without it, individuals are unable to fulfil their economic or 
social potential. Consequently, healthcare provision is integral to positive freedom - the 
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ability to be a someone, a do-er deciding, not an individual being decided for (Berlin, 1969).  
It might therefore be regarded as a particularly important sector, and accordingly, one that 
merits immediate consideration in terms of democratic decision-making.
1
 
 
Following Di Tommasso and Schweitzer (2001), the health industry might be viewed as 
consisting of all the corporations and other institutions or organisations that are in some way 
involved in healthcare related activities.  Our previous conclusions as to the governance of 
corporations are therefore of relevance, but they need to be supplemented by investigations in 
to the strategic decision-making processes of the non-corporate elements, such as public or 
not-for-profit hospitals, private trusts and charitable foundations.  The interaction of the 
corporate and non-corporate elements might also warrant further investigation.   
 
The possibility of applying a strategic decision-making approach to the governance of this 
sector is evident, given the number of corporations involved and the fact that strategic 
decisions are readily observable in the non-corporate settings.  For example, in countries 
where the university sector is state funded, the decision as to how many doctor, nurse or other 
medical training places to support is a strategic decision that takes place outside a corporation. 
The number of staff trained will have a significant impact upon the ability of the health 
industry as a whole to provide appropriate medical services.  Without a continuous supply of 
new staff, the industry would be unable to fulfil its obligation of providing medical care to 
local communities.  Indeed, a similar situation also exists in hospitals where various different 
types of appointments exist.  The number of appointments available, and the balance between 
medical professionals who are continuing their education and those who have special skills to 
                                                 
1
 The amount of resources devoted to healthcare also highlights the significance and importance of this sector. 
The United States, for example, spent 13% of GDP on health in 2000, whilst the same figure was 10.6% in 
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teach, again determines how the industry is able to provide its services both now and in the 
future.  Other examples of strategic decision-making in the corporate and non-corporate parts 
of the health industry are also easily discernible. 
 
The variation in interests surrounding the choice of strategic decisions is also readily 
observable in the (corporate and non-corporate parts of the) health industry. Consider, for 
example, the election of Richard Taylor to the British parliament, for the constituency of 
Wyre Forest.  Taylor, standing for the Independent Kidderminster Hospital and Health 
Concern Party, was protesting against the downgrading of the public hospital in 
Kidderminster, and the relocation of its accident and emergency unit to a hospital 12 miles 
away.  Dr Taylor’s unhappiness with this strategic decision was clearly widely felt in the local 
community, because the incumbent Labour party (which formed the national government, in 
turn controlling the hospital in question) saw its 26,843 votes in the previous election in 1997 
(which gave labour a majority of 6,946) collapse to just 10,857 votes, giving Dr Taylor a 
massive majority of 17,630.
2
  A significant number of local people clearly held a view of the 
strategic decision to downgrade Kidderminster hospital, a view at odds with that of the actual 
decision-makers. 
 
Within a broad topic such as the governance of the health industry, the detailed analysis of 
particular features or aspects might be seen as being appropriate.  Current evidence suggests 
that one potentially interesting option would be an investigation of the governance of the 
healthcare sector of England and Wales.  Hutton (2000, p.1) reports on a survey carried out in 
March 2000, which indicates that 63% of people questioned thought Britain’s National Health 
                                                                                                                                                        
Germany, 9.3% in France and 7.3% in the UK (OECD, 2002). 
2
 See “Doctor wins by healthy margin in Wyre Forest”, The Times, June 8
th
 2001. 
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Service (NHS) to be the ‘most valuable institution’ in the country.
3
  However, only 4% of 
people thought that the NHS provides a good service that cannot be improved, whilst 62% 
believed that it requires to be improved ‘quite a lot’ or ‘needs a great deal of improvement’ 
(Hutton, 2000, p.3). 
 
The relevance of this to our focus on control and decision-making is that for such a treasured 
national institution, only 36% of the people surveyed believed that the NHS was run ‘in an 
open way and consults the public’ (Hutton, 2000, p.126).   This indicates that strategic 
decision-making within the NHS might not be democratic, but could rather be the preserve of 
an elite.  Indeed, 77% of people thought they had little or no power over their medical 
treatment, whilst 55% of people thought they should have a lot of power in this respect, and 
only 3% of people thought they should have no power at all (Hutton, 2000, p.5, p.126/127).  
These apparent concerns with governance, and the fact that the British government has 
committed itself to a period of reform and increasing NHS spending by 6.1% in real terms 
(Hutton, 2000, p.3), make this an especially interesting and topical case for investigation.  
Comparisons with other countries might also be beneficial.  In line with this, specific research 
possibilities exist surrounding the success or failure of the proposed ‘foundation hospitals’ in 
England and Wales, which will be independent not-for-profit organisations accountable to the 
communities in which they operate.
4
   
 
 
                                                 
3
 As Hutton (2000, p.1) outlines “the NHS is tasked to provide equal care to every British citizen on the basis of 
their equal need, irrespective of where they live or how much they earn.  The service is publicly owned and 
accountable, and is almost wholly financed by general taxation.”  Moreover, it is interesting to note that the next 
highest institution after the NHS in this poll was Parliament, with only 12% of people voting this the most 
valuable. 
4
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2564281.stm 
 221 
II.iv Electricity Privatisation 
Given the importance of a privatisation as a policy (both in terms of a mechanism to increase 
democratic control but also as a widely implemented current industrial policy), further 
investigations and analysis of past or proposed privatisations are also an attractive possibility 
for future research.  Similar investigations to those contained herein could be conducted on 
electricity privatisations in other countries, or within the contexts of other (utility) industries, 
both within the UK and in other countries.  Furthermore, given the continuing changes and 
evolution of the British electricity industry since privatisation, other research possibilities 
exist within this sector.  To name two out of any number of possibilities, the effects of NETA 
(New Electricity Trading Arrangements) needs to be further analysed (perhaps within the 
context of possible democratic privatisation solutions), or the current difficulties experienced 
by the nuclear generation sector suggest the need for a focussed investigation.   
 
III. FINAL THOUGHTS 
We have raised a number of crucial issues herein, and the implications of these are both 
significant and numerous.  Most prominent amongst these is the nature of elite control of the 
corporation and perhaps other organisations, and the need to address this by broadening 
participation in the governance process.  Whilst we have suggested some ways that this might 
be achieved, it is imperative that they are developed further, and other avenues and 
possibilities be explored.  This exploration needs imagination and originality if it is to be the 
innovative and iconoclastic process required to make public interest decision-making a 
reality.  Hopefully we have provided the foundations for such a process, or at the very least, 
highlighted the need for it. 
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While many of the issues and/or implications raised by the work contained herein are 
important and might be discussed at some length, one that warrants special and immediate 
comment is the implied importance of education.  Citizens need to be appropriately educated, 
encouraged and nurtured so that they can think about, develop and penetrate the governance 
processes that impinge upon their lives.  It would be relatively meaningless at best, or 
counterproductive at worst, if civic society were to (be allowed to) participate in governance 
processes if they did not have the education required to make a meaningful contribution.   
 
The enablement of society should therefore not be seen as simply extending the right to 
participate.  It also needs to include the provision of appropriate (formal and informal) mass 
education and learning, based around the intelligence of each and every person, on the 
nurturing of active citizens with the ability to think about and therefore participate fully in the 
governance processes.  Recognising this, new potential may be unlocked, leading to 
unexpected possibilities and new outcomes, not only for corporations but also for individuals 
and for society.  Only such appropriately educated and active citizens can demand and assure 
that good governance prevails.  They are the key to a free economy, to an economy governed 
in the public interest. 
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APPENDIX A 
Defining a Corporate University 
Table A1 
A Summary of Meister’s View of the Key Differences Between a Training Department and a 
Corporate University 
 
Training Department  Corporate University 
Reactive Focus Proactive 
Fragmented & Decentralised Organisation Cohesive and Centralised 
Tactical Scope Strategic 
Little/ None Buy-In Management and Employee 
Instructor-Led Delivery Experience with Various Technologies 
Training Director Owner Business Unit Managers 
Wide Audience/ Limited Depth Audience Customised Curricula for Job Families 
Open Enrolment Enrolment Just-In-Time Learning 
Increase in Job Skills Outcome Increase in Performance On-The-Job 
Operates as a Staff Function Operation Operates as a Business Unit 
“Go Get Trained” Image “University as Metaphor for Learning” 
Trainer Dictated Marketing Consultative Selling 
Source: Meister (1998b), p.23 
 
Table  A2 
Meister’s General Organisational Principles and Goals for a Corporate University 
 
 
1. Provide learning opportunities that support the organisation’s critical business issues. 
 
2. Consider the corporate university model a process rather than a place of learning. 
 
3. Design a curriculum to incorporate the three Cs: Corporate citizenship. Contextual 
framework, and Core competencies. 
 
4. Train the value chain, including customers, distributors, product suppliers, and the 
universities that provide tomorrow’s workers. 
 
5. Move from instructor-led training to multiple formats of delivering learning. 
 
6. Encourage leaders to be involved with and facilitate learning. 
 
7. Move from a corporate allocation funding model to one ‘self-funded’ by the business 
units. 
 
8. Assume a global focus in developing learning solutions. 
 
9. Create a measurement system to evaluate outputs as well as inputs 
 
10. Utilise the corporate university for competitive advantage and entry into new markets. 
Source: Meister (1998b), pp.30/31 
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APPENDIX B 
Corporate University Interviews 
 
Table B1 
The Core Questions used in the Semi-Structured Telephone Interviews 
 
• Can you tell me what your company does in the area of Corporate Universities (CU)? 
How long has your Corporate University (CU) been in operation? 
• What was the thinking behind your company’s decision to create a CU?   
• Why not use an existing university to provide the training needs of your organisation? 
• Is your CU run totally separately from the parent organisation?  
• What is the structure of the CU? 
• Is it simply to provide training, or is it directly integrated with the company strategy, 
implementing this in the way it is organised, and executes training and/or research? 
• Who is your CU aimed at? 
• Does your CU accept students from outside your organisation? 
• How does your CU work?  What sorts of courses does it offer? 
• Does your CU provide any widely recognised qualifications, e.g. BSc, MBA? 
• If so, by whom are these certified? 
• How are the contents of these (or other) courses agreed upon? 
• Who teaches on the courses run by the CU? 
• Does your CU engage in active research? If so, who determines the research agenda? 
• Are researchers allowed to publish/make known the results of research conducted, in the 
normal academic way? 
• Is there any significance to the name you have chosen for your CU? 
 
 
 
Transcript of Interview with John Smith of XYZ Group plc
1
 
 
Rob = Interviewer 
John = Interviewee 
 
Greeting, introductions and permission to tape interview received. 
 
Rob OK, if we can just sort of start off with the focus of the university.  In that handout 
you said it was just for [company name] – is it the case that it is literally just the staff 
of the group or can any partners as it were join in? 
 
John At the moment it has to be – one of the rules if you like by which we are allowed to 
call ourselves a university is that we are not allowed to trade as a university which 
means we can’t offer our services outside those who work for [company name]. 
 
Rob You said the rule – whose rule is that? 
                                                 
1
 The names of the interviewee and company have been changed in order to protect the identity of those 
concerned. 
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John Governmental rule.  We spoke at some length with the department for education as it 
was at the same and said look, this is what we want to do, are there any rules…… 
because actually the use of the term university is quite jealously guarded by the 
universities.  They are scared of young whipper snappers coming in and sort of calling 
themselves universities when they are not.  In order to do that, we had to confirm that 
one, we would only make things available to people working within [company name] 
and secondly that we wouldn’t issue any qualifications in our own name, so you can’t 
get a degree from the University for [company name]. 
 
Rob OK, but you do do courses where you get a qualifications from external  …. 
 
John We will work with academic universities to produce courses, yeah. 
 
Rob When you say work with them, does that mean you have a partnership with a 
particular one, and they just accredit or are they involved with the teaching and 
delivery? 
 
John They can be involved with the teaching and delivery.  With the University of Warwick 
for example, Warwick Business School, we do quite a lot of work with them on the 
operations area and they are a very good – that is not your university is it? 
 
Rob No, I am at Birmingham but I was at Warwick before actually. 
 
John Ahh, right, OK.  They are very good on the operations –they are one the best 
operations management universities that we have got in Britain.  Between us and them 
we have worked an operations management course together which does involve some 
teaching from Warwick and some teaching from our own people and some access to 
web based learning etc. etc.  But ultimately it produces a University of Warwick and 
University for [company name], if you like, a shared qualification but it is in the name 
of Warwick University. 
 
Rob OK, I have got you.  That seems like quite a high level qualification… 
 
John Yeah that is an operational management certificate.  It is really horses for courses Rob.  
We will work with any awarding body if we think it is appropriate.  We don’t need to 
work with an awarding body.  We are big enough as we are to …. We can produce 
certification or a certificate of learning to confirm that someone has been through a 
University for [company name] course, but it is not something that you quote on your 
CV as such.  But we work with for example, City and Guilds to produce a customer 
service qualification, we work with the institute of financial services and chartered 
insurance institute to produce some of our sales financial consultant qualifications – 
those are externally qualifications that any financial consultant working in any 
financial arena has to have.  We have worked with Sheffield Hallam University to 
produce a coaching qualifications, so there is a lot of them but we don’t feel that we 
have to.  It is actually quite an expensive way to go about it, and we need to be sure 
that the money we are spending is – the greatest possible benefit for the greatest 
number of people type of approach. 
 226 
 
Rob So it is getting, as the Americans would say, “as much bang for your buck” as you can 
as it were? 
 
John Yes absolutely. 
 
Rob In a sense I can see that is one of the objectives and I can see that on the sheet, and the 
second one you said was to develop a closer link between learning etc. and the needs 
of the business.  Were they the only two goals behind the decision? 
 
John Essentially yeah.  What happened, to slightly go back a bit in the history which we 
perhaps didn’t go into in the sheet, when [company] and [name] bolted themselves 
together in, well it started in 1995 but it really happened in 1997/98, we decided that 
we needed a new training strategy for the new merged group and we needed a training 
strategy that was new and different and vibrant and didn’t really look back in either 
direction to old [company] or old [name].  At the time the University for Industry was 
just setting up and the whole concept of life long learning and the learning age 
document which presumably you are aware of and have had a look at, and the 
Corporate University movement, if you like, was just beginning to get a foothold in 
the UK.  There were about 4 or 5 of them in those days – they were places like British 
Aerospace, Unisys and Motorola, and Unipart, so there weren’t very many.  We had a 
look at them and we decided that this was the way that we wanted to go and we were 
adamant that wanted to call ourselves a university because it was different and because 
we did want to make a stamp.  The term university was more about the fact that it was 
universal - it was using the term university in its widest sense so it was a university 
that everybody could go to.  So from someone coming into the bank as a brand new 
entrant, I think it is quite a powerful message for them to hear that the first they are 
going to receive is some development through something called the University for 
[company name]. 
 
Rob OK, so in a sense you could perhaps put a third point on the objectives, to show this to 
your staff as a positive thing? 
 
John Well, there is something around profile.  There is also something around managing 
and developing talent.  That sort of got added on afterwards – on the sheet you got 
some details around the centre for career management and career management 
activities that we sort of got involved in. 
 
Rob I guess going back to the point about the business needs - how are they reflected in the 
University then?  You mention there was a close link but how was that close link 
fostered? 
 
John I think the thing that articulates that the best is the way we govern the university, and 
that is the strategy board which consists of half a dozen directors who are either on the 
main board or one stop removed from the main board and they are there as a business 
representation to make sure that we have an overall university and learning strategy 
and agenda that meets what the business wants. 
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Rob OK, so the learning is very much guided by what the business needs….  
 
John so the learning is very much guided by the direction in which the business is going, 
and then developing and subdividing if you like, all the key learning areas into what 
we call faculties and then appointing again a senior director as a head of each of those 
faculties in a sort of honorary capacity but we do expect them to work for the money.  
Well we don’t pay them any money but they do have to work for the title. 
 
Rob OK, so they have to integrate what their business needs into ….. 
 
John So they then have to be aware of the needs of the business but it is the group wide 
needs of the business not just the function they serve.  So for example, we have a 
faculty of IT because we can see that the need to be able to develop IT skills and 
capabilities is important for us going forward.  The head of the that faculty is the chap 
who is the director of group IT, so again one stop off the board really, but we have to 
be careful to make sure that he doesn’t develop, or try to develop, that faculty only to 
suit his own people, i.e. the people that are specialists working in IT.  It is as much 
there for – we keep sort of referring to this poor lady, Betty, in Banbury.  She must be 
incredibly busy because she keeps getting all the training we are forever talking about, 
but we have got to be as aware for poor old Betty that she needs IT skills as somebody 
who is sitting in an IT department needing to develop programming or architectural 
skills.   
 
Rob OK, I see.  So is this strategy board the head or is there a single figurehead of the 
university? 
 
John There is a head of the University. 
 
Rob OK, who do they report to?  
 
John They report to the group HR business director, who is effectively the group HR 
Operations director in most other parlance. 
 
Rob OK, so basically the head guy is very senior 
 
John Yeah. 
 
Rob You mention there about having faculties and so on.  That is sort of seems to be the 
normal phrases for what I would call a more traditional university.  Would you say the 
it is set-up is fairly traditionally university orientated or is it quite business perhaps 
….. 
 
John There are reflections of an academic university in that as I say, we have faculties, we 
have a curriculum framework that we operate, but in some respects that is pretty much 
there are the top level for the way we choose to govern the university.  We try very 
hard not to use those terms if we can help it when we are talking to Betty in Banbury 
because she has probably never been anywhere near a university and probably doesn’t 
actually feel comfortable using that terminology.  So when it is actually made manifest 
 228 
to her, what she will still see is – it is still called University for [company name] but 
she will see learn about IT or learn about operations, or something like that.  It will 
make some, maybe oblique reference to the fact that there is a faculty of operations 
that is running all this, but it is actually learn about what operations is all about and 
how operations is required in your job and how you can get better at it. 
 
Rob OK, got you.   I am fairly curious then as to what you see as the main difference 
between an academic university as you have just described it and your university?  
You said you were keen to use this term…… 
 
John I would say that there are two main differences.  One is the ability to award 
qualifications in your own right, and the other is probably around research.  We do an 
element of research but we certainly don’t…. ,  I wouldn’t say, where as a academic 
university would sort of exist for the furtherance of the theoretical of research into 
learning, we don’t indulge too much into that other than where it is a by product of 
what we are doing anyway. 
 
Rob OK, so the research is the real perhaps difference as it were? 
 
John Yes, I would say so.  We link in to pieces of research and in order to stay ahead of the 
field we need to keep pretty much abreast of what the big issues are but you wouldn’t 
find us, for example,  setting up a piece of work specifically researching into, I don’t 
know, the way people learn or something like that.  What we will do is maybe found 
out what the research is about the way people learn and then we may then use that as a 
catalyst as the way we develop things internally, but ultimately we have to bear in 
mind that we are hear to make people in [company name] better at what they do. 
 
Rob So it is more of a training function as it were than a knowledge generator? 
 
John No I wouldn’t say ….. it is a learning function because we are making many more 
things that are available to our people than pure training. 
 
Rob OK, yeah, but it is generally improving the skill level of your staff? 
 
John Yes, in that respect, yes. 
 
Rob You said you do, do a little bit of research, I was just curious, generally speaking, as 
someone who works in an academic university there is quite a bit of freedom into how 
you pursue that research.  Would you say that people involved in your university have 
that same freedom or is it very much ….. 
 
John To an extent.  It depends on the role I think.  I am probably more involved with that 
then most and I can probably choose the bits that I go for but I have to justify what I 
am doing.  No one is going to ask me why are you going to that meeting, but if I spend 
a lot of time….. one of the ways I do research is by looking at what other 
organisations are doing.  I am not so fussed about what is coming out of academic 
universities but I am interested in what British Aerospace University are doing. I am 
interesting in how Rolls Royce are doing some of the things that they are doing, and I 
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am interested in getting around a table and talking to other users and other corporates 
who have got the same problems as I have, and finding out how they get around them.  
9 times out of 10 I don’t get much out of it but every now and then I get a little nugget 
that says, yeah actually if Rolls Royce are doing it that way and we are very close to 
doing that, then there is a very small step between us being where we are, and really 
taking things on a stage further. 
 
Rob So it is very much focussed research, perhaps, on relevant on things that you can 
perhaps ….. 
 
John Yeah, we certainly wouldn’t just follow a wimsy as it were in terms of our research.  It 
would pretty much be something we would agree in conjunction with the faculty head 
or internally within the university as something we wanted to look at. 
 
Rob  So there is very much an accountability in your actions? 
 
John I think so.  I mean, one of the things we are looking at at the moment is the concept of 
learning to learn, for example.  You know, how individuals, not just how they learn, 
but how they learn to be able to learn because there are so many different ways of 
learning now.  Far more ways of learning than there were 5- 10 years ago.   Web and 
even M learning, mobile telephone learning coming up and experiencial learning is 
there more than ever and there is huge value in informal learning that people probably 
don’t actually manage to realise quite how much of that they are doing.  
 
Rob You mentioned about learning for learning – I remember that I talked to someone else 
who is involved in a Corporate University and they said they actually arranged for one 
of their staff to do a bricklaying course, not because that was particularly relevant to 
their business, but because they wanted to foster the whole learning ethos.  Does your 
University subscribe to that? 
 
John We don’t to be honest.  We’ve sort of danced around that.  Ford and Rover are the two 
that come to my mind, particularly when Rover many years ago said right we are 
going to give all of our staff whatever it was, £200, and they can go off and learning 
basket weaving if they want to, and Ford did something similar a few years back.  
Now I don’t know, maybe I am bit too hard nosed on this, but my view is that if they 
want to learn basket weaving they can go and do that at college in their own time but 
what I want to do is to make people better at their jobs and also more employable. 
There is a bit of me who says there is a lot of people at ford who went out and learned 
how to play golf – well now they have got an awful lot more time to play golf in and I 
bet they’re perhaps wishing they had developed a few business skills because now 
they are out of a job, it might have made it slightly easier to get back into one.  So, we 
have adopted, we have slightly bastardised the term lifelong learning and we use the 
term career-long learning within [company name], on the basis that we can’t give you 
learning for life because you don’t necessarily touch us for all your life.   You know 
we have people who come in and stay with us for 6 months sometimes, you know, in a 
call centre environments and then go out.  We don’t want them to – we would like 
them to stay a bit longer but that is the nature of things.  We have some people who 
are with us for 40 years, an entire career, so what we need to be able to do is to make 
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sure that as and when they do touch us, we provide them with the best quality 
development that a) makes them better at the jobs they are doing, but also gives them 
something to feel they have bettered themselves because they have touched us. 
 
Rob It was interesting there that you talked about people dipping in and out and leaving or 
what have you.  If you were giving people dipping in and out as it were, or leaving and 
what have you, if you are giving people accredited skills externally, those skills are 
fairly portable, I mean is there any way you try to lock those staff into you to make 
them stay as it were, as opposed to using the qualifications they get through you to 
move to a ‘rival company (named)’? 
 
John No not really.    To be honest it is a frequent question that if you develop your staff 
that you are developing them up to leave, and no I am not actually.  My view is that if 
you develop people up so that they could leave you, actually they won’t, because a lot 
of people would rather work for an organisation that is going to give them 
development than for an organisation that isn’t.  So actually yes you are always going 
to find some people who go, but on the whole, people would prefer to work in an 
organisation where moral and motivation is high, and moral and motivation is highest 
in organisations that put a lot of time effort and money into developing the people. 
 
Rob I guess I am taking quite a lot of your time here, but one final question.  Going back to 
the very beginning you said about the term university and how hard it was for you to 
get that.  I am just kind of interested in why you decided to go for that term as opposed 
to say, College for [company name]? 
 
John   We looked at all of them.  We looked at College, we looked at academy, we looked at 
School.  I don’t know, I guess it was in a way flavour of the month.  In some respects 
you know, in hindsight, was it a mistake and there are still some people within the 
organisation that still think the university is there only for the people at the top of the 
organisation.  But it was really a case of making a statement of something that was 
very different, and college to me, or academy, they don’t say anything different.  I 
mean, BT set-up their university as an academy and to me BT academy doesn’t say 
anything different to me from University for [company name] in terms of its 
connotations and I would rather be called a University than an Academy, so on that 
basis it felt, and still feels the best of the possible descriptions. 
 
Rob  So in a sense it is a branding issue? 
 
John I think it is a branding issue and there was initially a lot of sniping even from within 
the organisation, in other words all you have done is re-branded training and 
development, and actually yeah we did and I don’t apologise for the fact that it was to 
some extent a re-badging exercise but it was more than that.  It need to be re-badged 
because actually what you had got out there at the time was a whole load of individual 
training departments in business units doing a whole load of things that were all 
branded differently, they all talked in a different language, they all looked different.  
So if you went out to a branch, and we did a bit of this when we did the initial 
research, and we asked people in the branches what did they think of the training you 
get, and they said we don’t get much of it to be honest.  Well why is that then? Well 
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we don’t seem to get much – we were spending £30m on training people at that time.  
We are spending more now.  The fact was that every time that training came down to 
them it looked different, and it didn’t necessarily look like training.  What is this then?  
That is not training, that is just to help me do my job properly.  Well isn’t that 
training?  It was produced by the training department but because it came down 
looking just like a communication, it wasn’t considered to be training.  And they were 
saying that unless I am off my seat and in some sort of residential training centre, I 
don’t consider it to be training.  Well we can’t train everyone like that – we have got 
80,000 people and we can not put 80,000 through some sort of face to face residential 
training programme each year.  We just don’t have the money or resource to do it, and 
there are better ways of doing it, because you don’t need to give people face to face 
training for certain types of development particularly if it is just around knowledge, so 
what is the case now is that everything they receive looks …. It doesn’t look the same 
because we do make little subtle changes to it, but on the whole it will all have the 
overall branding pattern of the University for [company name]. 
 
Rob so it is presented in a way which makes people …… 
 
John so it is all consistently presented so when you go to then now and say tell me about the 
University of [company name] they have usually got something they can point to and 
say it does that or does that.  They may still not be using it, but a lot of them are – 
usage is very good and certainly the feedback we get through staff attitude surveys 
shows us that staff perception and understanding of a) of training available to them, of 
b) of accessibility of learning and c) in terms of something to manage their careers is 
significantly better than back in 1999 before we launched the thing. 
 
Rob One final, final question here.  You sort of just mention there the way the training 
comes through.  I was just curious as to how it was delivered – before you said some 
of it was delivered by traditional university partners, but I mean is ever any of training 
ever delivered by managers working in the line or people already working in that job 
function? 
 
John Very occasionally.  In the main – we have reduced the number of instructional 
trainers, face to face trainers, over the last 2 or 3 years because we have been putting a 
lot of things through different routes.   We have got multimedia PCs which are out 
there now, we have got around 2,000 of those that people can go and learn from a CD-
ROM, probably without having to leave their branch, or certainly if they do, they 
would only have to travel for about 10 minutes to get to one, which compares to 
maybe leaving the office for a whole day to go to a face to face event.  Both the staff 
and the managers are happy with that because they are not loosing their staff for 
significant lengths of time.   We have got a corporate intranet which we put a lot of e-
knowledge really rather than e-learning down, or e-reference – it is little bite-sized 
pieces of learning that are just there.  I am not sure I understand such and such.  Well 
it is there and you can go on to the website and find out about it.  You don’t then to 
find a training course to learn that little bit.  We are looking at a buzz word which I 
don’t particularly like is blended solution which is taking what was originally a week 
long face to face intervention and saying well right OK, how much of that could we be 
doing in a different way.  So we will say there is an awful lot of knowledge up front 
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and there is stuff at the end that is just reflecting and revising the stuff you have 
learned and that can be taken out.  That can be done at the branch.  That can be done 
over the web, it can be done through a work book, it can be done through CD-ROM or 
whatever, and you can say right so what we need then is a two day course for people 
to go away to that just looks at the behavioural side of things and gives people the 
chance to practice some of the behavioural skills and maybe a follow up workshop 2 
or 3 weeks later just to check that these things are being embedded.  So it reduces your 
face to face intervention from 5 days to 3 days or even 2 days sometimes, which 
means we can through-put more people because if you have got a 90 bed college, and 
we have got 3 of those, if you have got 1, 1 week course running your throughput is 90 
people but if you can manage to put two courses at 2 days through each week and then 
suddenly your through put doubles so we are able to touch twice as many people by 
changing the way we deliver the learning. 
 
Rob Interesting.  How do you see the University developing in the future?  Has it reached 
its plateau for the time being, or …? 
 
John No, I don’t think it has.  I think there is an element of consolidation that we do need to 
do but I think we need to – I still don’t think that we have completely harnessed what 
technology can do for us.  I still think there is something we can significantly work on 
in terms of managing the knowledge that we have available to us and reporting that 
information back to the business.  There is an awful lot more we can do in terms of 
providing information, not just knowledge management but providing information to 
those that are governing the university.  I don’t think we have quite got that right yet 
so there is some sort of house-keeping bits we can improve.  I think we can certainly 
look at …. One of the things we are having to do at the moment is integrate more parts 
of the group into the university because we have done it gradually so 2 or 3 big parts 
of the University for [a group company] for example is just coming in so that is a big 
piece of activity.  So one of the things we are needing to do now is to have a better 
approach to our product management strategy because very time you integrate some 
more parts of the university you get all of the learning products that they have 
suddenly come into the central pot.  Now we rationalise and rationalise and rationalise 
and then suddenly we get another lot and so we are going to have to go through 
another rationalisation.  We are managing something like 400 products right now.  I 
would personally want to get that down significantly – probably to halve it actually 
over the next 12 to 18 months into much more modular based programmes that fit 
with the way we develop the curriculum better. 
 
Rob This really is my last question now – I know that [company name] isn’t a purely UK 
based thing.  Do you extend the facilities as it were to subsidiaries based overseas? 
 
John Yeah we do.  It is not a huge international organisation in the way that [rival company 
name] is, for example, but yeah the multimedia PCs we have got those available in …. 
Most of the international – certainly in S. America which is probably our biggest 
international presence.   The Internet and group intranet are both available 
internationally.  We very, very rarely will send a face to face trainer overseas because 
usually if it is face to face it is cheaper then frankly to purchase that thing locally and 
it probably has to be done in the local language anyway, because we employ quite a 
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lot of local workers.  We don’t have too many trainers who are fluent in Spanish or 
Portuguese to be frank to send them over to Argentina or Brazil.  
 
Rob So there is some but not much? 
 
John There is some but it is not considered a priority.  Our priority is probably to get the 50 
odd thousand people who work in the UK better at their jobs. 
 
Thanks and goodbye 
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APPENDIX C 
Electricity Privatisation Interviews 
 
Table C1 
The Core Questions used in the Semi-Structured Telephone Interviews 
 
• How important was the structure of the electricity sector in your company’s 
decision to enter the market for generation? 
• Would your company still have considered entering the market if the structure had 
been different?  If so, might have the size/nature of the involvement changed? (If 
possible, give a rough idea of how)  
• More specifically consider privatisation with the following structures and indicate 
your company’s possible response; 
 If generation had been privatised with 5 conventional generators? 
 If generation had been privatised with more than 20 conventional generators? 
 Generation structure privatised as the existing CEGB but with moves to make 
it easier for Independents to sell electricity into the system? 
 Generation unchanged with CEGB but National Grid separated and formation 
of electricity pool/spot market? 
 If the privatisation of the other electricity sectors had been different in some 
way e.g. The National Grid owned transmission and distribution networks? 
• How would your answers to the previous 5 questions be affected if the same 
structure was used but the industry remained in public ownership? 
• What about if direct bulk electricity contracts with the RECs were not allowed? 
• What about if generation ownership by the RECs was prohibited? 
• What about if there were limits on the capacity each firm could own? 
• Was technology a factor in your decision to enter? What other factors were there? 
 
 
Transcript of Interview with James Smith of PQR Electric Group
1
 
 
Rob = Interviewer 
James = Interviewee 
 
Greeting, introductions and permission to tape interview received. 
 
Rob How important do you think the structure of the electricity sector was in your 
company's decision to enter the market for generation? 
 
James Well I can tell you precisely why the company enter the generation market and it was 
down to the structure.  The industry was split and the area boards evolved into the 
RECs, the CEGB was split into its numerous components of generators and 
transmission companies and the obligation to keep the lights on went to the RECs.  
The security standard as it was called was the obligation of the CEGB in the public 
                                                 
1
 The names of the interviewee and company have been changed in order to protect the identity of those 
concerned. 
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sector and this obligation transferred to the RECs.  For that reason we became very 
interested in assuring that there was sufficient capacity in the system but also they 
wanted to ensure there was competitive pressure on the generators because at the time 
when the industry was privatised there were only two sources your could go to for 
your energy, NP and PG and so that structure made it important to the RECs to ensure 
that competitive pressures were brought to bear on them. 
 
Rob Do you think this was the only factor or where there others such as new technologies 
making it easier to enter? Or was that just ‘by-the-by’? 
 
James The new evolving technology of CCGT made it easier for the RECs to enter having 
said that, most of the REC that went into generation entered it in partnership and 
probably at least one member of the partnership consortium would be an experienced 
operator of power plant.  There is no doubt the gas fired plant is a lot simpler and 
made the technological decision a lot easier. 
 
Rob Obviously that is coupled with the long term gas contracts which reduce the risk etc. 
to the individuals? 
 
James Yes the long-term gas contracts were all part and parcel of making the projects 
financiable - that was really driven by financing considerations. 
 
Rob If that was unavailable would you think they would have not gone ahead if they could 
not have been financed on this loan basis? 
 
James If the finance had not been available that would have made it much more difficult 
indeed. 
 
Rob If the structure of the privatisation had been different would that have affected your 
decision; For example say there had been 5 conventional generators (instead of the 2) 
or 20 generators would that have reduced in your view the need to have this 
independent presence because potentially there would have been more competition in 
the generation sector? 
 
James I think that in essence yes.  20 generators would probably be too many - there is just 
not enough plant to go around as it were or enough viable plant with a long-term 
future.  If there had been more generators it may actually have precipitated a much 
more significant change in the structure of the industry. You may have found that 
instead of the RECs being privatised as RECs they may well have been combined with 
the remnants of the CEGB to form power boards. 
 
Rob Like the situation in Scotland with Scottish Power and Hydro Electric, which are more 
vertically integrated? 
 
James Yes that right vertically integrated.  What you may have got in that situation, is from 
day one the structure we now see the industry is now moving towards.  Eastern has 
generation has generation plant and was a REC,  PowerGen has got East Midlands, 
National Power has bought the supply  business of MEB so there is a number  of 
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power boards creating themselves just through the market forces that have evolved 
over time.  So I think your question needs to acknowledge the fact that if it had been 5 
generators that had been created you would probably have caused the industry to be 
structured quite differently and for it to be 5 power boards.  The number 5 is 
interesting because the CEGB had 5 regions. 
 
Rob  I did not know that. 
 
James Yes it did: North East, North West, Midlands, South East and South West. 
 
Rob So how did they operate - were they just centrally controlled? 
 
James There was a central control with a senior man in each region/division and they were 
pretty powerful regions in there own right but of course it was co-ordinated centrally 
by the CEGB.   
 
Rob So it was a means of controlling the system? 
 
James Well the problem with that system is that there were 12 area boards at the time and so 
it would mean splitting the CEGB a single entity into 5 but it already had structure of 
5 which that possibly wasn't going to be a problem.  Area boards would need to be 
condensed down from 12 to 5 and those merged in with the CEGB regions and that 
would have involved a lot of redrawing of maps.  It may have involved some re-
jigging of the generation assets because each of the regions did not have an even mix 
of plant in them, so some regions might have had more nuclear than others some may 
have had more coal and some may have been dominated by oil and so there were asset 
split issues in that as well. And all those complications may have been part of the 
deciding factor that made it privatised the way it was. 
 
Rob What do you think would have happened if they decided to sell it just like the CEGB 
as it was, with no restructuring at all so the RECs would have had to go to the CEGB 
for electricity - would that have encouraged you even more so to enter generation? 
 
James  I think it would have had other consequences first.  I think it would have had 
necessitated the generation side to be price regulated.  Now if that was price regulated 
that would then impact on whether we felt the need to go and invest in generation 
because the pressures are there - you have a regulator saying drive costs out of your 
business - it would probably have been an RPI-X formula. 
 
Rob That would have perhaps have been the same if the national grid had been spun off or 
would you perhaps view that as the national grid is separate therefore we have better 
access to transmit electricity to everywhere and therefore it might be worthwhile us 
entering. 
 
James It would have been the same answer really - if the CEGB had remained intact I think 
you would have found a different regulatory structure with price control on the CEGB. 
Whether we would then have felt the need to enter into generation is debatable even if 
we had access to the national grid or not.  
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Rob How about if the National grid owned all the overhead lines, so the national grid as it 
is now and also the distribution networks that you (i.e. the RECs) own now? 
 
James That is an interesting one that.  I think what that would have probably have done and it 
would have pushed generation and supply much closer from day one. The businesses 
in the electricity industry are essentially supply, distribution, transmission and 
generation.  Transmission is the high voltages, 275 and above, distribution is the local 
networks so imagine its likes motorways right down to the ‘B’ roads, generation is 
obvious and supply is an odd one.  It almost like an admin function - it’s the billing 
and all that stuff that takes a wholesale price and converts it into a retail price for the 
customer.  So in going through the supply side it has a basic electricity costs from 
generation, has the transmission costs added, the distribution costs added to it, IT 
costs, Billing costs and that converts it into a retail price.  Now it’s a very low margin 
business supply but a very high turnover.  Now [company name]’s supply business 
probably turns over in excess of £1.5 billion but profits are measured in a few £10's of 
millions. 
 
Rob So it perhaps would not have been viable to separate distribution and supply then? 
 
James It would have been perceived as a very risky business and so if the wires business had 
been stripped out from the RECs, what remained (i.e. supply) probably could not have 
been floated on its own, so again it would have pushed you towards bringing together 
of generation and supply which is what we are seeing now. 
 
Rob OK - could you not have argued that if you are going to combine supply with gas 
supply etc, just having one entity that does all the billing for the various companies 
would that not have been viable or would that again been too early? 
 
James Again the gas market was not mature at that time - it wasn't open to viable and 
extensive competition at that particular juncture so the infrastructure was not there to 
bring those two things together but you are right and that is why they are coming 
together now. That is why you see the merger of the various companies as they try and 
reduce costs and get critical mass.  Certainly in supply where margins are very low, 
critical mass is important. 
 
Rob What about if all this still remained within the public sector, apart from the RECs 
which were floated off and the CEGB etc. remained within the public sector. Would it 
again be the case that you perceived the electricity to be cheap enough for you coming 
from the public sector so that you would not have had to worry about entering the 
market? 
 
James Well I am not sure where competitive forces would arise from then. 
 
Rob There would be no competitive forces but the view being that the government would 
keep electricity prices lower without the need for regulation by being the government 
and the need to be seen to be popular? 
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James Governments have never really pushed prices down in their nationalised industries and 
that was the driving force for them all being privatised in the first instance and so I am 
not sure that would have actually work. 
 
Rob So are you saying there might have been more entry because you think you could 
generate electricity cheaper so as long as you had access to the grid to transmit this 
electricity to wherever? 
 
James Yes the danger is how you can get your capacity on to the network so you would need 
open access and secondly how is the price of electricity determined in that new 
marketplace. Now the CEGB has sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the nation 
and if someone else built some capacity who is going to close the power station.  If 
you are single power station developers you have only got one plant so who is going 
to close their power station so electricity prices remain viable so unless there is a 
closure programme, building a new power station, so OK it introduces competition 
and price will fall but without closure you are going to drive prices to such a level that 
new entrants are totally not viable.  Now a big government backed entity could sustain 
that because it has got the treasury behind it and so there need to be some 
understanding to remove the slack from the system. 
 
Rob Which would obviously have to be the government. 
 
James They would need to have a undertaking that indeed the slack would come from them. 
 
Rob so in a sense they are privatising new plant, since new plant will be done by the 
independents? 
 
James  Yes but if there was an edict that said the CEGB couldn't build new plant there would 
be a big fight over that because they had the obligation to keep the lights on and now 
if they were no longer allowed to build new capacity they would say you can't leave  
the responsibility with us to keep the lights on  if we are not allowed to build new 
power stations.  So where that responsibility goes would cause a big debate. 
 
Rob What do you think would have happened if they had outlawed direct bulk electricity 
contract with the RECs? (i.e. they have to buy direct from the pool and not 15 year 
agreements with the IPPs) 
 
James I think what you would find is that the IPP build programme either would not have 
happened at all or would have been a lot more sluggish to take-off.  Its all about 
financing - to get the money from the banks they needed to know that the revenue was 
secure and that the costs were secure and they could only do that with a suite of 
contracts surrounding the investment. 
 
Rob So it’s all about getting rid of the risk element? 
 
James Yes that’s right - so as to make it bankable. 
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Rob What about if the RECs themselves were not allowed to hold stakes in those 
companies  -  do you think this would have stopped them happening as well? 
 
James Very much so because the players who would be coming into the market would see a 
generation sector dominated by the CEGB and would have no on going route to 
market for their output and they would not be sure that they could sell to the area 
board and at the price they might receive for it.  As new capacity comes onto the 
system its just going to drive down price and unless they saw some undertaking by the 
CEGB to remove the slack they would see price falling and so their investments would 
become non-viable. 
 
Rob so they need this security of the contracts and ownership to reduce the risk? 
 
James There is now a move towards more merchant plant which don't have this cradle to 
grave contractual structures but they are only occurring almost 10 years after the 
industry was privatised and people are much more comfortable with how it works and 
what is happening and so on and so forth. 
 
Rob Do you think the actual operating of the pool has had any thing to do with the 
independents and the way it which it has been manipulated by the big 2 - do you think 
that is a disincentive for this sort of investment? 
 
James Yes it’s a shame that they are introducing new trading arrangements because the only 
reason the pool has come into disrepute is because there has been far to few generators 
with plant that can set price in the pool.  In my mind the pool is actually a very neat 
system and it would work really quite well if it had an adequate number of generators 
bidding prices into the pool.  It has suffered from having too few and therefore there 
has been market influence has been possible. 
 
Rob Do you not think a system where by each plant would bid in a fee and they would 
receive the fee that they have bid rather than the current system where they bid in MC 
and then receive the highest price? 
 
Brain No because doing it the way it has been done on supposedly MC basis is the economic 
optimum way of doing it as it basically means you cover your fuel costs, you bid that 
price and it is worth you running and the capacity payment, combined with any extra 
you make over and above your fuel price allows you to recover your fixed costs. Now 
that system, as any economist will tell you is the optimum way to run. 
 
Rob Do you not think that although this might be the best system in theory but as you say it 
has been manipulated so much that perhaps it is better to take a step back and take the 
second best option as it might work better? 
 
James It’s a shame - I think its all unfortunate that the timing as just as we are getting further 
plant divestment and getting more generators in the marketplace with plant that can set 
price and therefore could make the pool become effective and operate in the way that 
it should operate - is the very time that we are about to throw it in the ditch. 
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Rob So would you advocate that when it was first created to have split up National Power 
and PowerGen? 
 
James Yes I would have gone for 5 companies as the number you already suggested. 
 
Rob Is this because of the CEGB having 5 regions or do you see 5 as enough? 
 
James I think that 5 is enough to get competitive juices flowing. 
 
Rob but still having the size to get the economies of scale and that sort of thing? 
 
James That’s right. 
 
Rob What do you think would have happened if there had been some government effort to 
limit the size of firms - they said OK each firm can only have a maximum of 
2,000MW of capacity or something - would that have been a really big disincentive to 
get involved knowing that you could not expand if you were successful? 
 
James In actual fact there is such a limit on us. 
 
Rob I don't just mean on the RECs but I mean companies generally.  Is the limit on RECs 
not just a percentage on electricity you sell and so you could get around this by just 
selling more electricity? 
 
James  It’s a percentage of our equity interest in generation, so if we have a 10% equity 
interest in a 1,000MW plant then 100MW counts towards our limit. If we have a 50% 
interest, 100% of that power station contribute towards our limit. 
 
Rob Ah because they are saying you control the company or something? 
 
James Yes that’s right and so after a certain point the whole amount counts towards our limit.  
So basically what you are saying is should the CEGB have been split into virtually 
about 20 companies? 
 
Rob Well I mean not 20 - I just want to know if in an effort to increase competition in the 
pool they had this limit so if they didn't cut PG and NP they would tell them to get rid 
of capacity by the same token I can see if that if they were privatised with 20 these 
firms would start to predate and take over each other and so get big again? 
 
James I think limiting the size to 2,000MW is probably too small but a larger size - I don't 
think there is a need to do that at the moment and it might be something that the 
regulator keeps his eye on and it is something the regulatory authorities do keep there 
eye on through the offices of the OFT and I think the size that attracts their interest is 
25% of the market and then they will say you are of a significant size and you 
potentially have market influencing capabilities - you are getting too big.  So the 
processes are there to limit the size of companies and now indeed the merger that we 
have just gone through with [partner company name] it went right through the OFT to 
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see whether the merger of [company name] with [partner company name] was going 
to have an impact of the competitive position of the market.  
 
Rob Are you going to fully integrate with [partner company name] - I mean with all their 
English generation interests be pooled with your interests or will you still differentiate 
between the two? 
 
James Part of the conditions of the merger is that the regulator wants all generation brought 
under a subsidiary company of [partner company name].  Our generation assets are 
held in a special purpose vehicle which is called [company division name] and that is 
where I am based, and this is going to be taken out of [company name] and put under 
[partner company name]. 
 
Rob Will that not reduce competition where as I would have though it would be the other 
way around and they try and keep them separate and not encourage you to join them 
together. 
 
James No - what they are trying to do is separate generation from distribution and supply and 
so they are lumping the various businesses together. 
 
 
Thanks and explanation of interview programme. 
 
James Its interesting that you have interviews someone from [partner company name] as we 
are now one entity so you might be able to draw something out from that, getting the 
different perspectives. 
 
Goodbyes and further thanks. 
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APPENDIX D 
Plant Margin 
 
The formula used to calculate plant margin is as follows: 
 
PM
ML
MLC
=×
−
100      Equation D1 
 
 
Where 
 
C = Capacity   
ML = Maximum Load   
PM  = Plant Margin 
 
 
. 
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APPENDIX E 
The Counterfactual Model 
 
Table E1 
A Summary of the Key Counterfactual Assumptions Used 
 
General 
 
• CEGB structure as before privatisation with further reductions in entry barriers and use of  
slightly more aggressive financial/performance targets. 
 
 
Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• Capacity of coal and gas the only fuels to be affected by privatisation. 
 
• Less new gas capacity constructed (as entry by IPPs 50% lower) and older coal capacity 
utilised for longer – results in nearly 3.5GW lower gas capacity by 1998. 
 
• Gas capacity utilised less intensively and coal used more intensively than with 
privatisation, resulting in a larger share for coal generated electricity.  
 
• Coal prices assumed to be the same, with small adjustments reflecting the different 
quantities purchased. 
 
• Gas and Oil prices assumed to be the same. 
 
• All generation plant assumed to operate with the same efficiency levels, in terms of the 
quantity of fuel required to generate one unit of electricity. 
 
 
Profits 
 
• Industry profits divided 61.65% to domestic and 38.35% to industrial. This is assumed 
constant over the period of interest for the both the counterfactual and the actual results. 
 
• Profits continue with the financial targets for the return on current cost (CC) assets (CC 
assets are taken to be the same as the ones actually observed).  Industry  target for 
England and Wales of  3% return from 1988/89 to 1992/93 and 3.25% from 1993/94 to 
1997/98. Target for Scotland of 2.7% for 1988/89, 3% from 1989/90 to 1992/93 and 
3.25% from 1993/94 to 1997/98. 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued overleaf 
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Non Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• No  fossil fuel levy in the counterfactual - decommissioning paid out of future income.  
 
• Savings in capital costs from 1993/94 to 1997/98 reflecting the lower amounts of new gas 
capacity.  
 
• Labour costs higher due to slower reductions in the workforce. 
 
• Cost savings from not privatising the industry - savings of £2,000m  taken over the years 
1988/89 to 1990/91. 
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APPENDIX F 
The Breakdown of Profit Between Industrial and Domestic Sales 
 
Table F1 
 The Price of Electricity and the Breakdown of Typical Bills in 1993/94 
 
 Domestic Industrial 
Price of Electricity 1 
(£/kWh) 
0.0750 0.0438 
Percentage breakdown of 
Typical Bills in 1993/94 2 
Generation  
Transmission 
Distribution 
Supply  
Fossil Fuel Levy 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.05 
0.26 
0.07 
0.10 
 
 
0.69 
0.05 
0.15 
0.01 
0.10 
Generation Price 
(£/kWh) 
0.03900 0.03022 
 
1 Energy Prices and Taxes from the OECD, 1999, First Quarter Edition.    
2The UK Electricity Industry: Electricity Services and Costs from the Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, Table 2, 
p.xi. 1994/95 edition. 
 
Using the final price of electricity and the proportion of this accounted for by the generation 
companies, allows the generation price to be calculated.  This is the amount of money that is 
passed to the generators per unit of electricity sold. 
 
(Generation price = Price of electricity x Proportion of the bill that goes to the generators) 
 
Assuming each unit (kWh) costs the same to generate, then the difference between the two 
generation prices will be the additional profits that domestic electricity sales make over industrial 
sales for the generation companies. 
 
Additional profit from domestic sales = domestic generation price – industrial generation price 
     = 0.0390 – 0.03022  
     = 0.00878 (£/kWh) 
 
This means  that 22.51% of the generation price for domestic electricity is additional profits (i.e. 
[0.00878/0.03900] x 100) 
 
Assuming the mark-up is the same for all electricity sectors, not just generation, then additional 
profit on 1 kWh of electricity sold to the domestic sector is given by: 
 
Additional Profit per unit  = Unit Price x Profit Rate 
 
However, the final price quoted above includes the fossil fuel levy, which accounts for 10% of the 
final price (see table); this will not have generated industry profits and so should be excluded from 
the profit calculations at this point.  Therefore 
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Unit Price = Bill price x Proportion accounted for by electricity firms 
  = 0.0750 x 0.9 
  = 0.06136 
 
 
thus  Additional Profit per unit  = 0.06136 x 0.2251 
      = 0.01381 (£/kWh) 
 
Since domestic electricity accounts for approximately 35% of electricity sold, total additional 
profits on domestic electricity sales can be calculated by multiplying the additional profit per kWh 
by the number sold to domestic users, i.e. 
 
Domestic sales  = 0.35 x Total Sales 
   = 0.35 x (3.0878 x 1011) 
   = 1.08073 x 1011 
 
Additional Profits in domestic sector  = Additional Profit per unit x Domestic Sales 
      = 0.01381   x (1.08073 x 1011) 
      = £1,493 million 
 
This therefore leaves profits of £2,148,193,987.73 (see below) unaccounted for by the difference 
between domestic and industrial profit rates.  This must be the profits earned equally on all units 
of electricity sold. i.e. 
 
Base profits = Total profits  - additional profits in the domestic sector 
  = £3,641 million - £1,493 million 
  = £2,148 million 
 
This profit can then be split equally over the total units sold (since the differential between the 
two types of sales has already been accounted for). 
 
Base profits per unit = Base profits  / Units sold 
   = £2,148 million / 3.0878 x 1011 
   = 0.00696 (£/kWh) 
 
Therefore total profits per unit sold in 1993/94 are: 
 
Domestic 
 
= Base Profits + additional domestic profits 
= 0.006957 + 0.01381 
= 0.02077 (£/kWh) 
 
Industrial 
 
= Base Profits 
= 0.006957 (£/kWh) 
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Combining the above information allows the distribution of industry profits: 
 
Table F2 
 1993/94 Electricity Sector Profits, Broken Down by Class of Sale 
 
 Domestic Industrial 
Profit per unit sold (£/kWh) 0.02077 0.006957 
Units sold (kWh) 1.08073 x 10
11 2.00707 x 1011 
Sector Profits (£) 2,244 million 1,396 million 
% of Total Profits 61.65 38.35 
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APPENDIX G 
The Pessimistic Counterfactual 
 
Table G1 
A Summary of the Key Assumptions Used in the ‘Pessimistic’ Counterfactual 
 
As the Preferred Counterfactual as outlined in Appendix E except 
 
Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• From 1990/91, coal prices 5% higher than those assumed under the preferred 
counterfactual (and actually observed). 
 
• From 1990/91, gas prices 10% higher than those assumed under the preferred 
counterfactual (and actually observed). 
 
 
Profits 
 
• Profits continue with the financial targets for the return on current cost (CC) assets (CC 
assets are taken to be the same as the ones actually observed).  Industry  target for 
England and Wales of  3% return from 1988/89 to 1989/90, 3.75% from 1990/91 to 
1991/92, 4.25% from 1992/93 to 1994/95 and  4.75% 1995/96 to  1997/98.  
 
• Target for Scotland of 2.7% for 1988/89, 3% for 1989/90, 3.25% from 1990/91 to 1992/93 
and  3.75% from 1993/94 to 1997/98. 
 
 
Non Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• Savings in capital costs from 1993/94 to 1997/98 reflecting the lower amounts of new gas 
capacity. Assumed to be the same as under the preferred counterfactual. 
 
• Additional £750m charge applied evenly from 1991/92 until 1997/98 for general higher 
costs of operation and other inefficiencies. 
 
• Labour costs higher due to slower reductions in the workforce. By 1997/98 10% higher 
cost increase than that assumed under preferred counterfactual. 
 
• Cost savings from not privatising the industry - savings of £2,150m  taken over the years 
1988/89 to 1990/91. 
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APPENDIX H 
The Optimistic Counterfactual 
 
Table H1 
A Summary of the Key Assumptions Used in the ‘Optimistic’ Counterfactual 
 
As the Preferred Counterfactual as outlined in Appendix E except 
 
Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• From 1990/91, coal prices 5% lower than those assumed under the preferred 
counterfactual (and those actually observed). 
 
• From 1990/91, gas prices 10% lower than those assumed under the preferred 
counterfactual (and those actually observed). 
 
 
Profits 
 
• Profits continue with the financial targets for the return on current cost (CC) assets (CC 
assets are taken to be the same as the ones actually observed).  Industry  target for 
England and Wales of  2.7% return from 1988/89  to 1997/98.  
 
• Target for Scotland of 2.7% from 1988/89 to 1997/98. 
 
 
Non Fossil-Fuel costs 
 
• Savings in capital costs from 1993/94 to 1997/98 reflecting the lower amounts of new gas 
capacity. 11% higher capital saving than assumed under preferred counterfactual. 
 
• Labour costs higher due to slower reductions in the workforce. By 1997/98 10% lower 
cost increase than that assumed under preferred counterfactual. 
 
• Cost savings from not privatising the industry - savings of £1,850m  taken over the years 
1988/89 to 1990/91.  
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